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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
Utah Constitution, Article VIII, section 4 1 
Iv 
STATEMENT SHOWING JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to the 
Utah Constitution, article VIII, section 4, and to Rule 6(c) of the Rules of Lawyer 
Discipline and Disability ("RLDD"), which provides that: 
A former judge who has resumed the status of a lawyer is subject 
to the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court not only for conduct as a 
lawyer but also for misconduct that occurred while the lawyer was a 
judge and would have been grounds for lawyer discipline, provided 
that the misconduct was not the subject of a judicial disciplinary 
proceeding as to which there has been a final determination by the 
Supreme Court. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the Screening Panel err in concluding that the Respondent, Ray 
Harding did not violate Rules 8.4(a) or (d) of the Rules of Professional 
Conduct? The standard of review is a correctness standard. See In re 
Johnson. 2001 UT 110 (Utah 2001); see also In re Rav Harding. Jr.. 
Order of Reference, March 25, 2004. 
2. Did the Screening Panel err in finding no aggravating circumstances, and 
according too much weight to those in mitigation? The standard of review 
is a correctness standard. See In re Johnson. 2001 UT 110 (Utah 2001); 
see also In re Rav Harding. Jr.. Order of Reference, March 25, 2004. 
3. Did the Screening Panel err in recommending that the Respondent, Ray 
Harding, should be sanctioned with a five-year probation? The standard 
of review of sanctions for professional misconduct in attorney discipline 
actions is a correctness standard, and the Utah Supreme Court may make 
an independent judgment regarding the appropriate level of discipline if 
the evidence warrants it. See In re Babilis. 951 P.2d 207 (Utah 1997); see 
also In re Rav Harding. Jr.. Order of Reference, March 25, 2004. 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, 
ORDINANCES, RULES AND REGULATIONS 
Rule 8.4(a), Rules of Professional Conduct: 
It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to: (a) Violate or attempt to 
violate the Rules of Professional Conduct, knowingly assist or induce another to 
do so, or do so through the acts of another. 
Rule 8.4(b), Rules of Professional Conduct: 
It is professional misconduct for a lawyer t o : . . . (b) Commit a criminal act 
that reflects adversely on the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a 
lawyer in other respects. 
Rule 8.4(d), Rules of Professional Conduct: 
It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to : . . . (d) Engage in conduct 
that is prejudicial to the administration of justice. 
Rule 4.2, Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions: 
Disbarment is generally appropriate when a lawyer: 
(a) knowingly engages in professional misconduct as defined in Rule 
8.4(a), (d), (e), or (f) of the Rules of Professional Conduct with the 
intent to benefit the lawyer or another or to deceive the court, and 
causes serious or potentially serious injury to a party, the public, or the 
legal system, or causes serious or potentially serious interference with 
a legal proceeding; or 
(b) engages in serious criminal conduct, a necessary element of which 
includes intentional interference with the administration of justice, false 
swearing, misrepresentation, fraud, extortion, misappropriation, or 
theft; or the sale, distribution, or importation of controlled substances; 
or the intentional killing of another; or an attempt or conspiracy or 
solicitation of another to commit any of these offenses; or 
(c) engages in any other intentional misconduct involving dishonesty, 
fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation that seriously adversely reflects on 
the lawyer's fitness to practice law. 
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Rule 4.3, Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions: 
Suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer: 
(a) knowingly engages in professional misconduct as defined in Rule 
8.4(a), (d), (e), or (f) of the Rules of Professional Conduct and 
causes injury or potential injury to a party, the public, or the legal 
system, or causes interference or potential interference with a legal 
proceeding; or 
(b) engages in criminal conduct that does not contain the elements 
listed in Standard 4.2(b) but nevertheless seriously adversely 
reflects on the lawyer's fitness to practice law. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case: This is an attorney discipline proceeding. 
Course of the Proceedings: In accordance with an Order of Reference 
from the Utah Supreme Court dated March 25, 2003, the Office of Professional 
Conduct ("OPC") was instructed "to proceed with a disciplinary review under its 
ordinary rules, but with its conclusions and recommendations regarding Mr. 
Harding's license to practice law to be submitted directly to this Court for final 
action." Pursuant to this directive, the OPC presented the results of its 
investigation to the Screening Panel on January 22, 2004, along with its 
conclusions and recommendations for a specific sanction with respect to Mr. 
Harding's law license in accordance with the Standards for Imposing Lawyer 
Sanctions ("Standards"). Mr. Harding appeared for the Screening Panel hearing, 
offered his own testimony and that of several witnesses, and made argument 
concerning the sanction to be imposed. 
Disposition By the Screening Panel: The Screening Panel concluded 
that a six-month suspension is the appropriate presumptive sanction, but 
recommended that the suspension be stayed and that Mr. Harding be placed on 
probation for a period of five years, with conditions including random drug testing, 
and continued participation in a rehabilitation program. 
Statement of the Facts Relevant to the Issues Presented for Review: 
On July 13, 2002, after being called to Ray Harding Jr.'s home on a 
domestic disturbance call, law enforcement officers found cocaine, heroin and 
drug paraphernalia. Mr. Harding's person also tested positive for 
benzoylecyonine and opiates in addition to the cocaine. 
Mr. Harding was arrested and charged with two felony criminal counts: 
Count I - Unlawful Possession or Use of a Controlled Substance, a 3rd degree 
felony; Title 58, Chapter 27, section 8(2)(a)(i) and Title 76, Chapter 2, section 
202 of the Utah Code for knowingly and intentionally possessing or using a 
controlled substance to wit: cocaine, a Schedule II Controlled Substance; Count 
II - Unlawful Possession or Use of a Controlled Substance, a 3rd degree felony; 
Title 58, Chapter 37, section 8(2)(a)(i) and Title 76, Chapter 2, section 202 for 
knowingly and intentionally possessing or using a controlled substance, to wit: 
Heroin, a Schedule I Controlled Substance. 
Mr. Harding was a Fourth District Court Judge for the State of Utah at the 
time the criminal charges were brought. Mr. Harding entered a plea of guilty to 
two counts of attempted possession or the use of controlled substances -
opiates in one count, cocaine in another, both of which are class A 
misdemeanors. Mr. Harding was sentenced to 120 days in jail; fined; ordered to 
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perform 500 hours of community service; and placed on probation for 24 months, 
including participation in individual therapy and help from 12-step programs. 
In the OPC's view, Mr. Harding also must have committed the illegal act of 
soliciting the controlled substances that he used, inasmuch as cocaine and 
heroin are controlled substances that can only be obtained illegally. Mr. Harding 
may have solicited these controlled substances from an individual by the name of 
Rick Connelly. 
Mr. Harding conceded that no one could come into possession of illegal 
controlled substances except by some illegal solicitation. He noted, however, that 
he has never been and never will be charged with illegal solicitation, and it is 
unlikely that the facts of this case would have supported such a criminal charge. 
See Response to OPC Screening Panel Memo. 
In addition to the July 13, 2002 incident, Ann Harding, who was Mr. 
Harding's wife, told the police, and testified at the Screening Panel hearing, that 
she had seen Mr. Harding smoking "crack" on a prior occasion, and he told her 
that he had been using "crack" and heroin since October 2001. Mr. Harding also 
told her that he smoked "crack" in the bathroom while he was at work (as a 
judge). Mrs. Harding also told police and testified at the hearing that Mr. Harding 
had been on a drug "binge" for approximately three weeks prior to the July 13, 
2002 incident. This raises the question whether Mr. Harding was under the 
influence of controlled substances while he was on the bench. 
With respect to Mr. Harding's use of controlled substances and the effect 
of these controlled substances on his judicial responsibilities, the Screening 
Panel explored allegations that Mr. Harding at times used illegal drugs while he 
was at work. Specifically, Mr. Harding allegedly was unable to attend a hearing 
the Thursday before the July 13, 2002 incident as a result of his illegal controlled 
substance use (even though the lawyers in the case settled the case so his 
attendance was not necessary). Also, Mr. Harding may have been under the 
influence of an illegal controlled substance at a hearing he presided over on 
Friday July 12, 2002. The lawyers at the hearing noticed that Mr. Harding 
appeared drawn and ill. Moreover, Mr. Harding may have been under the 
influence of illegal controlled substances at other times while on the bench and 
specifically during the six-month period prior to the July 13, 2002 incident. Court 
staff reported to the police that during this six-month period, Mr. Harding had 
"mood" changes and often appeared bored and disinterested before brief 
recesses, after which he returned refreshed. 
Mr. Harding denied that he used illegal drugs while performing his duties 
as a judge. His in-court clerk, Shauna Young Woodward, testified that she was 
in daily close proximity to Mr. Harding, with an opportunity to observe his actions 
and behavior, and never saw any evidence that he used illegal drugs at the 
courthouse. Likewise, Judge Claudia Laycock and Judge Fred Howard, both of 
whom had regular contact with Mr. Harding, testified that they never saw any 
evidence of Mr. Harding using illegal drugs in the courthouse. Other attorneys -
Mike Petro (by proffer), Dave Sturgill, and John Allen - also testified that when 
they appeared in front of Mr. Harding they never observed any behavior that 
would lead them to conclude that Mr. Harding was under the influence of drugs, 
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and they appeared in front of Mr. Harding on a fairly regular basis. The 
Screening Panel found that there was no proof that Mr. Harding used drugs in 
chambers and that "The clear and convincing evidence is that Ray Harding did 
not use drugs in the courthouse while acting as a judge." (Recommendation at 
3.) 
The Screening Panel also found that Mr. Harding's "decision to violate the 
law and use illegal drugs was an intentional act," and that it violated Rule 8.4(b). 
(Recommendation at 2.) It further found that "there was no violation of Rule 
8.4(a), (c), or (d)." (Recommendation at 6.) 
The Screening Panel also considered charges that Mr. Harding killed a 
trophy moose and two cow elk on or about October 6, 2001 for which he could be 
charged with several third-degree felony counts of wanton destruction of 
protected wildlife. Mrs. Harding testified that Mr. Harding did not have the proper 
licenses, and that she witnessed him killing the moose and elk outside of any 
licensing limits. 
Harding denied that he illegally killed any game animals. The Screening 
Panel found that 'there is no evidence to support even a finding of probable 
cause that Ray Harding committed the crime of poaching. The only statement to 
that effect came from his ex-wife whom the Panel did not find credible." 
(Recommendation at 6.) 
Aggravating Circumstances 
The Screening Panel found no aggravating circumstances. 
Mitigating Circumstances 
The Screening Panel found the following mitigating circumstances: 
Ray Harding sat as a District Court Judge when he engaged in the 
misconduct of possessing and using illegal drugs. The evidence 
before the Panel shows that he has paid a significant price for that 
illegal conduct. He has been removed from his judgeship. He has 
plead [sic] guilty to and been convicted of two misdemeanors. He 
has spent 90 days in jail in circumstances which amounted to 
solitary confinement. His confinement was in 'protective custody' 
because the inmate population included those who had been sent 
to the prison by his order as a judge, and protective custody was 
necessary to provide safety to him during confinement. However, 
that custody amounted to solitary confinement. He has also been 
barred from holding any further judicial office in the State of Utah, 
paid the maximum monetary fine imposed by the statute, 
undergone treatment for drug dependency at the Betty Ford Clinic, 
and become involved in 12-step programs on an on-going active 
basis. 
(Recommendation at 1.) 
The Panel also found by clear and convincing evidence that Mr. Harding 
"has been completely drug free for a period lasting 18 months," and "is now over 
95% likely to remain drug free." It further found that Mr. Harding's voluntary 
withdrawal from practice, coupled with the testimony concerning his treatment 
and recovery, "is reason to believe that he has sincerely and seriously pursued 
the processes of rehabilitation, and that he has succeeded in putting his drug use 
behind him for that time period." (Recommendation at 5.) It concluded that Mr. 
Harding "has accomplished a 'meaningful and sustained period of successful 
rehabilitation' and that he has otherwise qualified under Rule 6.3(i) for mitigation 
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of his punishment under the Rules of Professional Discipline."1 
(Recommendation at 5.) 
A number of witnesses testified on Mr. Harding's behalf with respect to his 
substance abuse and to his claim of a meaningful and sustained period of 
successful rehabilitation. The witnesses were as follows: Dr. Lynn Johnson, a 
psychologist involved with Mr. Harding's aftercare through the Betty Ford Clinic; 
Dr. Glen R. Hanson, Director of Utah Addiction Center; Francis Mackenzie, a 
drug rehabilitation peer; Richard Uday, Director of Utah Lawyers Helping 
Lawyers Program; Ed Brass, Mr. Harding's criminal defense attorney; Sheleigh 
A. Chalkey-Harding (by proffer), an attorney and friend of Mr. Harding; Michelle 
Monson (by proffer), Mr. Harding's daughter; James Heiting, an attorney and Mr. 
Harding's current mentor and sponsor; and Nicole Farnsworth, Mr. Harding's 
daughter. (Respondent's Screening Panel Witness List.) 
A number of witnesses testified on Mr. Harding's behalf with respect to his 
good character and/or reputation. These witnesses were Dr. Johnson; Mr. 
Mackenzie; Mr. Uday; Thomas W. Seiler (by proffer), an attorney; Rick 
Sutherland (by proffer), an attorney; Ms. Chalkey-Harding (by proffer); Paul 
Belnap (by proffer), an attorney; John Allen, an attorney; Mike Petro (by proffer), 
an attorney; Shauna Young Woodward, Mr. Harding's in-court clerk; Dave 
Sturgill, an attorney; Ms. Monson (by proffer); Ms. Farnsworth; and Mr. Heiting. 
(Respondent's Screening Panel Witness List.) 
1
 The OPC believes that this is an erroneous reference to the Rules of Lawyer 
Discipline and Disability, and that the reference intended is to the Standards for 
Imposing Lawyer Sanctions. 
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Mr. Harding had the following witnesses testify on his behalf as to his 
personal and emotional problems: Dr. Johnson; Ms. Monson (proffer); and Ms. 
Farnsworth. (Respondent's Screening Panel Witness List.) 
Witnesses who testified to Mr. Harding's remorse were Mr. Mackenzie; Mr. 
Uday; Ms. Chalkey-Harding; Ms. Monson (by proffer); and Ms. Farnsworth. 
(Respondent's Screening Panel Witness List.) 
The Screening Panel's Conclusions 
The Screening Panel concluded that "Ray Harding violated Rule 8.4(b) in 
that he committed the crime of possession of illegal drugs while an active judge 
in the Fourth District Court." (Recommendation at 1.) 
The Screening Panel's Recommendation of Sanctions 
The Screening Panel recommended that Mr. Harding be suspended for 
his violation of Rule 8.4(b), but that the suspension be stayed in favor of 
probation in light of the mitigation. (Recommendation at 1.) Elsewhere, it stated, 
in the totality of the circumstances, the Panel recommends that Ray 
Harding be placed on Probation, and allowed to continue his 
practice of law. The conditions for that probation should include 
random drug testing, the costs of which should be borne by Ray 
Harding, to be coordinated through the Office of Professional 
Conduct. Further, Ray Harding should be required to participate in 
a 12-step program on an on-going basis, at least monthly, for the 
entire time of probation. That Panel recommends that the period of 
probation last not less than five years. 
(Recommendation at 5-6.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The Screening Panel erred in concluding that Mr. Harding did not violate 
Rule 8.4(a) and 8.4(d) of the Rules of Professional Conduct. His violation of Rule 
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8.4(b) is necessarily a violation of Rule 8.4(a). Likewise, a conviction of serious 
crimes committed by a sitting judge in and of itself constitutes conduct prejudicial 
to the administration of justice in violation of Rule 8.4(d). 
The Screening Panel also erred in its assessment of the aggravating 
factors and in weighing these against the mitigating factors. The Panel identified 
no aggravating factors, although the evidence supports the conclusion that a host 
of these are present. By the same token, the Panel gave too much weight to the 
factors it found in mitigation. 
Finally, the Screening Panel erred in concluding that the appropriate 
sanction would be a five-year probation with conditions to be monitored by the 
OPC. Instead, a correct application of the Standards leads to disbarment as the 
appropriate presumptive sanction for Mr. Harding's misconduct. Although the 
mitigation may be sufficient to warrant a downward departure from this 
presumption, and a period of probation following a long-term suspension might 
be appropriate as the ultimate sanction, a long-term probation by itself is 
insufficient to protect the integrity of the profession. 
ARGUMENT 
I. Mr. Harding's Violation of Rule 8.4(b) (Misconduct) Necessarily 
Constitutes the Violation of Rule 8.4(a) of the Rules of Professional 
Conduct 
Rule 8.4(b) (Misconduct) provides that M[i]t is professional misconduct for a 
lawyer to: . . . Commit a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer's 
honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects." The Panel 
correctly concluded that Mr. Harding violated this rule through unlawful 
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possession and use of cocaine, heroin, and drug paraphernalia—crimes for 
which he was charged and convicted. 
Although the Panel did not address this, Mr. Harding also violated Rule 
8.4(b) by soliciting the controlled substances he used: cocaine and heroin are 
controlled substances that can only be obtained illegally and Mr. Harding 
solicited them from another person. Violations of Rule 8.4(b) are not predicated 
upon an attorney's conviction of a crime; the rule merely requires that the 
attorney commit an act that constitutes a crime. See e.g. People v. Odom. 941 
P.2d 919, 920-921 (Colo. 1997) (lawyer disciplined for crime of concealing 
property to avoid seizure, for which he was never charged); In re Hassenstab. 
934 P.2d 1110 (Or. 1997) (rule does not require criminal conviction). Moreover, 
the criminal conduct for which a lawyer is subject to professional discipline need 
not have been committed while the lawyer was acting in a professional capacity. 
See In re Mullen 659 N.Y.S.2d 255 (App. Div. 1997) (lawyer made harassing 
phone calls and posed as clerk to federal court judge to harass former girlfriend 
at her law school); In re Capone. 689 A.2d 128 (N.J. 1997) (lawyer made false 
statement on loan application); In re Peters. 428 N.W.2d 375, 380 (Minn. 1988) 
(formal adjudication that conduct is illegal is not necessary, nor are lawyer's 
ethics obligations confined to conduct arising out of attorney-client relationship). 
Rule 8.4(a) (Misconduct) provides that it is professional misconduct for an 
attorney to violate or attempt to violate the Rules of Professional Conduct. A 
lawyer's first professional obligation is to obey the rules of professional ethics in 
the jurisdiction in which he is licensed to practice. Thus, any violation of the 
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Rules of Professional Conduct also constitutes a violation of Rule 8.4(a). See 
e.g. Terrell v. Mississippi Bar, 662 So.2d 586, 591 (Miss. 1995) ("Rule 8.4 is the 
'bread and butter* charge in attorney discipline cases; it accompanies almost any 
other charge in a bar complaint"). Hence, Mr. Harding's violation of Rule 8.4(b) 
is also necessarily a violation of Rule 8.4(a), and the Panel erred in concluding 
that "there was no violation of Rule 8.4(a)...." (Recommendation at 6.) 
II. Mr. Harding's Possession and Use of Controlled Substances During 
a Time When He Served as a District Court Judge Constitutes the 
Violation of Rule 8.4(d) (Misconduct) 
Rule 8.4(d) (Misconduct) states that "[i]t is professional misconduct for a 
lawyer to: . . . Engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of 
justice/' The Comment following the rule explains that "Lawyers holding public 
office assume legal responsibilities going beyond those of other citizens. A 
lawyer's abuse of public office can suggest an inability to fulfill the professional 
role of attorney." 
Even if there is no evidence that Mr. Harding's use of controlled 
substances influenced the cases over which he presided, his position as a 
District Court Judge, and particularly his responsibilities for the administration of 
justice, subject him to the highest standard of conduct. A judge is required to 
show respect for and obey the law as an example to others. In the OPC's view, 
Mr. Harding's illegal drug use while serving as a judge is sufficient to establish a 
violation of 8.4(d), and the Screening Panel erred in concluding otherwise. Cf jn 
re Inquiry Concerning a Judge. 403 S.E.2d 255, 257 (N.C. 1991) (during time 
when respondent was judge, he possessed marijuana, cocaine, and 
paraphernalia, and this constituted "willful misconduct in office and conduct 
prejudicial to the administration of justice that brings the judicial office into 
disrepute"); see also Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Hambv. 589 A.2d 53 (Md. 
1991) (court adopted trial court's finding that attorney violated Rules 8.4(b) and 
8.4(d) by among other things possessing cocaine and resisting arrest); In re 
Gooding, 917 P.2d 414 (1999 Kan.) (court found attorney violated Rule 8.4(d) by 
violating criminal statutes which as a lawyer he had sworn to uphold.) 
III. The Screening Panel Incorrectly Applied the Standards for Imposing 
Lawyer Sanctions, Thereby Reaching an Erroneous Result 
Mr. Harding's solicitation, use, possession and conviction of attempted 
possession of illegal controlled substances establishes that, at minimum, Mr. 
Harding violated Rule 8.4(b) of the Rules of Professional Conduct, by committing 
a criminal act that reflects on the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a 
lawyer in other respects; Rule 8.4(d), by engaging in conduct prejudicial to the 
administration of justice; and Rule 8.4(a), based on violations of these other 
Rules of Professional Conduct. 
The Standards are used in determining the appropriate sanction or 
sanctions following a determination that a member of the legal profession has 
violated a provision of the Rules of Professional Conduct. See Rule 1.3, 
Standards. The Standards ensure and maintain the high standard of professional 
conduct required of those who undertake the discharge of professional 
responsibilities as lawyers, and to protect the public and the administration of 
justice from lawyers who have demonstrated by their conduct that they are 
unable or likely to be unable to discharge properly their professional 
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responsibilities. See Rule 1.1, Standards. The Standards are a system for 
determining sanctions, and permit flexibility and creativity in assigning sanctions 
in a particular case of lawyer misconduct. They are designed to promote: "(a) 
consideration of all factors relevant to imposing the appropriate level of sanction 
in an individual case; (b) consideration of the appropriate weight of such factors 
in light of the stated goals of lawyer discipline; and (c) consistency in the 
imposition of disciplinary sanctions for the same or similar offenses within and 
among jurisdictions." Rule 1.3, Standards. 
The following factors are to be considered in imposing sanctions: "(a) the 
duty violated; (b) the lawyer's mental state; (c) the potential or actual injury 
caused by the lawyer's misconduct; and (d) the existence of aggravating or 
mitigating factors." Rule 3.1, Standards. 
A. The Duty Violated 
An attorney's license to practice is granted on the implied understanding 
that the person receiving it will conduct himself in a manner that is proper, and 
will abstain from conduct that brings discredit to himself, the profession, and the 
courts. Mr. Harding violated this duty by engaging in criminal activity. 
Additionally, Mr. Harding had a higher duty because he was a judge, which he 
breached by adjudicating cases involving drug offenders while he himself was a 
drug offender, and presiding over criminal cases while committing criminal acts. 
Harding violated this higher duty regardless of whether his drug use influenced 
his decisions as a judge. 
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B. Mr. Harding's Mental State 
There is a dearth of case law explicitly interpreting the lawyer's mental 
state as a factor for the Court's consideration. It appears linked to motive, or 
personal or emotional problems or mental disability, but each of these is 
independently covered in the aggravating and mitigating factors listed elsewhere 
in the Standards. See Rule 6, Standards. The OPC contends that this factor is 
inextricably linked with these other factors, but concedes that the rule itself is 
ambiguous as to its precise application. 
As the Panel concluded, Mr. Harding intentionally committed the criminal 
acts that led to his conviction plea. Ancillary to this, his conduct was also 
knowing. An addiction is not something that comes about by accident; the 
person taking illegal drugs knows that they are illegal and still elects to 
participate. In a concurring opinion from the Supreme Court of Ohio, one justice 
discussed the situation of a judge with a substance abuse problem: 
If the respondent was addicted to cocaine before he assumed the 
bench, then he took office knowing he would adjudicate drug-
related cases and sentence drug-related felons while he too was 
violating the law. If he began his cocaine use after he assumed the 
bench, then he deliberately and voluntarily began using the drug 
knowing it was illegal while, at the same time, he was sentencing 
other drug abusers for the same behavior. This is hypocrisy. 
Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Gallagher. 693 N.E.2d 1078, 1080 (Stratton, J. 
concurring). 
C. The Injury Caused by Mr. Harding's Misconduct 
Criminal misconduct causes havoc to the public, the legal system, and the 
profession. Mr. Harding "injured" each of these groups by his criminal conduct. 
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Furthermore, as a lawyer and judge, Mr. Harding placed at risk the very fiber of 
judicial administration by presiding over cases while he himself was committing 
crimes. This created a level of potential harm due to the possible necessity of re-
evaluating some of those cases and specifically any case where Mr. Harding 
may have presided while under the influence of illegal drugs. Moreover, Mr. 
Harding's misconduct had a devastating impact upon public respect for and 
confidence in the judiciary. 
D. Aggravating and Mitigating Factors 
Aggravating factors are "any considerations or factors that may justify an 
increase in the degree of discipline to be imposed." Rule 6.2, Standards. 
Conversely, mitigating factors are "any considerations or factors that may justify 
a reduction in the degree of discipline to be imposed." Rule 6.3, Standards. 
Possible mitigating and aggravating factors are identified in the Standards, 
although, as this Court has noted, the lists are non-exclusive. See In re Tanner, 
960 P.2d 399, 402 (Utah 1998). 
This Court discussed the balancing process in which a court must 
engage when it considers mitigation and aggravation: 
Once a trial court determines the presumptive level of discipline, 
it may apply rule 6 and consider the aggravating and mitigating 
circumstances in deciding what sanction should ultimately be 
imposed. Because rule 6 does not provide any guidance as to how 
these circumstances are to be weighed, the process of applying 
them is necessarily somewhat subjective 
To justify a departure from the presumptive level of discipline 
set forth in the Standards, the aggravating and mitigating factors 
must be significant. 
In re Ince. 957 P.2d 1233,1238 (Utah 1998). 
17 
In two attorney discipline decisions reviewed by this Court, the trial court 
accorded too much weight to mitigating factors that were not compelling. See 
Ince. 957 P.2d at 1238. Indeed, in light of the number of aggravating factors, 
which "at least" balanced the "not particularly compelling" mitigating factors, "no 
adjustment to the presumptively appropriate level of discipline is warranted." ]d. 
Similarly, in In re Tanner, this Court found that the multiple aggravating factors 
"would in fact justify an increase in the degree of discipline imposed." In re 
Tanner. 960 P.2d 399, 402 (Utah 1998). 
1. The Aggravating Factors 
The following are the appropriate aggravating circumstances for 
consideration in this case: 
(1) A pattern of misconduct. Rule 6.2(c), Standards. By Mr. Harding's 
own admission, he engaged in criminal conduct involving illegal drugs as early as 
October 2001. This would necessarily entail a pattern of illegal activity of 
obtaining and using illegal drugs for almost a year (at the least, until the July 
2002 incident). This circumstance should be given significant weight. 
(2) Multiple offenses. Rule 6.2(d), Standards. Mr. Harding was 
convicted by his plea of two criminal offenses of possession; moreover, he 
necessarily engaged in multiple instances of solicitation. This circumstance 
should be given significant weight. 
(3) Substantial experience in the practice of law. Rule 6.2(i), 
Standards. Mr. Harding has been a member of the Utah State Bar since 
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September of 1978. Furthermore, he had been a member of the bench since 
September of 1995. This circumstance should be given significant weight. 
(4) Illegal conduct, including the use of controlled substances. Rule 
6.2(k), Standards. Obviously, this circumstance applies in Mr. Harding's case. 
2. The Mitigating Factors 
Mr. Harding asserted the following as mitigating circumstances: 
(1) Absence of a prior record of discipline. Rule 6.3(a), Standards. 
Although Mr. Harding did not assert the absence of a prior record of discipline at 
the Screening Panel, the OPC acknowledges that Mr. Harding does not have a 
prior record of discipline. The question is how much weight to give this factor. In 
the OPC's view, little if any weight is appropriate, given the seriousness of Mr. 
Harding's misconduct. See e.g. Borre v. State Bar of California, 804 P.2d 50, 53 
(Cal. 1991) ("Lack of a prior disciplinary record over many years of practice may 
be considered in mitigation when coupled with present misconduct which is not 
deemed serious. It does not, however, preclude substantial discipline for serious 
misconduct."); see also Basbanes' Case, 676 A.2d 93, 97 (N.H. 1996) 
(respondent urged lack of disciplinary record as mitigation; the court stated, "We 
believe that the respondent's twenty-eight years of experience as a litigator could 
just as easily Justify an increase in the degree of discipline to be imposed."') 
(citation omitted). Notably, the Panel does not appear to have considered this 
as a mitigating factor. 
(2) Absence of a dishonest or selfish motive. Rule 6.3(b), Standards. 
Mr. Harding claimed that his misconduct does not reflect a dishonest or selfish 
motive. This is entitled to little or no weight in light of Mr. Harding's obvious 
conflict of interest with the interests of the people who appeared before him while 
he was on the bench. 
(3) Personal or emotional problems. Rule 6.3(c), Standards. Mr. 
Harding claims that his emotional decline began with the death of his first wife in 
October 1991, then was exacerbated by a motorcycle accident in 1997 and a 
subsequent divorce. Presumably, all of this led to his drug use beginning, by his 
own admission, in October 2001. Although the OPC is sensitive to the effect that 
these types of personal problems may have on a person, it questions whether 
there is a causal connection between personal problems that began in 1991 and 
the type of drug use Mr. Harding began in October 2001—a decade later. 
Furthermore and also importantly, personal problems should not be compelling 
mitigation for criminal possession of illegal drugs by a sitting judge. 
(4) Timely good faith effort to make restitution or to rectify the 
consequences of the misconduct involved. Rule 6.3(d), Standards. This Court 
has addressed the issue of restitution. See In re Ince, 957 P.2d 1233, 1238. 
Restitution is not an issue in this case, however, there is an issue of rectifying the 
consequences of Mr. Harding's illegal drug use. In Ince. this Court stated that 
restitution should not be given much weight after an attorney's misconduct was 
discovered because restitution at that time can be characterized simply as the 
"honesty of compulsion." id. at 1238. Analogous to restitution, any showing of 
attempts at rectifying or rehabilitation of his criminal conduct, although welcome, 
should only be given weight in mitigation if it is shown to have happened before 
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discovery of the problem. That is not the case here. The evidence indicates that 
any attempts by Mr. Harding at rectifying the consequences of his misconduct 
were not timely because they happened after his arrest in July of 2002. 
(5) Full and free disclosure to the client or the discipline authority prior 
to the discovery of any misconduct or cooperative attitude toward proceedings. 
Rule 6.3(e), Standards. As previously indicated, there is no evidence in the 
record that Mr. Harding made any disclosures prior to discovery of his 
misconduct in July 2002. With respect to a cooperative attitude toward the 
proceedings, the OPC concedes that Mr. Harding, through his counsel, has been 
cooperative. Although this is entitled to some weight, it should not be compelling 
mitigation as measured against Mr. Harding's serious misconduct. 
(6) Good character or reputation. Rule 6.3(g), Standards. In his Pre-
Sentencing Report and in his response to the OPC's Notice of Informal 
Complaint, Mr. Harding offered letters attesting to his good character and 
reputation. Mr. Harding also provided testimonial evidence of this at the 
Screening Panel hearing. Although the testimony of the witnesses supported Mr. 
Harding's claim that he has good character or reputation, this mitigation is 
entitled to little weight unless the witnesses are shown to have been aware of the 
full extent of Mr. Harding's misconduct. See Jjnce, 957 P.2d at 1238-39; In re 
Ford, 749 P.2d 1331,1335 (Cal. 1988) (letters of support that did not reflect their 
authors' knowledge of the full extent of attorney's misconduct did not constitute 
mitigation, and in any case, although attorney "may continue to enjoy the respect 
and confidence of a number of his peers; it is our responsibility to determine if he 
is fit to remain a member of the bar."); Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Gary. 452 
A.2d 1221, 1222-223 (Md. 1982) (attorney convicted of tax evasion disbarred, 
notwithstanding excellent reputation); see also In re Petty. 627 P.2d 191, 194 
(Cal. 1981) (character testimony, no matter how laudatory, does not establish 
rehabilitation). 
None of the character witnesses who testified on Mr. Harding's behalf 
testified that they knew the full extent of his drug use. The Panel mentioned 
character evidence in conjunction only with its conclusion that Mr. Harding's 
rehabilitation is sincere and its conclusion that Mr. Harding's ability to practice 
law is unimpaired by the violations he committed. The OPC acknowledges that 
the character evidence was laudatory with respect to Mr. Harding's legal abilities. 
This is not necessarily entitled to much weight, however, particularly since this is 
only an asset if he remains drug free—a point that the Screening Panel 
recognized. 
(7) Mental disability or impairment including substance abuse when: 
(1) The respondent is affected by a substance abuse or mental 
disability; and 
(2) The substance abuse or mental disability causally contributed to 
the misconduct: and 
(3) The respondent's recovery from the substance abuse or mental 
disability is demonstrated bv a meaningful and sustained period of 
successful rehabilitation; and 
(4) The recovery arrested the misconduct and the recurrence of that 
misconduct is unlikely. 
Rule 6.3 (i), Standards. 
22 
If the evidence presented before and found by the Screening Panel 
supports each and every element of Rule 6.3(i), this would constitute a significant 
mitigating circumstance and, depending on the weight given to all the other 
mitigating and aggravating circumstances, could justify a decrease in the degree 
of discipline imposed. 
The OPC concedes that the evidence supports the conclusion that Mr. 
Harding was affected by substance abuse within the meaning of subsection (1), 
and that it causally contributed to his misconduct consistent with the meaning of 
subsection (2). It also concedes that Mr. Harding's recovery is demonstrated by 
meaningful rehabilitation; what it questions is whether eighteen months of 
rehabilitation constitutes a "sustained period of successful rehabilitation" within 
the meaning of subsection (3). Case law from other jurisdictions differs widely in 
what constitutes "meaningful and sustained successful rehabilitation." The OPC 
offers the following examples: 
• Tenner v. State Bar of California. 617 P.2d 486 (1980 Cal.) (where 
substantial period of time for rehabilitative efforts including 
substance abuse was assessed over an approximate four-year 
period). 
• Twohv v. State Bar. 769 P.2d 976 (1989 Cal.) (where court held 
eighteen months of sobriety was insufficient to demonstrate control 
of addiction and thus short-term effort at rehabilitation is not 
sufficiently compelling to warrant reducing the severity of 
disciplinary sanctions). 
• In re Steiner, 817 A.2d 793 (2003 Del.) (where the court could not 
conclude that four months in recovery from longstanding addiction 
established "a meaningful and sustained period of successful 
rehabilitation."). 
Finally, although the evidence favors the conclusion that Mr. Harding's 
recovery has arrested his misconduct, and the forecast for its recurrence is 
optimistic, all of the testimony included the caveat that Mr. Harding would not 
have a recurrence provided that he refrains from using illegal substances. In the 
OPC's view, this is a circular conclusion, and perhaps not entitled to significant 
weight. 
(8) Imposition of other penalties or sanctions. Rule 6.3(1), Standards. 
Mr. Harding offered evidence that other penalties or sanctions have been 
imposed upon him in the form of the criminal penalties and the loss of his 
judgeship. Again, this is entitled to little weight, inasmuch as the sanctions 
imposed upon Mr. Harding in the criminal matter and the loss of his judgeship did 
not encompass the totality of Mr. Harding's professional misconduct. The 
Screening Panel recognized that these were simply the consequences in other 
arenas of Mr. Harding's criminal acts. See People v. Marmon, 903 P.2d 651 
(Colo. 1995) (county judge charged with forgery was disbarred even though he 
had to resign his judge position and was subject to criminal charges; determining 
the appropriate level of attorney discipline is not retaliation but for the protection 
of the public). 
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(9) Remorse. Rule 6.3(m), Standards. Mr. Harding offered evidence 
that he is remorseful. The OPC does not doubt the genuineness of Mr. Harding's 
present state of remorse. However, based on the evidence that the OPC has 
reviewed, Mr. Harding's expressions of remorse were made only after he had 
been caught and confronted in July of 2002. With all due respect, this suggests 
that Mr. Harding's remorse is not for his misconduct, but for his apprehension, 
and as such, is entitled to little weight. See e.g. I nee, 957 P.2d at 1238; Tanner, 
960 P.2d at 403 ("Naturally anyone going through a trial for [Tanner's] 
wrongdoing would feel remorse after getting caught. Instead, the remorse 
question closely relates to the acknowledgement of wrongful conduct: did Tanner 
feel remorse about his behavior before getting caught, and was he motivated by 
remorse in making amends?"). 
Moreover, the OPC is constrained to observe that Mr. Harding continued 
on the State payroll after he was criminally charged. The concurring opinion in 
the Gallagher case addressed a similar situation: 
[Although the law did not require the respondent to resign from 
office upon his arrest, and he retained a presumption of innocence, 
respondent knew he was using illegal substances. He had a moral 
obligation to resign from his position. Yet he continued to draw his 
judicial salary, funded by taxpayer monies, from August 3, 1995 
until March 4, 1996. This created an appearance of impropriety 
and seriously damaged the public image of the judiciary. 
Respondent's actions certainly speak to his failure to accept 
responsibility for his conduct and to his lack of character. 
Gallagher. 693 N.E.2d at 1080. 
E. Disbarment Is the Appropriate Presumptive Sanction For Mr. 
Harding's Misconduct 
Rule 4.2 of the Standards provides that disbarment, absent aggravating 
and mitigating circumstances, is the appropriate presumptive sanction when a 
lawyer: 
(a) knowingly engages in professional misconduct as defined in 
Rule 8.4(a), (d), (e), or (f) of the Rules of Professional Conduct with 
the intent to benefit the lawyer or another or to deceive the court, 
and causes serious or potentially serious injury to a party, the 
public, or the legal system, or causes serious or potentially serious 
interference with a legal proceeding; or 
(b) engages in serious criminal conduct, a necessary element of 
which includes intentional interference with the administration of 
justice, false swearing, misrepresentation, fraud, extortion, 
misappropriation, or theft; or the sale, distribution, or importation of 
controlled substances; or the intentional killing of another; or an 
attempt or conspiracy or solicitation of another to commit any of 
these offenses; or 
(c) engages in any other intentional misconduct involving 
dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation that seriously 
adversely reflects on the lawyer's fitness to practice law. 
Although Mr. Harding's misconduct falls within the first two of these 
categories, the fact that it falls into one of them is sufficient to establish 
disbarment as the appropriate presumptive discipline. See In re Babilis. 951 
P.2d 207, 215 (a finding under any of the three subparagraphs of Rule 4.2 is 
sufficient to establish disbarment as presumptive sanction); In re Jamis M. 
Johnson. 2001 UT 110, H 13; In re Pendleton. 11 P.3d 284 (Utah 2000) where an 
attorney was disbarred for possession, use, and distribution of 
methamphetamines. Moreover, as this Court has explained, "Once an attorney's 
conduct has been found to fall within Rule 4.2 of the Standards for Imposing 
Lawyer Sanctions, the presumptive sanction is disbarment. There is no 
additional burden to show aggravating circumstances; the absence of 
aggravating factors is not a mitigating factor." Johnson. 2001 UT 110, n.3. 
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Even if disbarment were not the appropriate presumptive sanction for Mr. 
Harding's misconduct, suspension would be, and the significant circumstances of 
aggravation would raise the level of sanction to disbarment. The Standards 
provide: 
Suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer: 
(a) knowingly engages in professional misconduct as defined in 
Rule 8.4(a), (d), (e), or (f) of the Rules of Professional Conduct 
and causes injury or potential injury to a party, the public, or 
the legal system, or causes interference or potential 
interference with a legal proceeding; or 
(b) engages in criminal conduct that does not contain the elements 
listed in Standard 4.2(b) but nevertheless seriously adversely 
reflects on the lawyer's fitness to practice law. 
Rule 4.3, Standards. This Court has explained that "the difference between the 
sanctions of disbarment and suspension under paragraphs (a) of rules 4.2 and 
4.3 lies in the attorney's motive and in the relative severity of the conduct." 
Babjlis, 951 P.2d at 216; see also jd. at 215 (presumptive discipline may be 
increased from suspension to disbarment where there are "overwhelming 
aggravating factors"); see also Ennenqa. 2001 UT 111, n.6 (significant 
aggravating factors combined with lack of significant mitigating circumstances 
provide additional reason to disbar attorney). 
Thus, the appropriate level of discipline depends upon the existence and 
relative weight given the mitigating and aggravating circumstances. In this 
analysis, Mr. Harding's status as a judge figures significantly. Again, the 
Supreme Court of Ohio's analysis is useful. Although it usually "tempered] our 
decision where substance abuse is involved and the respondent has 
demonstrated a commitment to sobriety," it would not do so in this case, noting 
that "[[Judges are subject to the highest standard of ethical conduct" Office of 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Gallagher, 693 N.E.2d 1078, 1079 (Ohio 1998). The 
court concluded that "When a judge's felonious conduct brings disrespect to the 
judicial system, the institution is irreparably harmed." Id. Accordingly, despite 
evidence of rehabilitation, "Mitigating factors relevant to this individual attorney 
pale when he is viewed in his institutional role as a judge. We, therefore, find 
that respondent deserves the full measure of our disciplinary authority." id. The 
court permanently disbarred the former judge. 
If the Court is inclined to accord significant weight to Mr. Harding's 
rehabilitation, the OPC urges it to consider reducing the presumptive sanction of 
disbarment to a three-year suspension. Alternatively, if the Court concludes that 
a presumptive sanction of suspension is warranted and that the mitigation is 
sufficiently compelling to outweigh the aggravating circumstances, the OPC 
urges the Court to reduce a three-year suspension to nothing less than a two-
year suspension. Imposing anything less suggests that a judge's use of illegal 
drugs does not seriously offend the legal community, and it minimizes the effect 
Mr. Harding's behavior has had upon public confidence. 
The OPC's recommendation is supported to some extent by case law from 
other states. For example, long-term suspensions have been imposed for 
criminal conduct of prosecuting attorneys whose mitigation included 
rehabilitation, remorse, and accepting responsibility for their actions. See e.g. in 
re Penn. 548 N.W.2d 526, 527 (Wise. 1996) (district attorney convicted of 
misdemeanor marijuana and cocaine possession suspended for two years); 
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Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Norris. 666 N.E.2d 1087 (Ohio 1996) 
(prosecuting attorney who pled guilty to misdemeanor possession of cocaine 
suspended for two years with one year of the suspension stayed). 
As far as the OPC knows, there is no Utah case directly on point with Mr. 
Harding's case, which must be determined based on its own facts in accordance 
with Utah's Standards. Nevertheless, the OPC offers the following sample of 
drug-related attorney discipline cases that could be used as a backdrop for the 
Court's decision in this case. Note, however, that none of the cases is directly on 
point with Mr. Harding's case or his status as a judge, nor necessarily with the 
presumptive discipline Standards in this jurisdiction, or the applicable elements of 
aggravation and mitigation. 
• In re Olson. 537 N.W.2d 370 (S.D. 1995) (misdemeanor conviction for 
marijuana use resulted in three-year suspension). 
• In re Sawhill. 425 S.E.2d 274 (Ga. 1993) (attorney indicted for 
possession of cocaine, obstruction of an officer, two counts of DUI; 
pled guilty to possession of cocaine; sentenced to three years 
probation conditioned on surrender of license for three years; 
aggravation included fact that attorney entered rehabilitation only when 
required to do so; continued practicing until ordered to stop; sought to 
continue practicing after his conviction; failed to cooperate with Bar; 
disbarred). 
• State v. Stauffer, 858 P.2d 694 (Colo. 1993) (attorney convicted of 
felony cocaine possession; also failed to pay judgment against him for 
expert witness bill; aggravation: prior discipline; failure to acknowledge 
wrongful conduct; substantial experience; indifference; 
misrepresentations to clients; practicing law while suspended; 
mitigation: personal and emotional problems; delay in proceedings; 
disbarred). 
• In re Nelson. 874 P.2d 1201 (Kan. 1994) (attorney pled guilty to felony 
attempted possession of cocaine; sentenced to one and one-half to 
five years in prison; served three months, then probation; random 
urinalysis negative; doctor testified to complete recovery from 
addiction; legal competence not in question; during criminal 
prosecution, made false allegations against police; failed to 
communicate with two clients and abandoned another; mitigation: long 
term practice with only one previous discipline; general good character; 
therapy and clean urinalysis; no pattern of misconduct; aggravation: 
failed to return retainer to client; indefinite suspension). 
• In re Rivkind, 791 P.2d 1037 (Ariz. 1990) (attorney convicted of felony 
attempted possession of cocaine; placed on interim suspension, no 
impact on work; aggravation: repeated violation of state law for 
extended period; mitigation: remorse, rehabilitation, cooperation; two-
year suspension, followed by two-year probation). 
• In re Gooding. 917 P.2d 414 (Kan. 1996) (attorney charged with 
thirteen criminal counts; found guilty of felony possession of narcotic 
drugs; sentenced to three to ten years in prison; actually served one 
30 
yean eventually acquitted pursuant to habeas corpus petition; admitted 
using cocaine for ten years; engaged in illegal conduct including 
possession of illegal substances and paraphernalia; aggravation: 
cocaine use for ten years; multiple offenses; illegal conduct; 
mitigation: absence of prior disciplinary record; personal and emotional 
problems; cooperation; good character and reputation; rehabilitation; 
remorse; suspension presumptive discipline; compelling mitigation 
warranted two-year probation). 
• In re Abelman. 744 P.2d 486 (Colo. 1987) (attorney pled guilty to using 
cocaine; mitigation: rehabilitation, cooperation; six-month suspension). 
IV. Probation Alone Is Not an Adequate Sanction for Mr. Harding 
Mr. Harding suggested that the appropriate sanction in this case would be 
one that allows him to continue to practice law, for example, to complete his 
community service obligation. This suggestion is essentially requesting that 
probation be the appropriate sanction in this case, and that is what the Screening 
Panel ultimately recommended. 
Probation is a permissible sanction under the Standards. Specifically Rule 
2.7 of the Standards states that "Probation is a sanction that allows a lawyer to 
practice law under specified conditions. Probation can be public or non-public, 
can be imposed alone or in conjunction with other sanctions, and can be 
imposed as a condition of readmission or reinstatement." 
The OPC does not consider probation appropriate as the ultimate sole 
sanction in cases where disbarment is the presumptive sanction. Consistent with 
the goals of lawyer discipline and the responsibilities the legal profession owes 
the public to maintain high standards of professional conduct, the discipline 
ultimately imposed must involve actual time out from the practice of law. Further, 
given Mr. Harding's substance abuse problems and the probationary 
requirements of his criminal case, Mr. Harding may need this time out to 
evidence a "sustained period of successful rehabilitation" and to demonstrate 
conclusively that "the recurrence of that misconduct is unlikely." Rule 6.3(i), 
Standards. 
CONCLUSION 
The presumptive sanction for Mr. Harding's misconduct is disbarment. In 
light of the evidence concerning his continuing rehabilitation, a downward 
departure to a three-year suspension may be warranted, perhaps to be followed 
be a period of probation. Having said this, the OPC does not object to probation 
added to a sanction consisting of actual time out from the practice of law. 
Consistent with Rule 2.7 of the Standards, Mr. Harding's successful completion 
of his probation in the criminal matter, as well as in this case if probation is 
ordered, should be made before he is reinstated or readmitted to the practice of 
law. 
DATED: April / , 2004. 
OFFICE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 
Billy 1 . Walker 
Senior Counsel 
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SCREENING PANEL INFORMAL DECISION SHEET 
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DETERMINATION OF DISCIPLINE 
The Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions in pertinent part outline the following for 
the Screening Panel's consideration of discipline: 
Definitions. 
"Injury" is harm to a client, the public, the legal system, or the profession which results from a 
lawyer's misconduct. The level of injury can range from "serious" injury to "little or no" injury; a reference 
to "injury" alone indicates any level of injury greater than "little or no" injury. 
"Intent" is the conscious objective or purpose to accomplish a particular result 
"Knowledge" is the conscious awareness of the nature or attendant circumstances of the conduct 
but without the conscious objective or purpose to accomplish a particular result 
"Negligence" is the failure of a lawyer to heed a substantial risk that circumstances exist or that a 
result will follow, which failure is a deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable lawyer would 
exercise in the situation. 
"Potential injury" is the harm to a client, the public, the legal system or the profession that is 
reasonably foreseeable at the time of the lawyer's misconduct, and which, but for some intervening factor 
or event, would probably have resulted from the lawyer's misconduct 
Rule 3. Factors to be considered in imposing sanctions. 
3.1. Generally. 
The following factors should be considered in imposing a sanction after a finding of lawyer 
misconduct: 
(a) the duty violated; 
(b) the lawyer's mental state; 
(c) the potential or actual injury caused by the lawyer's misconduct; and 
(d) the existence of aggravating or mitigating factors. 
Rule 4. Imposition of sanctions. 
4.1. Generally. 
Absent aggravating or mitigating circumstances, upon application of the factors set out in 
Standard 3.1, the following sanctions are generally appropriate. 
4.2. Disbarment. 
Disbarment is generally appropriate when a lawyer 
(a) knowingly engages in professional misconduct as defined in Rule 8.4(a), (d), (e), or (f) of the 
Rules of Professional Conduct with the intent to benefit the lawyer or another or to deceive the court, and 
causes serious or potentially serious injury to a party, the public, or the legal system, or causes serious or 
potentially serious interference with a legal proceeding; or 
(b) engages in serious criminal conduct, a necessary element of which includes intentional 
interference with the administration of justice, false swearing, misrepresentation, fraud, extortion, 
misappropriation, or theft; or the sale, distribution, or importation of controlled substances; or the 
intentional killing of another; or an attempt or conspiracy or solicitation of another to commit any of these 
offenses; or 
(c) engages in any other intentional misconduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or 
misrepresentation that seriously adversely reflects on the lawyer's fitness to practice law. 
4.3. Suspension. 
Suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer 
(a) knowingly engages in professional misconduct as defined in Rule 8.4(a), (d), (e), or (f) of the 
Rules of Professional Conduct and causes injury or potential injury to a party, the public, or the legal 
system, or causes interference or potential interference with a legal proceeding; or 
(b) engages in criminal conduct that does not contain the elements listed in Standard 4.2(b) but 
nevertheless seriously adversely reflects on the lawyer's fitness to practice law. 
4.4. Reprimand. 
Reprimand is generally appropriate when a lawyer 
(a) negligently engages in professional misconduct as defined in Rule 8.4(a), (d), (e), or (f) of the 
Rules of Professional Conduct and causes injury to a party, the public, or the legal system, or causes 
interference with a legal proceeding; or 
(b) engages in any other misconduct that involves dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation 
and that adversely reflects on the lawyer's fitness to practice law. 
4.5. Admonition. 
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Admonition is generally appropriate when a lawyer 
(a) negligently engages in professional misconduct as defined in Rule 8.4(a), (d), (e), or (f) of the 
Rules of Professional Conduct and causes little or no injury to a party, the public, or the legal system or 
interference with a legal proceeding, but exposes a party, the public, or the legal system to potential injury 
or causes potential interference with a legal proceeding; or 
(b) engages in any professional misconduct not otherwise identified in this Standard 4 that 
adversely reflects on the lawyer's fitness to practice law. 
Rule 6. Aggravation and mitigation. 
6.1. Generally. 
After misconduct has been established, aggravating and mitigating circumstances may be 
considered and weighed in deciding what sanction to impose. 
6.2. Aggravating circumstances. 
Aggravating circumstances are any considerations or factors that may justify an increase in the 
degree of discipline to be imposed. Aggravating circumstances may include: 
(a) prior record of discipline; 
(b) dishonest or selfish motive; 
(c) a pattern of misconduct; 
(d) multiple offenses; 
(e) obstruction of the disciplinary proceeding by intentionally failing to comply with rules or orders 
of the disciplinary authority; 
(f) submission of false evidence, false statements, or other deceptive practices during the 
disciplinary process; 
(g) refusal to acknowledge the wrongful nature of the misconduct involved, either to the client or 
to the disciplinary authority; 
(h) vulnerability of victim; 
(i) substantial experience in the practice of law; 
(j) lack of good faith effort to make restitution or to rectify the consequences of the misconduct 
involved; and 
(k) illegal conduct, including the use of controlled substances. 
6.3. Mitigating circumstances. 
Mitigating circumstances are any considerations or factors that may justify a reduction in the 
degree of discipline to be imposed. Mitigating circumstances may include: 
(a) absence of a prior record of discipline; 
(b) absence of a dishonest or selfish motive; 
(c) personal or emotional problems; 
(d) timely good faith effort to make restitution or to rectify the consequences of the misconduct 
involved; 
(e) full and free disclosure to the client or the disciplinary authority prior to the discovery of any 
misconduct or cooperative attitude toward proceedings; 
(f) inexperience in the practice of law; 
(g) good character or reputation; 
(h) physical disability; 
(i) mental disability or impairment, including substance abuse when: 
(1) The respondent is affected by a substance abuse or mental disability; and 
(2) The substance abuse or mental disability causally contributed to the misconduct; and 
(3) The respondent's recovery from the substance abuse or mental disability is demonstrated 
by a meaningful and sustained period of successful rehabilitation; and 
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(4) The recovery arrested the misconduct and the recurrence of that misconduct is unlikely; 
(j) unreasonable delay in disciplinary proceedings, provided that the respondent did not 
substantially contribute to the delay and provided further that the respondent has demonstrated prejudice 
resulting from the delay; 
(k) interim reform in circumstances not involving mental disability or impairment; 
(!) imposition of other penalties or sanctions; 
(m) remorse; and 
(n) remoteness of prior offenses. 
6.4. Factors which are neither aggravating nor mitigating. 
The following circumstances should not be considered as either aggravating or mitigating: 
(a) forced or compelled restitution; 
(b) withdrawal of complaint against the lawyer; 
(c) resignation prior to completion of disciplinary proceedings; 
(d) complainants recommendation as to sanction; and 
(e) failure of injured client to complain. 
Furthermore, Rule 10(b)(6) of the Rules of Lawyer Discipline and Disability, as amended 
January 1,2003 ("RLDD") provides as follows: 
in determining an appropriate sanction and only after having found unethical 
conduct, the screening panel may consider any admonitions or greater discipline 
imposed upon the respondent within the five years immediately preceding the 
alleged offense. 
The Screening Panel will be provided with sealed information on 
any prior discipline against the Respondent. The sealed 
information should only be opened after the Panel has concluded 
that the Rules of Professional Conduct have been violated. 
After review of all the facts developed by the informal complaint, answer, investigation 
and hearing, and consideration of the Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions and 
Rule 10(b)(6) of the RLDD, as stated above, Rule 10(b)(5) of the RLDD requires the 
Screening Panel to make one of the following determinations: 
[ ] (A) That the informal complaint does not raise facts in which there is probable 
cause to believe that the respondent was engaged in unprofessional conduct, in 
which case, the informal complaint shall be dismissed. OPC counsel shall 
promptly give notice of such dismissal by regular mail to the complainant and 
the respondent 
[ ] (B) That a letter of caution may be issued. The letter shall be signed by OPC 
counsel or the screening panel chair and shall serve as a guide for the future 
conduct of the respondent Thereupon, the informal complaint shall be 
dismissed, with the complainant and the respondent being notified of the 
dismissal. The complainant shall also be confidentially notified of the caution. 
Please identify the conduct to be cautioned against: 
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(C) That a dismissal may be conditioned upon the performance by the 
respondent of specified conduct which the Committee determines to be 
warranted by the facts and the Rules of Professional Conduct. 
Please identify the condition and the date by which it mustbe performed: 
(Use extra page attached if necessary) 
(D) That the informal complaint be referred to the Committee chair with an 
accompanying screening panel recommendation that the respondent be 
admonished. Such screening panel recommendation shall be in writing and 
shall state the substance and nature of the informal complaint and defenses and 
the basis upon which the screening panel has concluded, by a preponderance of 
the evidence, that the respondent should be admonished. A copy of such 
screening panel recommendation shall be served upon the respondent prior to 
delivery of the recommendation to the Committee chair. The Committee chair 
shall enter an order admonishing the respondent if no exception has been filed 
within ten (10) days of notice of the recommendation being provided to the 
respondent 
List all Rules that the Panel determines have been violated by the 
Respondent, and state the facts that support the Panel's decision: 
(Use extra page attached if necessary) 
(E) That the informal complaint be referred to the Committee chair with an 
accompanying screening panel recommendation that the respondent receive a 
public reprimand. Such screening panel recommendation shall be in writing 
and shall state the substance and nature of the informal complaint and defenses 
and the basis upon which the screening panel has concluded, by a 
preponderance of the evidence, that the respondent should receive a public 
reprimand. A copy of such screening panel recommendation shall be served 
upon the respondent prior to the delivery of the recommendation to the 
Committee chair. The Committee chair shall enter an order publicly 
reprimanding the respondent if no exception has been filed within ten (10) days 
of notice of the recommendation being provided to the respondent 
List all Rules that the Panel determines have been violated by the 
Respondent, and state the facts that support the Panel's decision: 
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[ ] (F) That [there is probable cause that] a formal complaint be filed against the 
respondent 
List all Rules that the Panel determines have been violated by the 
Respondent, and state the facts that support the Panel's decision: 
(Use extra page attached if necessary) 
Based upon any finding(s) that the Respondent violated the Rules of Professional 
Conduct, the Panel finds that the Respondent also violated Rule 8.4(a) (Misconduct) of the 
Rules, which provides, alt is professional misconduct for a lawyer to violate or attempt to violate 
the Rules of Professional Conduct, knowingly assist or induce another to do so, or do so 
through the acts of another." 
The Panel understands that after considering its findings, including aggravating or 
mitigating circumstances, if it recommends that a formal complaint be filed, neither of the parties 
is limited to presenting facts consistent with those findings inasmuch as further factual 
development of the case through discovery and other means may result in additions to or 
elimination of factors such as aggravating or mitigatiprg/circumstances. 
Date: f*3g'pf Signature: ^ Q ^ r J ^ 
^ - O h a i r O F p i a t J (If ertra attached page is used, do not sign here) 
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From the evidence presented and the record in this case (Case No. 03-0417) the Screening Panel 
makes the following findings, reaches the following conclusions and makes the following 
recommendations: 
Ray Harding violated Rule 8.4 (b) in that he committed the crime of possession of illegal 
drugs while an active judge in the Fourth District Court For this violation the Panel 
recommends that Ray Harding be subject to suspension from practice for six months pursuant to 
Rule 4.3 (a) of the Standards for imposing Lawyer Sanctions; however, that the suspension be 
stayed and Ray Harding be put on probation pursuant to the mitigating circumstances discussed 
below, pursuant to the provisions of Rule 6.3 (i). 
Ray Harding sat as a District Court Judge when he engaged in the misconduct of 
possessing and using illegal drugs. The evidence before the Panel shows that he has paid a 
significant price for that illegal conduct He has been removed from his judgeship. He has plead 
guilty to and been convicted of two misdemeanors. He has spent 90 days in jail in circumstances 
which amounted to solitary confinement His confinement was in "protective custody" because 
the inmate population included those who had been sent to the prison by his order as a judge, and 
protective custody was necessary to provide safety to him during confinement However, that 
custody amounted to solitary confinement He has also been barred from holding any further 
judicial office in the State of Utah, paid the maximum monetary fine imposed by the statute, 
undergone treatment for drug dependency at the Betty Ford Clinic, and become involved in 12-
step programs on an on-going active basis. 
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The sanctions imposed upon Ray Harding, however, relate to his violation of the criminal 
law and the violation of the standards applicable to the judicial office he held at the time of 
committing the offenses. The question of his license to practice law is another matter, not dealt 
with in the other proceedings. Therefore, the question of his misconduct raising Professional 
Responsibility violations are being considered for the first time in these proceedings. Nothing 
that has preceded this hearing has dealt with Ray Harding's violations of the Rules of 
Professional Conduct 
Ray Harding's decision to violate the law and use illegal drugs was an intentional act It 
violated Rule 8.4 (b) in that it was a "criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer's... fitness 
as a lawyer." That violation subjects him to discipline. 
The rules for imposing discipline make suspension the appropriate sanction when "a 
lawyer (a) knowingly engages in professional misconduct... and causes injury or potential injury 
to... the public, or the legal system, or causes interference or potential interference with a legal 
proceeding." That presumption may be modified by mitigating circumstances such as we find 
here, as provided by Rule 6.3 (i). 
The record and testimony contained the allegation that Ray Harding's violation of the law 
included abuse of drugs within his chambers. No proof of that exists, however. The alleged act 
was not witnessed by anyone. Ray Harding denied that it ever occurred but insisted that his drug 
use was confined to weekends or holidays when he was away from his work as a judge. Other 
judges who had close contact with Ray Harding testified that they never saw any evidence of any 
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drug use by him while in the courthouse. The in-court clerk testified that she never witnessed 
any drug use or behavior indicating drug use in the court nor in his chambers. She testified that 
the door to his chambers remained open nearly all the time, and when closed his wife or counsel 
were present with him in the chambers. She detected nothing in his conduct which betrayed drug 
use, and she never smelled anything which would indicate use of or smoking of any drugs within 
his chambers. The clear and convincing evidence is that Ray Harding did not use drugs in the 
courthouse while acting as a judge. 
The rule governing aggravating and mitigating circumstances applicable to Ray Harding's 
case provides the following: 
"6.3 Mitigating circumstances are any considerations or factors that may justify a reduction in the 
degree of discipline to be imposed. Mitigating circumstances may include: 
...(i) mental disability or impairment, including substance abuse when: 
(1) The respondent is affected by a substance abuse or mental disability; and 
(2) The substance abuse or mental disability causally contributed to the misconduct; and 
(3) The respondent's recovery from the substance abuse or mental disability is demonstrated by a 
meaningful and sustained period of successful rehabilitation; and 
(4) The recovery arrested the misconduct and the recurrence of that misconduct is unlikely." 
In the case of In Re Ince, 957 P.2d 1233 (Utah 1998) the Utah Supreme Court makes it 
clear that in circumstances in which a person is brought to the point of remorse by criminal 
proceedings, their penitence for the wrongdoing is suspect. Therefore, the Panel was concerned 
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with the question of Ray Harding's sincerity in accepting responsibility for his wrongdoing, and 
the success of Ray Harding in accomplishing a "meaningful and sustained period of successful 
rehabilitation." 
Although there were allegations that Ray Harding's rehabilitation was insincere and that 
he began violating the process beginning at the Betty Ford Clinic, and that it continued thereafter, 
these allegations all originate with Ray Harding's ex-wife. She did not witness any of this 
conduct She testified that she heard Ray Harding say things which led her to these conclusions. 
This testimony was not credible, and the allegations were contradicted by proof in the record. 
Ray Harding was tested for drugs while in the Betty Ford Clinic. His sponsor monitored 
his recovery. The testimony of Ray Harding, of his sponsor, of his aftercare counselor, of his 
defense attorney, of his daughters and of the head of Lawyers Helping Lawyers was all to the 
effect that Ray Harding's recovery has been both sincere and successful. The clear and 
convincing evidence in the matter is that Ray Harding has been completely drag free for a period 
lasting 18 months. Given the length of time of his being drug free, the evidence is that he is now 
over 95% likely to remain drug free. The Panel can find no credible evidence that Ray Harding's 
efforts to recover from drug use are insincere. 
During this period, Ray Harding has refrained voluntarily from the practice of law. The 
Office of Professional Conduct contends that since this has been voluntary, Ray Harding should 
receive no credit against a period of suspension. The Panel agrees with the Office of 
Professional Conduct that a voluntary withdrawal from practice does not entitle a person to credit 
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against a period of suspension. However, the voluntary withdrawal from practice by Ray 
Harding does indicate to the Panel the seriousness with which Mr. Harding has taken his 
violations, and a manifestation of his commitment to changing his life. Therefore, the Panel 
finds that the voluntary withdrawal from practice by Ray Harding for the past eighteen months, 
along with the testimony of all those involved in his treatment and recovery, is reason to believe 
that he has sincerely and seriously pursued the processes of rehabilitation, and that he has 
succeeded in putting his drug use behind him for that time period 
The testimony established that Ray Harding will remain vulnerable, however, to a return 
to drug abuse for the remainder of his life. His success is to be measured therefore by the 
continuing commitment which he makes to the process of being "clean and sober.'9 To that end, 
since the end of his court-ordered participating in rehabilitation, he has continued to be involved 
in the processes of 12-step programs and in Lawyers Helping Lawyers. He has continued to 
demonstrate an on-going determination to remain drug free. He has also acknowledged to the 
Panel and to others that he is vulnerable to this addiction and needs to keep himself ever vigilant 
to avoid returning to abuse. The Panel is persuaded that the evidence in this case shows that Ray 
Harding has accomplished a "meaningful and sustained period of successful rehabilitation" and 
that he has otherwise qualified under Rule 6.3 (i) for mitigation of his punishment under the 
Rules of Professional Discipline. 
Therefore, in the totality of the circumstances, the Panel recommends that Ray Harding be 
placed on Probation, and allowed to continue his practice of law. The conditions for that 
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probation should include random drug testing, the costs of which should be borne by Ray 
Harding, to be coordinated through the Office of Professional Conduct. Further, Ray Harding 
should be required to participate in a 12-step program on an on-going basis, at least monthly, for 
the entire time of probation. The Panel recommends that the period of Probation last not less 
than five years. 
Ray Harding's ability to practice law and render meaningful assistance to clients was 
undisputed Even his harshest critic in the evidentiary proceedings, his ex-wife, commented on 
the excellence of his legal abilities. His fellow judges, his defense counsel, his drug counselors, 
the Prosecuting Attorneys and even his critics all hailed his legal abilities. There is no doubt, 
therefore, in the Panel's mind that Ray Harding's ability to practice law and assist the public is 
unimpaired by the violations he committed So long as he remains drug free, he is an asset to the 
Bar and to the public. Only in the event of a relapse does he become a threat to violate the Rules 
of Professional Conduct and a liability to the Bar. Given the record in this case, however, the 
Panel is satisfied that Ray Harding can practice law successfully, although the period of 
probation and supervision is warranted in his case. 
The Panel finds there was no violation of Rule 8.4 (a), ( c ) or (d). The Panel specifically 
finds that there is no evidence to support even a finding of probable cause that Ray Harding 
committed the crime of poaching. The only statement to that effect came from his ex-wife whom 
the Panel did not find credible. There was no physical evidence of the crime. There was no 
statement from Fish and Game officers. There was no testimony from prosecuting attorneys in 
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the case. The charges were denied by Ray Harding. Mr. Harding's defense attorney claimed the 
charges had no merit and that a plea bargain had been rejected The case involving those charges 
has not had a preliminary hearing as yet Therefore, the Panel cannot conclude that any basis for 
discipline lies in relation to the poaching allegations. 
Finally, the Panel notes that it is the considered opinion of the members of the Panel after 
hearing all of the evidence in this case that the best interests of all concerned, including the 
public and the Bar, are served by the recommendations made in this decision. 
Date: 1 /Wsf 
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Utah State Bar 
Office of Professional Conduct 
645 South 200 East, Suite 205 • Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-3834 
Telephone: (801) 531-9110 • FAX: (801) 531-9912 • 1-800-698-9077 
E-mail: opcOuiahbar.org 
August 5,2003 
Ray Harding, Jr. 
11165 North Yarrow Circle 
Highland, UT 84603 
NOTICE OF INFORMAL COMPLAINT 
OPC File No. 03-0417 
Dear Mr. Harding: 
This letter is to notify you that pursuant to Rule 10(a)(1) of the 
Rules of Lawyer Discipline and Disability (amended January 1, 2003) 
("RLDD"), the Utah State Bar's Office of Professional Conduct ("OPC") 
has initiated an .informal complaint of unprofessional conduct against you. 
The OPC's informal complaint is based upon an investigation conducted 
by the OPC pursuant to Rule 4(b)(2) of the RLDD. As a result of this 
investigation, this Notice of Informal Complaint ("NOIC") is issued in 
accordance with Rule 10(a)(5) of the RLDD. 
On May 22,2003 I sent this NOIC to your counsel in your criminal 
matter, Mr. Edward Brass. I specifically requested that Mr. Brass contact 
me and let me know if he intended to represent you in this attorney 
discipline matter. I also indicated to Mr. Brass that if I did not hear from 
him, I would assume that he does not represent you and that I would 
resend the NOIC to you for your response. I did not receive any response 
from Mr. Brass so pursuant to the RLDD, I am serving the NOIC on you 
for your response. 
With specific respect to the allegations of unprofessional conduct 
the information that the OPC has is represented by the documents that I 
have enclosed with this NOIC. Those documents are identified as follows: 
1) Copies of Judicial Conduct Commission proceeding 
documents (including a copy of the index of those 
documents); 
2) Copy of Discovery Index in the case of State v. Rav Harding 
Jr.. Case No. 021403545 (a copy of all the documents that 
are part of that Discovery Index can be made available to 
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you, however, they are not provided as part of this NOIC 
because the documents total in excess of one thousand 
pages. In this respect, it is likely that you already have 
copies of these documents as part of the criminal case.); 
3) Copies of newspaper articles as follows: 
a) Embattled Judge Resigns from Bench. Deseret News 
March 1,2003; 
b) Harding's Wife Hopes Case Won't ao to Trial. Deseret 
News, March 3,2003; 
c) Harding Admits to Reduced Charges. Deseret News, 
March 5,2003; 
d) Harding Gets 120 Days on Drug Counts. Deseret 
News, April 28,2003; and 
e) Hard Time for Judge Harding. Deseret News, May 1, 
2003. 
4) Copy of the videotape for the protective order hearing on 
October 23,2002 in the case of Harding v. Harding, case no. 
024402310. 
5) Additionally with respect to a matter distinct from the case of 
State of Utah v. Rav Harding. Jr.. case no. 021403545, 
enclosed are copies of the foliowing newspaper articles: 
a) Harding Charged with Poaching: 
b) Harding Faces Poaching Charges. Deseret News, 
April 12,2003; 
c) Ex-Judoe's Poaching Case Delayed. Deseret New, 
May 13,2003; and 
d) Judge Recuses Himself from Harding Case. Salt Lake 
Tribune, May 14,2003. 
Based upon the foregoing, it is the opinion of the OPC that you 
have violated the following Rules of Professional Conduct-
Rule 8.4(b) (Misconduct) states Tj]t is professional misconduct for a 
lawyer to: Commit a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer's 
honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects." in this 
respect, you may have violated this rule when law enforcement officers 
after being called to you home on a domestic disturbance call on July 13, 
2002, found cocaine, heroin, and drug paraphernalia. Your person also 
tested positive for benzoylecyonine and opiates in addition to the cocaine. 
You were arrested and charged with two felony criminal counts: Count I -
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Unlawful Possession or Use of a Controlled Substance, a 3rt degree 
felony. Title 58, Chapter 37, Section 8(2)(a)(0 and Title 76, Chapter 2, 
Section 202 of the U.CA for knowingly and intentionally possessing or 
using a controlled substance to wit: cocaine, a Schedule II Controlled 
Substance; Count II - Unlawful Possession or Use of a Controlled 
Substance, a 3rt degree felony. Title 58, Chapter 37, Section 8(2)(a)(l) 
and Title 76, Chapter 2, Section 202 for knowingly and intentionally 
possessing or using a controlled substance, to wit Heroin, a Schedule I 
Controlled Substance. 
There is also evidence that you may have committed the illegal act 
of soliciting the controlled substances that you used. Specifically, cocaine 
and heroin are controlled substances that can only be obtained illegally 
and there is evidence that you solicited these controlled substances from 
an individual by name of Rick Connelly. 
In addition to this, your wife indicated to the police that she had 
previously seen you smoking "crack" and you admitted to your wife that 
you had been using "crack" and heroin since October 2001. You stated to 
your wife that you smoked "crack" in the bathroom while at work (as a 
judge). 
Regarding the felony charges, reportedly, you entered a plea of 
guilty to two counts of attempted possession or the use of controlled 
substances - opiates in one count, cocaine in another, class A 
misdemeanors. You were sentenced to 120 days of jail; fined, ordered to 
do 500 hours of community service and probation for 24 months which 
includes individual therapy and help from 12-step programs. 
With respect to the criminal charges of poaching, You may have 
violated Rule 8.4(b) when reportedly you allegedly killed a trophy moose 
and two cow elk on October 6, 2001. You are facing three 3" degree 
felony counts of wanton destruction of protected wildlife. Reportedly, you 
did not have the proper licenses. 
Rule 8.4(c) (Misconduct) states that "[i]t is professional misconduct 
for a lawyer to: Engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or 
misrepresentation." In this respect, you may have violated this rule by the 
above outlined factual allegations of criminal conduct. Additionally, your 
reported actions of poaching may be a greater reflection of dishonesty if 
your conduct was outside of any licensing limits. 
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Rule 8.4(b) (Misconduct) states that "[i]t is professional misconduct 
for a lawyer to: Engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration 
of justice." In this respect, you may have violated this rule by the above 
outlined factual allegations of criminal conduct. Additionally, Mrs. Harding 
indicated that you had been on a drug "binge" about three weeks prior to 
the July 13, 2002 incident This raises the question whether you were 
under the influence of controlled substances while performing duties on 
the judicial bench. Specifically it is probable that due to controlled 
substance use that you were unable to attend a hearing on the Thursday 
before the July 13, 2002 incident (even though the lawyers in the case 
settled the case so your attendance was not necessary); it is probable that 
you were under the influence of a controlled substance at a hearing you 
presided over on Friday July 12,2002 (the lawyers at that hearing noticed 
that you appeared drawn and ill); it is also probable that you were under 
the influence of controlled substances at other times while on the bench 
and specifically, during the six month period prior to the July 13, 2002 
incident This is evidenced by reports from court staff to the police that 
during this six month period, you had "mood" changes and would often 
appear bored and disinterested before brief recesses when you would 
return refreshed. Finally, Mrs. Harding stated to the police that you 
indicated to her that you had smoked "crack" in the bathroom of your 
office. 
Rule 8.4(a) (Misconduct) by engaging in conduct that violates the 
above-mentioned Rules of Professional Conduct 
Rule 10(a)(5) of the RLDD provides that "[wjithin twenty days after 
service of the Notice of Informal Complaint on the respondent the 
respondent shall file with OPC counsel a written and signed answer 
setting forth in full an explanation of the facts surrounding the informal 
complaint, together with ail defenses and responses to the claims of 
possible misconduct" In addition, please provide any documents or other 
materials that support your response or would otherwise assist us in 
evaluating the informal complaint Do not submit original documents; the 
OPC cannot make photocopies, and will not be responsible for your 
originals. If at some point we need to review your original records, we will 
ask for them. 
One particular item that is not part of the OPC record that we need 
you to provide is the Pre-sentencing report in the State of Utah v. Rav 
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Harding. Jr.. case, case no. 021403545. I spoke to a Cathy Charlesworth 
(who I understand prepared the report) and she said that she could not 
provide me with a copy of the report without your consent. If you will 
authorize the release of a copy of this report to this office, I will contact 
Ms. Charlesworth to obtain a copy. 
Please be advised that Rule 8.1(b) of the Rules of Professional 
Conduct provides that attorneys shall not "knowingly fail to respond to a 
lawful demand for information from a disciplinary authority." Further, the 
Comment following the rule states that "it is a separate professional 
offense for a lawyer to knowingly make a misrepresentation or omission in 
connection with a disciplinary investigation of the lawyer's own conduct. 
This Rule also requires affirmative clarification of any misunderstanding on 
the part of the admissions or disciplinary authority of which the person 
involved becomes aware." Failure to do so may constitute a separate 
violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct 
The OPC will notify you in writing of significant milestones in your 
case. For example, if it determines that the matter must proceed to a 
hearing before a Screening Panel, you will be notified of this fact in writing. 
Likewise, if the matter is dismissed or if the OPC declines to prosecute the 
complaint, you will be notified in writing. If you do not receive written 
notification that the case is being closed, do not assume that it has been 
closed. 
If, under Rule 10(b)(1) of the RLDD, the OPC refers the matter to a 
Screening Panel of the Ethics and Discipline Committee of the Utah 
Supreme Court, you will'be notified of the date and time set for a hearing. 
Please note that Rule 10(b) of the RLDD sets forth Screening Panel hearing 
proceedings. If the matter is heard by a Screening Panel, pursuant to Rule 
10(b)(1), the Panel has the authority to make its determination based on the 
facts developed by the informal complaint, answer, investigation, the OPC 
recommendation and the Screening Panel hearing. In this respect, foots 
developed at the hearing may give rise to a determination of Rules of 
Professional Conduct violations not alleged in this Notice of Informal 
Complaint 
Further, Rule 32(a) of the RLDD provides that "p]f having received 
actual notice of the charges filed, the Respondent fails to answer the 
charges within twenty (20) days, the Respondent shall be deemed to have 
admitted the factual allegations." If you do not provide a response to the 
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charges in this NOIC within 20 days, the OPC may request that the 
Screening Panel find that the allegations are admitted. 
Also enclosed is a copy of the Utah Supreme Court's Order of 
Reference vesting authority and responsibility with this office to review this 
matter. Please note that after a Screening Panel review, pursuant to the 
Supreme Court Order of Reference, the recommendation will go directly to 
the Supreme Court 
If you have any questions regarding this informal complaint and 
investigation or. would like to suggest that an area be investigated or 
documents be secured, please contact me. 
Thank you for your cooperation. 
Sincerely, ^ , 
Billy L Walker 
Senior Counsel 
Office of Professional Conduct 
Acknowledged before me this iE_ day of -^4' - 2003. 
FUMe 
645 South 200 Eaat 
Owerntar4»jL. 
__Stta£fU*h 
No&ry Public 
Residing in SaJbt IsJli County, ttAn.fa 
My Commission Expires: 
BLW/ay 
Enclosures 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the ^ day of Al*Jty*M , 20OJ? the 
foregoing Notice of Informal Complaint was mailed via United States first-
class mail, postage pre-paid to Ray Harding, Jr., at 11165 North Yarrow 
Circle, Highland, UT 84603, the address reflected in the records of the Utah 
State Bar. 
^ f r » f f M r 
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GREGORY G. SKORDAS 
HARRY CASTON 
JACK M. MORGAN, JR. 
SKORDAS & CASTON, LLC4 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
9 EXCHANGE PLACE 
S U I T E 1104 BOSTON B U I L D I N G 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111 
TELEPHONE (801 > 53 1-7444 
FACSIMILE (801 ) 531 -8885 
September 5,2003 
RECEIVED 
$& 0 5 2001fK 
CONDUCT 
Billy L. Walker 
Senior Counsel 
Utah State Bar 
Office of Professional Conduct 
645 South 200 East, Suite 205 
Salt Lake City, Utah 8411-3834 
Re: Response to Notice of Informal Complaint 
OPC File No. 03-0417 Ray Harding, Jr. 
Dear Mr. Walker 
This letter and attached verification is a response to the Notice of Informal Complaint ("NOIC") 
received by this office on or after August 5,2003. You and I spoke briefly sometime last week and it 
was agreed that we could have additional time to prepare this response given that I was out-of-town for 
a couple of days during Labor Day. 
This response should not be taken in anyway as a waiver of Judge Harding's right to have his 
case heard just as any other attorney would before a District Court Judge. I am troubled by the way this 
case is intending to proceed. That is, that our only "due process" would be before a Screening Panel 
without the availability of subpoenas, cross- examination, and adequate presentation of witnesses. My 
experience with Screening Panels is that they are volunteer lawyers and citizens who devote time to 
hear matters such as this and cannot and should not be required to the make same evidentiary rulings 
that a judge would. Indeed, as you know, each Screening Panel session begins with the chair reading a 
statement that clearly defines the limitations on the Panel's authority. Apparently, uniquely to Judge 
Harding's case, the Screening Panel will serve the roles of prosecuting the case, judging the merits and 
recommending the final sanction. We believe this constitutes afimdamental violation of due process. 
One of the requests in the Notice of Informal Complaint is that we provide a copy of the Pre-
Sentencing Report in the case of State of Utah v. Ray M. Harding, Jr.. number 031900587. That 
request is followed by a suggestion from your office that foiling to provide this Pre-Sentence Report 
would constitute a separate professional offense. Because of that, and only because of that threat, the 
Pre-Sentence Report is attached to this letter. A Pre-Sentence Report is confidential and is never made 
a part of a public record. It contains information that typically would probably not be appropriate for a 
Screening Panel to view or consider such as Mr. Harding's personal and family history. Nonetheless, it 
is hereby provided It is our hope that you will honor the confidentiality that this report requires. 
A judge in a criminal matter will typically request the Office of Adult Probation and Parole 
("AP&P") to prepare a Pre-Sentence Report when a criminal defendant has entered a plea of guilty to 
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Billy Walker 
Senior Counsel 
Re: Judge Harding 
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Page 2 
any felony or some more serious misdemeanors. In this case, Judge Ray Harding entered 
a plea of guilty to two misdemeanor drug charges. He was thereafter referred to Adult 
Probation and Parole for the preparation of this report That referral was made by Judge 
Tim Hansen of the Third District Court and is typical for this type of case. The Pre-
sentence Report is typically an investigatiye report prepared so that a judge, at the time of 
sentencing, has sufficient information from which that judge can make a fair 
determination as to an appropriate sentence. Often, judges have little or no information 
about a defendant appearing before them and they rely on agencies such as AP&P to give 
them as much information as possible. 
A Pre-Sentence Report is, as such, an investigation and should not include 
conclusion, opinions, and editorials. Unfortunately, the Pre-Sentence Report which is 
attached to this letter is full of just such remarks. It is interesting to note that the cover 
sheet for the Pre-Sentence Report starts with the line "Just the fax." That is a law 
enforcement term which is intended to keep people, such as the person who prepared this 
Pre-Sentence Report, on task and it reminds them that their rqrorts are to be factual and 
not editorial. This Pre-Sentence Report, however, violates that rule on virtually every 
page. Nonetheless, we believe the Pre-Sentence Report is helpfiil because it provides 
your office and the Screening Panel with a very thorough understanding of the case and 
includes numerous letters of recommendation and commendation which should help in a 
fair determination of Judge Harding's future status as a member of the Utah State Bar. 
Because the Pre-Sentence Report contains some fifty pages, we will not attempt to 
address each issue in this response. However, it is our hope that you will take the time to 
read or peruse all of the report including the attached letters. 
With respect to the individual allegations in the NOIC, it is our intent to address 
those briefly as follows: 
L You indicate in page two of the NOIC that Judge Harding tested positive 
for "benzoylecyonine" and other controlled substances. Certainly the other controlled 
substances listed in your complaint are illegal, but benzoylecyonine is achemical term for 
Valium which was a prescribed drug and which was legally possessed by Judge Harding. 
2. Judge Harding has never been convicted of a felony. He was certainly 
charged with two possession counts. However, they were reduced to two class A 
misdemeanors. This is not uncommon in criminal cases especially for first time 
offenders. It also is not uncommon for people to practice their professions after having 
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been convicted of similar class A misdemeanors, after rehabilitation. Indeed, our justice 
system encourages and aids defendants in returning to their jobs, families, and other life 
activities. 
3. The NOIC implies that Judge Harding illegally solicited the controlled 
substances. Certainly no one could come into possession of these substances without 
some illegal solicitation. However, Judge Harding has never been charged with such an 
offense and it probably would not have been appropriate to charge him as such given the 
facts of this case. He was found in possession of small quantities of controlled 
substances and pled guilty to two counts of attempted possession of a controlled 
substance. There is no chance that he will ever be prosecuted for any other crime arising 
out of this conduct, including solicitation. 
4. The NOIC indicates that Judge Harding's now ex-wife stated that he 
smoked "crack" while at work. There is no credible evidence either from her or anyone 
else that Judge Harding, possessed, used, or was under the influence any controlled 
substance while he sat as a Fourth District Court Judge. To the contrary, while Judge 
Harding was at times ill or looked tired the evidence indicates that he at all times acted 
appropriately and handled his cases appropriately while on the bench. Certainly his 
judgment could have been impaired while dealing with drug offenders with the 
knowledge that he himself was a drug user but there has been no allegation or evidence 
that he treated such defendants any differently than any other judge would have. Further, 
there have been no successful challenges to any proceedings that were held before Judge 
Harding based upon an allegation of abuse by him as a judge. The Pre-Sentence Report 
at one point indicates that "tax payers may pay millions as appeals are filed regarding 
decisions Judge Harding made while on die bench." Our investigation has concluded that 
there were several minor challenges to Judge Harding's rulings which were similarly 
dismissed. It is unlikely that there was much of a taxpayer burden forthat 
5. Although this is addressed in the Pre-Sentence Report it is important to 
know that Judge Harding successfully completed a ninety-day treatment program at the 
Betty Ford Center in California and attended ninety aftercare meetings in ninety days 
thereafter. He continues to participate in aftercare on an almost daily basis even after he 
served substantial jail time and was ordered to complete five hundred hours of 
community service. 
Skordas & Caston, LLC 
Billy Walker 
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6. It is also important to note that since the date of his arrest, July 13,2002, 
he has never tested positive for any illegal drug or alcohol and he reports that he has not 
abused alcohol or drugs in the intervening months. 
7. As indicated, even now Judge Harding attends almost daily AA, CA, and 
NA Twelve Step Meetings. He attended those meetings at all times after he successfully 
completed treatment at the Betty Ford Clinic. The only time Judge Harding did not 
attend those meetings was while he served his jail term. 
8. Judge Harding has taken special efforts to stay involved in the "recovery 
community," chairing meetings at a local treatment center and sponsoring recovering 
addicts to help them maintain sobriety. 
9. Judge Harding has worked with and continues to work with Lawyers 
Helping Lawyers and he has become a liaison between that committee and treatment 
centers throughout the state. 
10. Judge Harding continues to meet regularly with Dr. Lynn Johnson in 
regular therapy sessions as suggested by the Betty Ford Clinic and Lawyers Helping 
Lawyers. 
11. Judge Harding continues to maintain contact with other recovering addicts 
and alcoholics who are lawyers and judges nationally and he has participated in 
conferences on addiction issues involving lawyers and judges in recovery. 
12. Judge Harding has successfully worked the Twelve Steps of Recovery with 
a sponsor. 
13. Judge Harding is fully compliant with all the terms and conditions of his 
sentence and probation which were ordered by Judge Hansen. 
14. There appears to be no creditable evidence that Judge Harding ever 
committed any poaching violations and it is anticipated that those charges will be 
dismissed or resolved soon. 
15. Judge Harding never appeared in court under the influence of alcohol or 
drugs and never failed to make any of his court appearances as a result of substance 
abuse. 
000205 
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16. - The illnesses that were observed by others during the second week of July, 
2002, were unrelated to substance abuse. Mr. Harding suffered from some flu symptoms 
on the Thursday and Friday before his arrest, but again this was not the result of 
substance abuse. 
17. Any recesses or breaks Judge Harding took while on the bench were for 
reasons other than substance abuse. It is not uncommon forjudges to take recesses and 
breaks periodically especially during hearings where a judge may want to compose 
himself or herself before pronouncing a ruling. Additionally, judges may take breaks for 
staff and lawyers to refocus, or check a point of law. 
18. Without reiterating too much of Judge Harding's life, it is clear that he 
started an emotional decline after the death of his first wife in October of 1991. That 
problem was exacerbated by a motorcycle accident in 1997 and a subsequent divorce. 
The problem became much more serious in October 2001, when Judge Harding's drug 
abuse problem began. This problem culminated with Judge Harding's arrest in July 2002. 
After the arrest, he has conducted himself appropriately and has not used or abused any 
alcohol or controlled substances whatsoever. 
Allowing Ray Harding to continue to practice law while on probation with other 
conditions will allow him to complete community service hours by volunteering time at a 
legal aid or legal defender office. It will also allow him to continue to assist other 
lawyers and judges both locally and nationally who suffer from addiction and who are in 
desperate need of mentors, such as Ray, who have overcome their problems. He has 
suffered the loss of his judgeship, his dignity, his liberty and has accepted full and 
complete responsibility for his actions. It is unlikely that taking his ability to practice law 
at this point would serve any legitimate purpose. Please let me know if there is 
anything further we can provide. 
Sincerely, /I 
/ / 
SKORDAS & CASTON, LLC. 
CMgazyXj. Skordas 
GGS/hy J\ \ 
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CERTIFICATION 
I Ray Harding, Jr., having been first dully sworn depose and say that I have read 
the foregoing Response to Notice of Infonnal Complaint and the contents therein are true 
and correct to the best of my knowledge. 
Dated this i y of September, 2003. 
Subscribed and sworn to before me day of September, 2003. 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:ss 
County of Salt Lake ) 
" N o S y Public— " 1 
BRIGID CARNEY , 
9ExctMng*Placa.M10 I 
SaKUteCBKUtollMiai , 
MyuoiHRNwincxpiflM 1 
»r 1,2004 
Notary Pijfclic r / *
 f 
My Commission Expires: y''°l 
Residing at: %^t/ CJJU (Lett 
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SCREENING PANEL MEMO 
Case No.: 03-0417 OPC Staff: Billy L Walker 
Respondent: Ray Harding, Jr. Complainant: Office of Professional Conduct 
Membership No.: 01363 Disciplinary History: 
Date of Birth: 11-23-53 
Year Admitted: 1978 
Address/Telephone: 11165 North Yarrow Circle 
Highland, UT 84603 
(801)756-6279 
Respondent's Attorney: Gregory Skordas 
A. Alleged Violations: 
Rule 8.4(b) (Misconduct) 
Rule 8.4(c) (Misconduct) 
Rule 8.4(d) (Misconduct) 
Rule 8.4(a) (Misconduct) 
B. Summary of Investigation: 
On March 25, 2003 the Utah Supreme Court ordered the Office of Professional 
Conduct ("OPC") "to proceed with a disciplinary review [of Ray Harding, Jr.] under its 
ordinary rules " (000001). On May 22, 2003 the OPC served a Notice of Informal 
Complaint on Edward Brass, Mr. Harding's counsel during the criminal proceedings 
(000152). On August 5, 2003 the OPC served the Notice of Informal Complaint 
("NOIC") on Mr. Harding (000160). Gregory Skordas, Mr. Harding's counsel, filed a 
response by letter of September 5, 2003 (000202). Sheleigh A. Harding submitted 
information by letter of September 14,2003 (000297). 
C. Introduction: 
In accordance with an Order of Reference from the Utah Supreme Court dated 
March 25,2003, the OPC was requested "to proceed with a disciplinary review under its 
ordinary rules, but with its conclusions and recommendations regarding Mr. Harding's 
license to practice law to be submitted directly to this Court for final action." Therefore, 
the OPC's charge in this case is to not only forward the results of its investigation to the 
Screening Panel on alleged Rules of Professional Conduct violations but also its 
conclusions and recommendations for a specific sanction with respect to Mr. Harding's 
law license in accordance with the Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions 
("Standards"). 
Additionally, since, the Court has requested that "under its ordinary rules" the 
conclusions and recommendation regarding Mr. Harding's license to practice law be 
submitted directly to the Supreme Court (and not to the District Court if there is probable 
cause for a formal complaint pursuant to Rule 10(b)(5)(F) of the Rules of Lawyer 
Discipline and Disability ("RLDD") or to the Chair of the Ethics and Discipline Committee 
if there is a preponderance of evidence for a recommendation of an admonition or 
public reprimand pursuant to Rules 10(b)(5)(D) and (E) of the RLDD), the OPC will 
forward the conclusions and recommendation for a specific sanction with respect to Mr. 
Harding's law license to the Supreme Court. This means that unlike other matters 
heard by the Screening Panel and determined pursuant to Rule 10(b)(5) of the RLDD, 
the Screening Panel's determination in this case may recommend a specific sanction 
beyond those outlined in Rule 10(b)(5) of the RLDD and should do so if the evidence 
supports a sanction in accordance with the Standards for this case. This expands the 
Screening Panel recommendation authority to those sanctions that ordinarily would be 
determined by a District Court (i.e. suspension, probation, disbarment). The 
recommendation and conclusion by the Screening Panel in this case will be considered 
by the Utah Supreme Court based on the record established at the Screening Panel for 
the determination of the ultimate sanction, if any, to be imposed on Mr. Harding's law 
license. 
D. Complainant's Statement: 
OPC's statement is summarized as follows: 
1. Controlled Substances 
On or about July 13,2002, after being called to Mr. Ray Harding Jr.'s home on a 
domestic disturbance call, law enforcement officers found cocaine, heroin and drug 
paraphernalia. Mr. Harding's person also tested positive for benzoylecyonine and 
opiates in addition to the cocaine. Mr. Harding was arrested and charged with two 
felony criminal counts: Count I - Unlawful Possession or Use of a Controlled 
Substance, a 3rd degree felony. Title 58, Chapter 27, Section 8(2)(a)(i) and Title 76, 
Chapter 2, Section 202 of the U. C. A. for knowingly and intentionally possessing or 
using a controlled substance to wit: cocaine, a Schedule II Controlled Substance; Count 
II - Unlawful Possession or Use of a Controlled Substance, a 3rd degree felony. Title 
58, Chapter 37, Section 8(2)(a)(i) and Title 76, Chapter 2, Section 202 for knowingly 
and intentionally possessing or using a controlled substance, to wit: Heroin, a Schedule 
I Controlled Substance. Mr. Harding was a Fourth District Court Judge for the State of 
Utah at the time of the criminal charges. 
Mr. Harding may have committed the illegal act of soliciting the controlled 
substances that he used. In this respect, cocaine and heroin are controlled substances 
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that can only be obtained illegally. Mr. Harding may have solicited these controlled 
substances from an individual by the name of Rick Connelly. 
In addition to the July 13,2002 incident, Mr. Harding's wife indicated to the police 
that she had previously seen Mr. Harding smoking "crack" and Mr. Harding admitted to 
his wife that he had been using "crack" and heroin since October 2001. Mr. Harding 
stated to his wife that he smoked "crack" in the bathroom while at work (as a judge). 
Mrs. Harding indicated that Mr. Harding had been on a drug "binge" about three 
weeks prior to the July 13,2002 incident At minimum, this raises the question whether 
Mr. Harding was under the influence of controlled substances while on the bench. 
More specifically, with respect to Mr. Harding's use of controlled substances and 
the effect of these controlled substances on his judicial responsibilities, it is at the least 
probable that Mr. Harding was unable to attend a hearing the Thursday before the July 
13,2002 incident due to his illegal controlled substance use (even though the lawyers in 
the case settled the case so his attendance was not necessary); it is at the least 
probable that Mr. Harding was under the influence of an illegal controlled substance at a 
hearing he presided over on Friday 12,2002 (the lawyers at the hearing noticed that Mr. 
Harding appeared drawn and ill); and it is at the least probable that Mr. Harding was 
under the influence of illegal controlled substances at other times while on the bench 
and specifically during the six month period prior to the July 13, 2002 incident (in this 
respect, there were reports from court staff to the police during this six month period 
that Mr. Harding had "mood" changes "and would often appear bored and disinterested 
before brief recesses when he would return refreshed.). 
Regarding the felony controlled substance charges, Mr. Harding entered a plea 
of guilty to two counts of attempted possession or the use of controlled substances -
opiates in one count, cocaine in another, class A misdemeanors. Mr. Harding was 
sentenced to 120 days of jail; fined, ordered to 500 hours of community service and 
probation for 24 months which included individual therapy and help from 12-step 
programs. 
2. Poaching 
Mr. Ray Harding Jr. allegedly killed a trophy moose and two cow elk on or about 
October 6, 2001. Mr. Harding faces three 3rd degree felony counts of wanton 
destruction of protective wildlife. Reportedly, Mr. Harding did not have the proper 
licenses and additionally this conduct may have been outside of any licensing limits. 
E. Respondent's Statement: 
Name: Ray Harding, Jr. 
Address: 11165 North Yarrow Circle 
Highland, UT 84603 
Telephone: (801) 756-3279 
Mr. Harding's responsive statement is summarized as follows: 
Mr. Harding's response should not be taken as a waiver of Mr. Harding's right to 
have his case heard by a District Court Judge. In this respect, Mr. Harding objects to 
Mr. Harding's case being treated differently than any other attorney discipline case. Mr. 
Harding states that a Screening Panel cannot and should not be required to make the 
evidentiary rulings that a judge would. Besides exceeding the Screening Panel 
authority, having the Screening Panel prosecute the case, judge the merits and 
recommend the final sanction violates the due process of Mr. Harding. 
Mr. Harding provided his Pre-Sentencing Report but only because of threat by 
the OPC that the failure to provide this report would be the basis for a separate 
professional offense. A Pre-Sentence Report is confidential and should never be part of 
a public record. It contains information that typically is probably not appropriate for a 
Screening Panel to view or consider (i.e. Mr. Harding's personal and family history). 
The Report is an investigative report for the judge for sentencing in a criminal matter. In 
this case it was prepared by the Office of Adult Probation and Parole for Judge Timothy 
Hansen to have sufficient information to make a fair determination of an appropriate 
sentence in Mr. Harding's criminal case. The confidentiality of the report should be 
honored. 
Furthermore, since a Pre-Sentence Report is investigative, it should not include 
conclusions, opinions and editorials. However, Mr. Harding's report does. Having said 
that, Mr. Harding believes the Pre-Sentence Report is helpful because it provides to the 
OPC and the Screening Panel information for a complete understanding of the case. 
With specific reference to the NOIC, in summary Mr. Harding responds as 
follows: 
1. "Benzolyecyonine" is a chemical term for Valium which was a prescribed 
drug and which was legally possessed by Mr. Harding. The other 
controlled substances listed in the NOIC are illegal. 
2. Mr. Harding was not convicted of a felony. He was charged with two 
possession counts that were reduced to two class A misdemeanors. This 
is not uncommon for first time offenders in criminal cases and it is not 
uncommon for people to practice their professions after having been 
4 
convicted of similar class A misdemeanors after rehabilitation. The justice 
system encourages this. 
3. Even though no one could come into the possession of illegal controlled 
substances except by some illegal solicitation, Mr. Harding has never 
been and never will be charged with illegal solicitation and it is unlikely 
that the facts of this case would have supported such a criminal charge. 
Mr. Harding was found in possession of small quantities of controlled 
substances and pled guilty to two counts of attempted possession of a 
controlled substance, not illegal solicitation of a controlled substance. 
4. There is no credible evidence that Mr. Harding used or was under the 
influence of any controlled substance while he served on the bench as a 
judge. Even if there is evidence that at times Mr. Harding was ill or looked 
tired, the evidence indicates that at all times he handled his cases 
appropriately from the bench. Admittedly his judgment could have been 
impaired while as a judge he was dealing with drug offenders with the 
knowledge that he was drug user himself but there is no evidence that Mr. 
Harding as a judge treated such defendants differently than any other 
judge would have. In this respect, there have been no successful 
challenges to Mr. Harding's rulings on the bench based on allegations of 
the judge's drug abuse. 
5. Mr. Harding has successfully completed a ninety-day treatment program 
and attended ninety aftercare meetings in ninety days thereafter. Mr. 
Harding continues to participate in aftercare on almost a daily basis even 
after service of substantial jail time and the order of completion of five 
hundred hours of community service. 
6. Since Mr. Harding's arrest on July 13, 2002, he has never tested positive 
for any illegal drug or alcohol and Mr. Harding reports that he has not 
abused alcohol or drugs since. 
7. Mr. Harding attends almost daily AA, CA and NA twelve step meetings. 
8. Mr. Harding has taken special efforts to stay involved in the "recovery 
community". He chairs meetings at a local treatment center. 
9. Mr. Harding has worked and continues to work with Lawyers Helping 
Lawyers and has become a liaison. 
10. Mr. Harding continues to meet with a doctor in regular therapy sessions. 
11. Mr. Harding continues to maintain contact with recovering addicts and 
alcoholics who are judges and lawyers and he has participated in national 
conferences regarding "recovering" lawyers and judges. 
12. Mr. Harding has successfully worked the Twelve Steps of Recovery with a 
sponsor. 
13. Mr. Harding is in full compliance with the terms and conditions of his 
sentence and probation resulting from his criminal substance abuse case. 
14. There is no evidence that Mr. Harding committed any poaching violation 
and it is expected that those charges will be dismissed or resolved soon. 
15. Mr. Harding never appeared in court under the influence of alcohol or 
drugs and never failed to make any of his court appearances as a result of 
substance abuse. 
16. The illnesses observed by people during the second week of July 2002 
were related to flu symptoms and not substance abuse. 
17. Any recesses taken by Mr. Harding while on the bench were not related to 
substance abuse. 
18. Mr. Harding started an emotional decline since the death of his first wife in 
October 1991. The problems became worse with a motorcycle accident in 
1997 and a divorce. Mr. Harding's drug abuse began in October 2001 and 
his problems culminated with his arrest in July 2002. After this arrest he 
has conducted himself appropriately and has not used or abused any 
alcohol or controlled substance whatsoever. 
Mr. Harding's response specifically states the following: 
"Allowing Ray Harding to continue to practice law while on 
probation with other conditions will allow him to complete community 
service hours by volunteering time at a legal aid or legal defender office. It 
will also allow him to continue to assist other lawyers and judges both 
locally and nationally who suffer from addiction and who are in desperate 
need of mentors, such as Ray, who have overcome their problems. He 
has suffered the loss of his judgeship, his dignity, his liberty and has 
accepted full and complete responsibility for his actions. It is unlikely that 
taking his ability to practice law at this point would serve any legitimate 
purpose " 
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Witnesses: (to support OPC's statement) 
• Ann E. Harding 
(Possibly) 
• Mariane O'Bryant and Sherry Ragan 
Utah County Attorney's Office 
100 East Center Street #2100 
Provo, UT 84606 
Financial Records: 
• None 
Court Records: 
• Information, Utah v. Harding. Jr.. District Court No. 021403545, 09-09-02 
(000049) 
• Discovery Index, Utah v. Harding. Jr.. District Court No. 021403545,01 -17-03 
(000144) 
• Order of Reference, In Re: Rav Harding. Jr.. Supreme Court No. 20020535, 
03-25-03 (000001) 
• Final Order, In Re: Rav Harding. Jr.. Supreme Court No. 20030173, 03-25-03 
(000003) 
• Docket, Harding. Jr. v. Judicial Conduct Commission. District Court No. 
030901394, 08-18-03 (000173) 
• Docket, Utah v. Harding. Jr.. District Court No. 031900587, 08-18-03 
(000175) 
• Docket, Utah v. Harding. Jr.. District Court No. 031800042, 08-18-03 
(000182) 
• Docket, Harding v. Harding. Jr.. District Court No. 024402310, 08-18-03 
(000186) 
• Docket, Brown v. Friel et al.. District Court No. 030400499, 08-18-03 
(000190) 
• Docket, Harding. Jr. v. Harding. District Court No. 024402632, 08-18-02 
(000192) 
• Docket, Attorney General v. Harding. Jr.. District Court No. 021403545, 08-
18-03(000194) 
Other Documentation: 
• Geoffrey Fattah, Judge Arrested in Utah County, Deseret News, 07-14-02 
(000032) 
• Matt Canham, Judge Jailed Over Drugs, Salt Lake Tribune, 07-15-02 
(000034) 
Geoffrey Fattah, $10,000 Bail Set for 4th District Judge, Deseret News, 07-15-
02 (000036) 
Jesse Coleman, Local Judge Behind Bars; Law Enforcement Shocked Over 
Harding's Drug Charges, Hark the Herald.com, 07-15-02 (000044) 
Stephen Hunt, Judge on Leave After Arrest, Salt Lake Tribune, 07-16-02 
(000038) 
Debra Jandreau, Harding Posts $10,000, Hark the Herald.com, 07-16-02 
(000042) 
Rebecca Kellog and Liesel Enke, Utah Judge Faces Drug Charges, NewsNet, 
07-17-02(000040) 
Stephen Hunt, Officer says Judges was 'Staggering', Salt Lake Tribune, 07-
18-02 (printed) (000046) 
Letter to Mr. Harding from Colin R. Winchester, 08-21-02 (000119) 
Letter to Collin R. Winchester from Sharon A. Donovan, 09-06-02 (000121) 
Letter to Sharon A. Donovan from Colin R. Winchester, 09-12-02 (000122) 
Letter to Judicial Conduct Commission from Brian R. Florence, 09-18-02 
(000123) 
Letter to Brian R. Florence from Colin R. Winchester, 09-20-02 (000125) 
Letter to Brian R. Florence from Colin R. Winchester, 10-10-02 (000126) 
Letter to Brian R. Florence from Colin R. Winchester, 11-13-02 (000127) 
Notice of Formal Proceedings, 11-19-02 (000052) 
Letter to Judicial Conduct Commission from Brian R. Florence, 12-02-02 
(000128) 
Letter to Brian R. Rorence from Colin R. Winchester, 12-12-02 (000129) 
Notice of Confidential Hearing and Pre-hearing Order, 01-03-03 (000056) 
Notice of Withdrawal of Counsel, 01-07-03 (000063) 
Letter to Judicial Conduct Commission from Brian R. Florence, 01-07-03 
(000130) 
Examiner's Position Paper, 01-17-03 (000059) 
Letter (with attachments) to Edward K. Brass from Colin R. Winchester, 01-
17-03(000131) 
Appearance of Counsel, 01-24-03 (000064) 
Motion to Stay Proceedings, 01-24-03 (000065) 
Letter to Edward K. Brass and Colin R. Winchester from Ruth Lybbert, 02-01-
03 (000134) 
Stipulation, 02-01-03 (000070) 
Transcript of hearing before Utah Judicial Conduct Commission, 02-01-03 
(000076) 
Memorandum Decision, 02-01-03 (000100) 
Letter to Edward K. Brass from Colin R. Winchester, 02-06-03 (000135) 
Letter to Edward K. Brass from Colin R. Winchester, 02-11-03 (000136) 
Order Denying Motion to Stay Proceedings, 02-12-03 (000067) 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 02-12-03 (000108) 
Order of Removal from Office, 02-12-03 (000115) 
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Letter (with attachment) to Edward K. Brass from Colin R. Winchester, 02-13-
03 (000137) 
Stephen Speckman and Linda Thomson, Embattled Judge Resigns from 
Bench, Deseret News, 03-01-03 (000016) 
Geoffrey Fattah and Linda Thomson, Harding's Wife Hopes Case Wont go to 
Trial, Deseret News, 03-03-03 (000019) 
Linda Thomson, Harding Admits to Reduced Charges, Deseret News, 03-05-
03 (000022) 
Jesse Coleman, Harding to Face New Criminal Charges, Hark the 
Herald.com, 03-22-03 (000004) 
Leziee E. Whiting, Harding Faces Poaching Charges, Deseret News, 04-12-
03 (000009) 
Fax to Edward Brass from Utah Department of Corrections Adult Probation 
and Parole, 04-22-03 (000208) 
Presentence Investigation Report, 04-23-03 (000211) 
Linda Thomson, Harding Gets 120 Days on Drug Counts, Deseret News, 04-
28-03 (000025) 
Hard Time forjudge Harding, Deseret News, 05-01-03 (000028) 
Leziee E. Whiting, Ex-judge's Poaching Case Delayed, Deseret News, 05-13-
03(000011) 
For the Record Judge Recuses Himself from Harding Case, Salt Lake 
Tribune, 05-14-03 (000013) 
Linda Thomson, Sentence by Harding Upheld, Deseret News, 07-04-03 
(000200) 
Former Judge is Released from Jail, Deseret News, 08-03-03 (000199) 
For the Record Former Judge is Arraigned on Poaching Charges, Salt Lake 
Tribune, 08-12-03 (000170) 
Matt Canham, Harding Charged with Poaching (000015) 
Previous JCC Complaints against Judge Ray M. Harding Jr., Complied by 
Susan Hunt and Colin Winchester (000142) 
J. NOIC Summary & Recommendation: 
Our investigation suggests that Mr. Harding violated Rule 8.4(b) (Misconduct) 
states u[i]t is professional misconduct for a lawyer to: Commit a criminal act that reflects 
adversely on the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other 
respects." In this respect, Mr. Harding may have violated this rule when law 
enforcement officers after being called to his home on a domestic disturbance call on 
July 13, 2002, found cocaine, heroin, and drug paraphernalia. Mr. Harding also tested 
positive for benzoylecyonine and opiates in addition to the cocaine. Mr. Harding was 
arrested and charged with two felony criminal counts: Count I - Unlawful Possession or 
Use of a Controlled Substance, a 3rd degree felony. Title 58, Chapter 37, Section 
8(2)(a)(i) and Title 76, Chapter 2, Section 202 of the U.C.A. for knowingly and 
intentionally possessing or using a controlled substance to wit: cocaine, a Schedule II 
Controlled Substance; Count II - Unlawful Possession or Use of a Controlled 
Substance, a 3rd degree felony. Title 58, Chapter 37, Section 8(2)(a)(i) and Title 76, 
Chapter 2, Section 202 for knowingly and intentionally possessing or using a controlled 
substance, to wit: Heroin, a Schedule I Controlled Substance. 
There is also evidence that Mr. Harding may have committed the illegal act of 
soliciting the controlled substances that he used. Specifically, cocaine and heroin are 
controlled substances that can only be obtained illegally and there is evidence that Mr. 
Harding solicited these controlled substances from an individual by name of Rick 
Connelly. 
In addition to this, Mr. Harding's wife indicated to the police that she had 
previously seen him smoking "crack" and he admitted to his wife that he had been using 
"crack" and heroin since October 2001. Mr. Harding stated to his wife that he smoked 
"crack" in the bathroom while at work (as a judge). 
Regarding the felony charges, reportedly, Mr. Harding entered a plea of guilty to 
two counts of attempted possession or the use of controlled substances - opiates in 
one count, cocaine in another, class A misdemeanors. Mr. Harding was sentenced to 
120 days of jail; fined, ordered to do 500 hours of community service and probation for 
24 months which includes individual therapy and help from 12-step programs. 
With respect to the criminal charges of poaching, Mr. Harding may have violated 
Rule 8.4(b) when reportedly he allegedly killed a trophy moose and two cow elk on 
October 6, 2001. Mr. Harding is facing three 3rd degree felony counts of wanton 
destruction of protected wildlife. Reportedly, he did not have the proper licenses. 
Rule 8.4(c) (Misconduct) states that "[i]t is professional misconduct for a lawyer 
to: Engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation." In this 
respect, Mr. Harding may have violated this rule by the above outlined factual 
allegations of criminal conduct. Additionally, Mr. Harding reported actions of poaching 
may be a greater reflection of dishonesty if his conduct was outside of any licensing 
limits. 
Rule 8.4(d) (Misconduct) states that "[i]t is professional misconduct for a lawyer 
to: Engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice." In this respect, 
Mr. Harding may have violated this rule by the above outlined factual allegations of 
criminal conduct. Additionally, Mrs. Harding indicated that he had been on a drug 
"binge" about three weeks prior to the July 13, 2002 incident. This raises the question 
whether Mr. Harding was under the influence of controlled substances while performing 
duties on the judicial bench. Specifically it is probable that due to controlled substance 
use that Mr. Harding was unable to attend a hearing on the Thursday before the July 
13, 2002 incident (even though the lawyers in the case settled the case so his 
attendance was not necessary); it is probable that Mr. Harding was under the influence 
of a controlled substance at a hearing he presided over on Friday July 12, 2002 (the 
lawyers at that hearing noticed that he appeared drawn and ill); it is also probable that 
he was under the influence of controlled substances at other times while on the bench 
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and specifically during the six month period prior to the July 13, 2002 incident. This is 
evidenced by reports from court staff to the police that during this six month period, he 
had "mood" changes and would often appear bored and disinterested before brief 
recesses when he would return refreshed. Finally, Mrs. Harding stated to the police that 
he indicated to her that he had smoked "crack" in the bathroom of his office. 
It should also be noted that given the nature of public trust of the position held by 
Mr. Harding, a state District Court Judge, and specifically the administration of justice 
that he was responsible for in this position, even if there is no evidence to support that 
his controlled substance abuse influenced his cases, it is OPC's contention that the 
illegal drug use, in and of itself, while serving in this position is sufficient evidence for a 
violation of 8.4(d). The OPC feels that the same analysis is true, if there is sufficient 
evidence to show that Mr. Harding committed the crime of poaching and the Panel finds 
that this crime is related to a lawyer's fitness. 
Rule 8.4(a) (Misconduct) by engaging in conduct that violates the above-
mentioned Rules of Professional Conduct. 
OPC'S RECOMMENDATION 
The purpose of the Standards is for the use in imposing a sanction or sanctions 
following a determination that a member of the legal profession has violated a provision 
of the Rules of Professional Conduct. Rule 1.3, Standards. Even considering the 
response submitted by Mr. Harding, the undisputed fact of Mr. Harding's use, 
possession and conviction for attempted possession of illegal controlled substances 
establishes that, at minimum, Mr. Harding violated Rule 8.4(b) of the Rules of 
Professional Conduct, i.e., a criminal act that reflects on the lawyer's honesty, 
trustworthiness or fitness . . .; Rule 8.4(d), conduct prejudicial to the administration of 
justice; and Rule 8.4(a), based on violations of these other Rules of Professional 
Conduct . If the Panel finds that there is sufficient evidence that Mr. Harding used 
illegal controlled substances while at work on the bench, these additional facts only 
supplement the above-mentioned rule violations. Furthermore, if the Panel finds 
sufficient evidence of the allegations of the criminal conduct of poaching and finds that 
this criminal conduct reflects upon Mr. Harding's fitness as a lawyer, this also 
supplements the above-outlined rule violations. 
The Standards are to ensure and maintain the high standard of professional 
conduct required of those who undertake the discharge of professional responsibilities 
as lawyers, and to protect the public and the administration of justice from lawyers who 
have demonstrated by their conduct that they are unable or likely to be unable to 
discharge properly their professional responsibilities. Rule 1.1, Standards. The 
Standards are a system for determining sanctions, permitting flexibility and creativity in 
assigning sanctions in a particular case of lawyer misconduct. They are designed to 
promote: (a) consideration of all factors relevant to imposing the appropriate level of 
sanction in an individual case; (b) consideration of the appropriate weight of such 
factors in light of the stated goals of. lawyer discipline; and (c) consistency in the 
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imposition of disciplinary sanctions for the same or similar offenses within and among 
jurisdictions. Rule 1.3, Standards. 
The following factors are to be considered in imposing sanctions: (a) the duty 
violated; (b) the lawyer's mental state; (c) the potential or actual injury caused by the 
lawyer's misconduct; and (d) the existence of aggravating or mitigating factors. Rule 
3.1, Standards. 
A. The Duty Violated 
An attorney's license to practice is granted on the implied understanding that the 
person receiving it will conduct himself in a manner that is proper, and will abstain form 
conduct that will bring discredit to himself, the profession, and the courts. Mr. Harding 
violated this duty by engaging in criminal activity. Additionally, Mr. Harding had a higher 
duty as a lawyer placed on him due to his judicial capacity and, at the minimum, he 
breached this duty by adjudicating cases involving drug offenders while he himself was 
a drug offender. At the maximum, Mr. Harding violated this higher duty by presiding 
over any cases while committing criminal acts. The OPC's view is that this higher duty 
was violated whether or not Mr. Harding's decisions as a judge were influenced by his 
drug use. 
B. Mr. Harding's Mental State 
Mr. Harding knowingly and intentionally committed the criminal acts, which led to 
his conviction plea. 
C. The Injury Caused bv Mr. Harding's Misconduct 
Criminal misconduct causes havoc to the public, the legal system and the 
profession. Mr. Harding "injured" each of these groups by his criminal conduct. 
Furthermore, as a lawyer and judge, Mr. Harding placed at risk the very fiber of judicial 
administration by presiding over cases while he himself was committing crimes. This 
created a level of potential harm due to the possible re-evaluation needed for those 
cases and specifically any case where Mr. Harding may have presided while under the 
influence of illegal drugs. 
D. Aggravating and Mitigating Factors 
Aggravating factors are "any considerations or factors that may justify an 
increase in the degree of discipline to be imposed." Rule 6.2, Standards. Conversely, 
mitigating factors are "any considerations or factors that may justify a reduction in the 
degree of discipline to be imposed." Rule 6.3, Standards. 
Possible mitigating and aggravating factors are identified in the Standards, 
although, as the Utah Supreme Court has noted, the lists are non-exclusive. See In re 
Tanner. 960 P.2d 399, 402 (Utah 1998). 
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The Supreme Court recently discussed the balancing process in which a court 
must engage when it considers mitigation and aggravation: 
Once a trial court determines the presumptive level of discipline, it may 
apply rule 6 and consider the aggravating and mitigating circumstances in 
deciding what sanction should ultimately be imposed. Because rule 6 
does not provide any guidance as to how these circumstances are to be 
weighed, the process of applying them is necessarily somewhat 
subjective 
To justify a departure from the presumptive level of discipline set forth 
in the Standards, the aggravating and mitigating factors must be 
significant 
In re Ince. 957 P.2d 1233,1238 (Utah 1998). 
In two fairly recent attorney discipline decisions issued by the Utah Supreme 
Court, the trial court has been found to have accorded too much weight to mitigating 
factors that were not compelling. In Ince. the Supreme Court found that the District 
Court accorded too much weight to mitigation that was "not particularly compelling." Jd. 
at 1238. Indeed, in light of the number of aggravating factors, which "at least" balanced 
the "not particularly compelling" mitigating factors, "no adjustment to the presumptively 
appropriate level of discipline is warranted." Jd. at 1238. Similarly, in In re Tanner, the 
Supreme Court found that the multiple aggravating factors "would in fact justify an 
increase in the degree of discipline imposed." In re Tanner. 960 P.2d 399, 402 (Utah 
1998). 
It is the OPC's viewpoint that the following are appropriate aggravating 
circumstances for consideration in this case: 
(1) A pattern of misconduct. Rule 6.2(c), Standards. In this respect, by Mr. 
Harding's own admission, he engaged in criminal conduct involving illegal 
drugs as early as October 2001. This would necessarily entail a pattern of 
illegal activity of obtaining and using illegal drugs for almost a year (at the 
least, until the July 2002 incident). 
(2) Multiple offenses. Rule 6.2(d), Standards. At minimum, Mr. Harding was 
convicted by his plea of two criminal offenses of possession. 
(6) Substantial experience in the practice of law. Rule 6.2(i), Standards. Mr. 
Harding has been a member of the Utah Bar since September of 1978. 
Furthermore, he had been a member of the bench since September of 
1995. 
(6) Illegal conduct, including the use of controlled substances. Rule 6.2(k), 
Standards. 
Based on what Mr. Harding has provided to the OPC, in his response and in his 
Pre-Sentencing Report, the OPC expects that Mr. Harding will, at the minimum, assert 
the following as mitigating circumstances: 
(1) Absence of a prior record of discipline. Rule 6.3(a), Standards. The OPC 
does not contest this fact, however, the question is how much weight to 
give it. The OPC feels little if any should be given because of the 
seriousness of this misconduct. See e.g. Borre v. State Bar of California. 
804 P.2d 60,53 (Cal. 1991) ("Lack of a prior disciplinary record over many 
years of practice may be considered in mitigation when coupled with 
present misconduct which is not deemed serious. It does not, however, 
preclude substantial discipline for serious misconduct."); see also 
Basbanes' Case. 676 A.2d 93, 97 (N.H. 1996) (respondent urged lack of 
disciplinary record as mitigation; the court stated, "We believe that the 
respondent's twenty-eight years of experience as a litigator could just as 
easily 'justify an increase in the degree of discipline to be imposed.'") 
(citation omitted). 
(2) Absence of a dishonest or selfish motive. Rule 6.3(b), Standards. Mr. 
Harding may claim that his misconduct does not reflect a dishonest or 
selfish motive. This is entitled to little or no weight in light of Mr. Harding's 
obvious conflict of interest with the interests of the people who appeared 
in front of him while he was on the bench. Mr. Harding's desire to obtain 
and use illegal controlled substances placed his interests before those of 
the plaintiffs and defendants, appearing in front of him thereby evidencing 
a selfish motive underlying his misconduct 
(3) Personal or emotional problems. Rule 6.3(c), Standards. Mr. Harding 
claims that his emotional decline began with the death of his first wife in 
October 1991, was exacerbated by a motorcycle accident in 1997 and a 
subsequent divorce. Presumably, all of this led to his drug use beginning 
by his admission in October 2001. Even though the OPC is sensitive to 
the effect that these types of personal problems may have on person, with 
all due respect, it is questionable whether there is a causal connection to 
problems of this type which began in 1991 to the type of drug use that Mr. 
Harding began in October 2001. Furthermore and also importantly, it is as 
questionable whether personal problems should be compelling mitigation 
for criminal possession of illegal drugs by a sitting judge. 
(4) Good character or reputation. Rule 6.3(g), Standards. As part of his Pre-
Sentencing Report and response, Mr. Harding has offered evidence 
through letters of good character and reputation and Mr. Harding may 
provide testimonial evidence of this at the Panel hearing. Although the 
testimony of witnesses might be offered in support of a claim that Mr. 
Harding has good character or reputation, this mitigation evidence is 
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entitled to little weight unless the witnesses are shown to have been 
aware of the full extent of Mr. Harding's misconduct. See Ince, 957 P.2d 
at 1238-39; In re Ford. 749 P.2d 1331,1335 (Cal.-1988) (letters of support 
that did not reflect their authors' knowledge of the full extent of attorney's 
misconduct did not constitute mitigation, and in any case, attorney "may 
continue to enjoy the respect and confidence of a number of his peers; it is 
our responsibility to determine if he is fit to remain a member of the bar."); 
Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Gary. 452 A.2d 1221, 1222-223 (Md. 
1982) (attorney convicted of tax evasion disbarred, notwithstanding 
excellent reputation): see also In re Petty. 627 P.2d 191,194 (Cal. 1981) 
(character testimony, no matter how laudatory, does not establish 
rehabilitation). 
Mental disability or impairment, including substance abuse when: 
(1) The respondent is affected bv a substance abuse or mental disability: 
and 
(2) The substance abuse or mental disability causally contributed to the 
misconduct: and 
(3) The respondent's recovery from the substance abuse or mental 
disability is demonstrated bv a meaningful and sustained period of 
successful rehabilitation: and 
(4) The recovery arrested the misconduct and the recurrence of that 
misconduct is unlikely. 
Rule 6.3 (i), Standards. 
This alleged mitigating circumstance is the focus of Mr. Harding's claim for 
mitigation (i.e. a substance abuse problem which caused the misconduct 
and is being rehabilitated). The OPC concedes that if each and every 
element of Rule 6.3(i) is met, this would be a significant mitigating 
circumstance and depending on the weight given to all mitigation and any 
aggravating circumstances this could justify a decrease in the degree of 
any discipline imposed. 
Imposition of other penalties or sanctions. Rule 6.3(1), Standards. The 
OPC anticipates that Mr. Harding will attempt to offer evidence that other 
penalties or sanctions have been imposed upon him (i.e. his criminal 
penalties and the loss of judgeship). Again, this is entitled to little weight, 
inasmuch as the sanctions imposed upon Mr. Harding in his criminal 
matter and the loss of his judgeship did not encompass the totality of Mr. 
Harding's.professional misconduct. 
(7) Remorse. Rule 6.3(m), Standards. Finally, the OPC anticipates that Mr. 
Harding will offer evidence that he is remorseful. In order for remorse to 
constitute a significant mitigating factor, something more than an isolated 
eleventh-hour expression is required. See e.g. Hipolito v. State Bar of 
California. 770 P.2d 743, 746 (Cal. 1989) (remorse may be significant 
factor in mitigation if an attorney Mdisplay[s] candor, cooperation and 
remorse throughout the disciplinary proceedings, and a willingness to 
rehabilitate himself."*) (emphasis added). The OPC does not doubt the 
genuine nature of Mr. Harding's present state of remorse. However, 
based on the evidence that the OPC has reviewed, Mr. Harding's 
expressions of remorse were made only after he had been caught and 
confronted on July of 2002. With all due respect, this suggests that Mr. 
Harding's remorse is not for his misconduct, but for his apprehension, and 
as such, is entitled to little weight. See e.g. Ince. 957 P.2d at 1238; 
Tanner. 960 P.2d at 403 ("Naturally anyone going through a trial for 
[Tanner's] wrongdoing would feel remorse after getting caught. Instead, 
the remorse question closely relates to the acknowledgement of wrongful 
conduct: did Tanner feel remorse about his behavior before getting 
caught, and was he motivated by remorse in making amends?"); In re 
Lamb. 776 P.2d 765, 768-70 (Cal. 1989) (seriousness of misconduct 
outweighed repeated expressions of "genuine remorse"). 
Rule 4.2 of the Standards outline that disbarment, absent aggravating and 
mitigating circumstances, is the appropriate presumptive sanction when a lawyer: 
(a) knowingly engages in professional misconduct as defined in Rule 8.4(a), (d), 
(e), or (f) of the Rules of Professional Conduct with the intent to benefit the 
lawyer or another or to deceive the court, and causes serious or potentially 
serious injury to a party, the public, or the legal system, or causes serious or 
potentially serious interference with a legal proceeding; or 
(b) engages in serious criminal conduct, a necessary element of which includes 
intentional interference with the administration of justice, false swearing, 
misrepresentation, fraud, extortion, misappropriation, or theft; or the sale, 
distribution, or importation of controlled substances; or the intentional killing of 
another; or an attempt or conspiracy or solicitation of another to commit any of 
these offenses; or 
(c) engages in any other intentional misconduct involving dishonesty, fraud, 
deceit, or misrepresentation that seriously adversely reflects on the lawyer's 
fitness to practice law. 
It is the OPC's viewpoint that Mr. Harding engaged in serious criminal conduct. If the 
Panel determines under 4.2(b) of the Standards that Mr. Harding's serious criminal 
conduct includes any of the elements listed under that Standard, such as solicitation of 
someone (i.e., Mr. Rick Connally) to sell Mr. Harding the illegal controlled substances 
then the presumptive discipline in this case is disbarment. See In the Matter of the 
Discipline of Pendleton. 11 P.3d 284 (Utah 2000) where an attorney was disbarred for 
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possession, use, and distribution of methamphetamines (a copy of this case is attached 
as Exhibit A). Thereafter, the issue is whether Mr. Harding's rehabilitation evidence 
sufficiently meets the standards of mitigation and outweighs any aggravation to reduce 
the degree of discipline (i.e., to a suspension). 
Rule 4.3 of the Standards outlines the presumptive discipline of suspension as 
follows: 
Suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer: 
(a) knowingly engages in professional misconduct as defined in Rule 8.4(a), (d), 
(e), or (f) of the Rules of Professional Conduct and causes injury or potential 
injury to a party, the public, or the legal system, or causes interference or 
potential interference with a legal proceeding; or 
(b) engages in criminal conduct that does not contain the elements listed in 
Standard 4.2(b) but nevertheless seriously adversely reflects on the lawyer's 
fitness to practice law. 
Due to violations of Rules of Professional Conduct 8.4(d) and 8.4(b) as outlined by the 
OPC, either Standards, 4.3(a) or 4.3(b) would be an appropriate guideline for 
suspension as the presumptive sanction in this case (if the Panel determines that the 
elements of the crime do not exist to support a presumptive disbarment sanction). 
Pursuant to Rule 2.3 of the Standards, the maximum period of suspension is 
three years. From the OPC's perspective, the best case scenario for Mr. Harding is that 
all of the elements of aggravation or significant mitigation appears to balance toward the 
presumptive discipline in this case with the exception of Mr. Harding's claim of 
rehabilitation. The worst case scenario for Mr. Harding, is that the aggravating 
circumstances outweigh the mitigation in this case and the presumptive discipline 
should be increased in degree, notwithstanding his rehabilitation claim. An argument 
certainly can be made for the worst case scenario since most of the mitigation asserted 
by Mr. Harding could be determined to have little or no weight as outlined above by the 
OPC and the added aggravating circumstance in this case is the fact of a sitting judge 
committing this type of misconduct However, the OPC's recommendation is based on 
the best case scenario for Mr. Harding. 
The OPC's recommendation is that if the evidence supports Mr. Harding's 
rehabilitation claim, consistent with the elements of the Standards, the OPC feels that 
this claim should at most reduce a presumptive sanction of disbarment to a three-year 
suspension or a presumptive sanction of suspension from a three-year suspension to a 
two-year suspension. Therefore the OPC's recommendation is that at minimum, Mr. 
Harding's law license should be suspended for a period of two years for his misconduct 
The OPC's recommendation is also somewhat supported by case law from other 
states. At least two cases are similar to Mr. Harding's case from the standpoint that the 
criminal conduct involving the lawyer occurred while the attomey was in a public service 
capacity. See In re Penn. 548 N.W.2d 526, 527 (Wise. 1996) (involving conviction of 
district attorney for misdemeanor marijuana and cocaine possession. The district 
attorney was suspended from practice for two years.) See also Office of Disciplinary 
Counsel v. Norris. 666 N.E.2d 1087 (Ohio 1996) (respondent attorney was a 
prosecuting attorney who pled guilty to misdemeanor possession of cocaine. The court 
suspended the attorney for two years with one year of the suspension stayed) (a copy 
of these cases are attached as Exhibit B). In these cases, there were mitigating 
elements of rehabilitation, remorse and accepting responsibility for actions. 
A sampling of other drug misconduct related attorney discipline cases is as 
follows: 
In re Olson, 537 N.W.2d 370 (S.D. 1995) 
Misdemeanor conviction for marijuana use resulting in a three-year 
suspension. 
In re Sawhill. 425 S.E.2d 274 (Ga. 1993) 
Indicted for possession of cocaine, obstruction of an officer, two counts 
of DUI; pled guilty to possession of cocaine; sentenced to three years 
probation conditioned on surrender of license for 3 years. 
Aggravation: entered rehabilitation only when required to do so; 
continued practicing until ordered to stop; sought to continue practicing after 
his conviction; failed to cooperate with Bar. 
Disbarment. 
State of Colorado v. Stauffer. 858 P.2d 694 (Colo. 1993) 
Convicted of possession cocaine (felony); failed to pay judgment 
against him for expert witness bill. 
Aggravation: prior discipline; failure to acknowledge wrongful conduct; 
substantial experience; indifference. 
Mitigation: personal and emotional problems; delay in proceedings. 
Aggravation: misrepresentations to clients; practicing law while 
suspended. 
Disbarment. 
In re Nelson. 874 P.2d 1201 (Kan. 1994) 
Pled guilty to attempted possession of cocaine (felony); sentenced to 
one and one-half to five years in prison; served 3 months, then probation; 
random urinalysis negative; doctor testified to complete recovery from 
addiction; legal competence not in question. 
During criminal prosecution, made false allegations against police. 
Failed to communicate with client (2 counts). Abandoned client 
Mitigation: long term practice with only one previous discipline; 
general good character; therapy and clean urinalysis; no pattern of 
misconduct. 
Aggravation: failed to return retainer to client. 
Indefinite Suspension. 
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In re Rivkind. 791 P.2d 1037 (Ariz. 1990) 
Convicted of attempted possession of cocaine (felony); placed on 
interim suspension, no impact on work 
Aggravation: repeated violation of state law for extended period. 
Mitigation: remorse, rehabilitation, cooperation. 
Suspension (2 years, followed by 2 year probation). 
In re Gooding. 917 P.2d 414 (Kan. 1996) 
Charged with 13 criminal counts; found guilty of possession of narcotic 
drugs (felony); sentenced to 3 to 10 years in prison; actually served one year; 
eventually acquitted pursuant to habeas corpus petition; admitted using 
cocaine for ten years; engaged in illegal conduct including possession of 
illegal substances and paraphernalia. 
Aggravation: use of cocaine for 10 years; multiple offenses; illegal 
conduct. 
Mitigation: absence of prior disciplinary record; personal and 
emotional problems; cooperation; good character and reputation; 
rehabilitation; remorse. 
Suspension presumptive discipline; because of compelling mitigation, 
2 year probation. 
In re Abelman. 744 P.2d 486 (Colo. 1987) 
Pled guilty to using cocaine 
Mitigation: rehabilitation, cooperation 
Suspension (6 months). 
It should be noted that none of the cases are right on point with Mr. Harding's 
case with respect to all aspects of the facts, presumptive sanction standards in this 
jurisdiction, and the elements of aggravation and mitigation. And, as far as the OPC 
knows, there is no case directly on point in our jurisdiction. Therefore, Mr. Harding's 
case should be determined based on its facts in accordance with Utah's Standards. 
The various elements of the cases from other jurisdictions can be used as a 
backdrop for Utah's determination. 
One final note, Mr. Harding in his response has suggested that the 
appropriate sanction in this case should be one that allows him to continue to 
practice law (i.e. to complete community service etc.). This suggestion is essentially 
requesting that probation be the appropriate sanction in this case. 
Probation is an allowable sanction under the Standards. Specifically Rule 2.7 
of the Standards states: 
Probation is a sanction that allows a lawyer to practice law under 
specified conditions. Probation can be public or non-public, can be 
imposed alone or in conjunction with other sanctions, and can be 
imposed as a condition of readmission or reinstatement. 
It is the position of the OPC that in Utah, probation is not appropriate as a 
sole sanction for cases where due to the misconduct, disbarment is potentially the 
presumptive sanction. As outlined by this memo disbarment is certainly a possibility 
in Mr. Harding's case. In cases like Mr. Harding's, it is the OPC's viewpoint that 
consistent with the goals of lawyer discipline and the responsibilities that the legal 
profession has to the public to maintain the high standards of professional conduct 
that the discipline sanction imposed involve actual time out from the practice of law. 
This time out is a lawyer's license price that Mr. Harding should pay for his 
misconduct. Furthermore, due to the nature of the substance abuse problem that 
Mr. Harding is claiming and the probationary requirements of his criminal case, Mr. 
Harding may need this time out to evidence a "meaningful and sustained period of 
successful rehabilitation" and to show that "the recurrence of that misconduct is 
unlikely." Rule 6.3(i), Standards. 
Having said the foregoing, the OPC does not object to probation added to a 
sanction consisting of time out from the practice of law (i.e. at the minimum the two 
years consistent with the OPC's recommendation). And certainly consistent with 
Rule 2.7 of the Standards, completion of all probations (including his criminal case) 
should be made before he is reinstated or readmitted to the practice of law. 
Dated: _ H ^ 4 - N a m e : "R, JUL A ^/JUy 
Dated: Name: 
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convicted of a crime that reflected on his honesty, 
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second petition was filed, appellant had been convicted 
of die possession charge. Appellant challenged the trial 
court's judgment disbarring him. The court affirmed The 
court held appellee did not have to take appellant's case 
to a screening panel, his request to change die judge was 
untimely, appellants requests for a protective order and 
relief from default admissions were properly denied, 
appellee's protective order was properly granted, 
disbarment was proper, and appellant was not denied due 
process. 
OUTCOME: Judgment affirmed because trial court did 
not err in not requiring appellant's action first be brought 
before a screening panel, appellant's notice of change of 
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protective order motion was properly granted, 
disbarment was appropriate, and appellant was not 
denied due process. 
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RUSSON 
OPINION: 
[*287] RUSSON, Associate Chief Justice: 
Gary Pendleton appeals from die district court's 
judgment disbarring him for misconduct involving his 
possession, use, procurement, and distribution of 
methamphetamine. We affirm. 
BACKGROUND 
Pendleton was licensed to practice law in the state 
of Utah and was engaged full time in the practice of law 
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in Washington County, Utah, when criminal charges 
were filed against him. On April 28, 1997, he was 
charged in Fifth District Court with criminal solicitation 
to deliver a controlled substance, distribution of a 
controlled substance (two counts), and possession or use 
of a controlled substance. In December 1997, a jury trial, 
[**2] presided over by District Judge David E. Roth, 
was held in die criminal court nl at which the State 
presented evidence of Pendleton's alleged involvement 
with methamphetamine, a controlled substance. The jury 
returned a verdict of guilty on the charge of possession 
or use of a controlled substance, a third degree felony in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2XaXi)> n2 and 
on March 16, 1998, the criminal court entered its 
judgment of conviction of this offense. The criminal 
court sentenced Pendleton to a five-year prison term but 
stayed the sentence and placed Pendleton on thirty-six 
months' probation. 
nl To avoid confusion, the district court in 
which Pendleton's criminal trial took place shall 
be referred to in this opinion as the "criminal 
court" and the district court in which die 
disciplinary proceeding took place shall be 
referred to as the "disciplinary court" 
n2 The other three charges were dismissed 
before die matter was submitted to the jury for 
determination. 
On July 2, 1997, after [**3] die criminal charges 
had been filed against Pendleton but before he was 
ultimately convicted, the Utah State Bar's Office of 
Professional Conduct (die "OPC") commenced a separate 
disciplinary proceeding against Pendleton by filing a 
petition for die interim suspension of Pendleton in the 
Fiflh District Court The OPC filed its petition pursuant 
to rule 18 of the Rules of Lawyer Discipline and 
Disability ("RLDD"), which permits die OPC to seek 
interim suspension of a lawyer who poses a substantial 
threat of irreparable harm to the public, pending a final 
determination of whether permanent discipline is 
necessary. The OPC alleged in its petition that Pendleton 
(1) possessed and used methamphetamine, (2) solicited 
one of his clients, Donald Mills, to distribute 
methamphetamine to him, (3) purchased large amounts 
of methamphetamine from Mills, (4) requested 
methamphetamine from Mills's wife, Shannon Mills, in 
exchange for legal services, and (5) accepted 
methamphetamine in exchange for legal services 
provided to another client, Robert Hernandez. The OPC 
contended that in light of these acts, Pendleton's 
continued practice of law posed a substantial threat of 
irreparable harm to die public. [**4] The presiding 
judge of die Fifth District Court assigned Senior Judge 
Boyd Bunnell to preside over the [*288] OPCs 
disciplinary proceeding against Pendleton. 
On January 10, 1998, a hearing was held before 
Judge Bunnell on die OPCs petition for interim 
suspension. In an order entered January 20, 1998, the 
disciplinary court granted the OPCs petition and ordered 
that Pendleton be suspended from the practice of law 
pending final disposition of die disciplinary proceeding 
against him. On February 19, 1998, Pendleton filed a 
notice of appeal of the interim suspension order. 
On March 3, 1998, die OPC filed a formal 
complaint in the disciplinary court pursuant to rule 18 of 
die RLDD, which provides that once an interim 
suspension order is entered, die OPC is entitled to file a 
formal complaint seeking permanent discipline. In 
addition to listing the allegations set forth in die OPCs 
rule 18 petition for interim suspension, the formal 
complaint listed additional allegations of misconduct that 
had arisen since the petition was filed, including 
allegations that Pendleton (1) distributed 
methamphetamine to Marlene Meyers, a client, and 
smoked methamphetamine with her in his [**5] office, 
(2) failed to wind up his law practice, as required by rule 
26 of the RLDD and die disciplinary court's interim 
suspension order, (3) engaged in die unauthorized 
practice of law while on an administrative suspension for 
failure to pay his annual licensing fee, (4) improperly 
used his client trust account, and (5) was convicted of 
possession or use of methamphetamine. The OPC 
requested in its formal complaint that Pendleton be 
disbarred for his alleged misconduct 
On April 1,1998, Pendleton filed a notice of change 
of judge as a matter of right pursuant to rule 11 of the 
RLDD, which entities a lawyer subject to discipline to a 
change of judge as of right when die lawyer files a notice 
within thirty days after the action is commenced against 
the lawyer. The OPC opposed Pendleton's notice, 
contending that die notice was untimely. Senior Judge 
Douglas L. Cornaby was assigned to rule on the notice of 
change of judge, since die judges of die Fifth District 
recused themselves. 
On June 2, 1998, a hearing was held before Judge 
Cornaby on Pendleton's notice of change of judge. The 
OPC contended that Pendleton's notice was untimely 
because it was not filed within [**6] thirty days after die 
action had commenced, as required by rule 11 and this 
action "commenced" when die motion for interim 
suspension was filed on July 2, 1997—several months 
before Pendleton requested a change of judge. Pendleton 
argued, however, that the notice was timely because the 
action against him did not "commence" for purposes of 
rule 11 until the OPC filed its formal complaint on 
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March 3, 1998, and thus, die notice of change of judge 
was timely filed on April 1, 1998. Judge Comaby ruled 
that Pendleton's notice of change of judge was untimely 
and thus denied the notice. Judge Bunnell then continued 
to preside over die ongoing disciplinary proceeding 
against Pendleton. 
During this time, we granted Pendleton's 
interlocutory appeal of the rule 18 interim suspension 
order and concluded on April 20, 1998, that while 
Pendleton's conduct constituted grounds for discipline, 
his conduct was insufficient to justify interim suspension 
under rule 18. We therefore stayed die rule 18 interim 
suspension order pending final resolution of die 
proceeding against Pendleton in die disciplinary court 
We added, however, that die OPC was entitled to move 
for interim suspension under [**7] rule 19 of the RLDD. 
On April 24, 1998, after we decided Pendleton's 
appeal from the rule 18 interim suspension order, die 
OPC filed with the disciplinary court a second motion for 
interim suspension. This time die OPC sought the interim 
suspension of Pendleton under rule 19 of the RLDD, 
which enables the OPC to seek interim suspension "upon 
being advised that a lawyer has been convicted of a 
crime which reflects adversely on the lawyer's honesty, 
trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects." 
At this point, Pendleton's conviction had been entered for 
possession or use of a controlled substance. Pendleton 
opposed the rule 19 motion for interim suspension, 
arguing, in part, that a conviction of possession or use of 
a controlled substance does not warrant interim 
suspension. [*289] On July 6, 1998, the disciplinary 
court ultimately granted die OPCs rule 19 motion for 
interim suspension, again suspending Pendleton from the 
practice of law pending die final outcome of die 
disciplinary proceeding. 
On May 1,1998, die OPC served upon Pendleton a 
set of interrogatories, a request for admissions, and a 
request for production of documents. On June 5, 1998, 
Pendleton [**8] moved for a protective order seeking 
relief from die OPCs requested discovery. Pendleton 
contended that the OPCs requests were not reasonably 
calculated to lead to die discovery of admissible 
evidence and that die requested discovery involved 
"impermissible inquisition." The OPC objected to 
Pendleton's motion for a protective order by filing both a 
motion to strike Pendleton's motion and a memorandum 
in opposition to Pendleton's motion. The OPC argued 
that Pendleton's motion was untimely, unsigned, and 
lacking an accompanying memorandum of points and 
authorities, and should therefore be stricken. Moreover, 
die OPC contended that its discovery requests were 
reasonable and sought relevant evidence. Chi June 22, 
1998, Pendleton filed an amended motion for a 
protective order, accompanied by a forty-five-page 
memorandum of points and authorities. In his 
memorandum, Pendleton argued that the district court 
lacked jurisdiction over this case during the pendency of 
Pendleton's earlier appeal and, thus, Pendleton had no 
duty to respond to the OPCs discovery requests, which 
were filed during the pendency of the appeal. The 
disciplinary court denied Pendleton's motion, stating: 
Respondent's [**9] motion is so general that it in effect 
is asking the Court to deny the Bar its rights of discovery 
in preparing for die disbarment proceeding. For the Court 
to enter such a general and all-inclusive protective order 
would thus deny die Bar its discovery rights as set forth 
in die Rules of Civil Procedure. 
The court did not address the jurisdictional issue raised 
by Pendleton. 
After die disciplinary court denied Pendleton's 
motion for a protective order, Pendleton still did not 
respond to the OPCs interrogatories, request for 
production of documents, or request for admissions. 
Therefore, on September 4,1998, die OPC filed a motion 
to compel responses to the interrogatories and request for 
production of documents. As for the request for 
admissions, die OPC alleged that die matters therein 
were deemed admitted because Pendleton failed to 
respond thereto within thirty days as required by rule 36 
of die Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. n3 
n3 This rule provides in pertinent part: 
Each matter of which an admission is requested 
shall be separately set forth. The matter is 
admitted unless, within thirty days after service 
of the request,... die party to whom the request is 
directed serves upon the party requesting the 
admission a written answer or objection 
addressed to die matter 
Utah R. Civ. P. 36(a)(2). 
[**10] 
On September 15,1998, die disciplinary court ruled 
tinat die matters set forth in die OPCs request for 
admissions were, indeed, deemed admitted by default In 
addition, die court ordered Pendleton to respond to the 
OPCs interrogatories and request for production of 
documents before September 18,1998. 
On September 18, 1998, Pendleton finally filed a 
response to die OPCs interrogatories and request for 
production of documents, but included admissions and 
denials of die matters set forth in die OPCs request for 
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admissions. The OPC filed a motion objecting to 
Pendleton's late responses to the request for admissions 
and requested that his responses be stricken because the 
matters had already been deemed admitted. In response, 
Pendleton moved for relief from his default admissions. 
The disciplinary court ultimately ruled that Pendleton 
was not entitled to relief from his default admissions, and 
die same were deemed admitted. 
Meanwhile, the OPC sought partial summary 
judgment as to Pendleton's alleged violations of rule 
8.4(d) of the Rules of Professional Conduct In a motion 
filed on September 4, 1998, the OPC argued that 
undisputed facts as to [**11] Pendleton's admitted use, 
possession, solicitation, and distribution of 
methamphetamine established that Pendleton committed 
criminal acts reflecting adversely [*290] on his honesty, 
trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer in violation of rule 
8.4(d). The disciplinary court granted die motion for 
partial summary judgment on September 18,1998. In its 
order granting die motion for partial summary judgment, 
the disciplinary court made numerous findings of fact, 
including (1) Pendleton's default admissions, (2) 
Pendleton's admission at an earlier hearing that he 
possessed and used methamphetamine over an extended 
period of time, and (3) the feet of Pendleton's conviction 
for his possession or use of methamphetamine. The court 
concluded in its order that Pendleton had violated rule 
'8.4(d) and ordered that a sanctions hearing be held to 
determine die appropriate sanctions for Pendleton's 
misconduct 
On November 5, 1998, Pendleton served a number 
of interrogatories upon the OPC. The OPC thereafter 
moved for a protective order on the grounds that die 
discovery requests were irrelevant and not reasonably 
calculated to lead to admissible evidence. On December 
24, 1998, the disciplinary [**12] court granted die 
OPCs motion and entered a protective order. 
The disciplinary proceeding against Pendleton 
culminated in a sanctions hearing commenced on 
January 27, 1999, to determine the appropriate 
permanent sanction to be imposed upon Pendleton. At 
the hearing, Pendleton testified that he had been 
convicted for possessing methamphetamine, that he had 
obtained methamphetamine from a client, that he had 
repeatedly used metiiamphetamine, that he had violated 
his probation agreement and had been sent to jail, that he 
had refused to submit to urinalysis while in jail, and that 
he knew possessing metiiamphetamine and asking 
another to procure it for him were criminal acts. 
Other witnesses, including clients of Pendleton, 
testified at the hearing. Marlene Meyers testified that 
while a client of Pendleton, she smoked 
metiiamphetamine with Pendleton at his office. Donald 
Mills testified that while a client of Pendleton, he 
received legal services in exchange for 
metiiamphetamine, Pendleton paid him to purchase 
methamphetamine for Pendleton, he used 
metiiamphetamine with Pendleton several times, and 
Pendleton supplied him with methamphetamine. Other 
witnesses testified [** 13] that when Pendleton presented 
himself to the jail to serve his sixty-day sentence for 
violating his probation agreement, he was under the 
influence of methamphetamine. 
On March 5, 1999, the disciplinary court ordered 
that disbarment was the appropriate presumptive 
sanction for Pendleton's misconduct and, in the 
alternative, that even if suspension was the presumptive 
sanction, disbarment was still proper due to several 
aggravating factors. The court based its ruling upon its 
findings of feet regarding evidence presented at the 
sanctions hearing as to Pendleton's use, distribution, and 
procurement of metiiamphetamine. The court also 
incorporated those findings of feet set forth in its earlier 
order granting partial summary judgment against 
Pendleton, which were based on Pendleton's admissions 
and his conviction. 
Pendleton now appeals the disciplinary court's 
ruling and raises the following claims of error (1) the 
disciplinary court erred in allowing the OPC to pursue 
this action in the Fifth District Court without "first 
proceeding through a "screening" panel; (2) Pendleton's 
notice of change of judge was timely; (3) the disciplinary 
court erred in denying his [** 14] motion for a protective 
order and denying relief from his default admissions; (4) 
the disciplinary court erred in granting die OPCs motion 
for a protective order; (5) die disciplinary court erred in 
concluding that disbarment was proper, and (6) the 
disciplinary court denied Pendleton due process. We will 
address each argument in turn. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
"Given the unique nature of attorney discipline 
proceedings, we may draw our own inferences from the 
trial court's factual determinations, which we review 
under a clearly erroneous standard." In re Stubbs, 1999 
UT15, P19, 974 P.2d296 (citing In re Tanner, 960 P.2d 
399, 401 (Utah 1998)). While we give serious 
consideration to the rulings and factual findings of die 
disciplinary court, "we may make an independent [*291] 
judgment regarding the appropriate level of discipline" if 
the evidence warrants. In re Knowlton, 800 P.2d 806, 
809 (Utah 1990). Our review of this disciplinary 
proceeding is guided by the stated purpose and scope of 
theRLDD: 
(c) ... These rules shall be construed so as to achieve 
substantial justice and fairness in disciplinary matters 
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with [**15] dispatch and at the least expense to all 
concerned parties. 
(d) The interests of die public, the courts, and the legal 
profession all require that disciplinary proceedings at all 
levels be undertaken and construed to secure die just and 
speedy resolution of every complaint 
RLDD l(c)-(d). 
ANALYSIS 
I. THE SCREENING PANEL 
Pendleton argues that the disciplinary court erred in 
allowing the OPC to pursue this action in die district 
court without first proceeding through a "screening" 
panel. In addition, he alleges that the OPC was not 
entitled to raise additional allegations in its formal 
complaint outside the scope of those allegations raised in 
the motion for interim suspension. 
In the typical case, a disciplinary proceeding is 
initiated by die filing of an informal complaint with die 
OPC. See RLDD 10(a)(1). After the informal complaint 
is filed, the OPC has die opportunity to conduct a 
preliminary investigation into die allegations of 
misconduct, see RLDD 10(a)(3), and the respondent 
attorney may respond to the allegations raised in die 
informal complaint, see RLDD 10(aX5). Unless OPC 
counsel determines that the informal complamt [** 16] is 
nonmeritorious, the OPC then refers the case to a 
screening panel, see RLDD 10(a)(5)-(6), whose purpose 
is to determine whether there is "probable cause to 
believe that there are grounds for public discipline and 
that a formal complaint is merited," RLDD 11(a). If the 
screening panel concludes that probable cause exists, 
then the OPC can file with the district court Na formal 
complaint setting forth in plain and concise language die 
facts upon which the charge of unprofessional conduct is 
based and die applicable provisions of the Rules of 
Professional Conduct*9 Id. 
However, it is not always necessary for die OPC to 
have a screening panel's recommendation before filing a 
formal complaint When applicable, rules 18 and 19 
enable the OPC to file a petition for interim suspension 
directly with the district court without going through a 
screening panel First, rule 18 applies when the lawyer 
"poses a substantial threat of irreparable harm to the 
public" and has violated the Rules. of Professional 
Conduct RLDD 18(a). When die district court orders 
interim suspension under rule 18, die OPC is entitled to 
file a formal complaint in die district court See RLDD 
[**17] 18(b)(2). 
Second, rule 19 applies when die lawyer "has been 
convicted of a crime which reflects adversely on die 
lawyers honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer." 
RLDD 19(b). If a lawyer is convicted of a crime that 
fells within die purview of rule 19, the OPC may file 
concurrently a motion for interim suspension and a 
formal complaint See RLDD 19(b). In sum, both rule 18 
and rule 19 obviate the need for the OPC to proceed 
tiirough a screening panel for a determination of 
probable cause before filing a formal complaint 
Rules 18 and 19 do not, however, alter the 
requisites of the formal complaint These requirements-
which apply to proceedings that are screened by a panel 
or are commenced directly in the district court—are listed 
in rule 11(a). This rule states that die formal complaint 
shall "setQ forth in plain and concise language the facts 
upon which the charge of unprofessional conduct is 
based and the applicable provisions of the Rules of 
Professional Conduct" RLDD 11(a). These broad 
requirements thus permit die OPC to include in its 
complaint any facts on which its disciplinary proceeding 
will be based. The formal complaint need not [**18] be 
limited to die specific allegations that supported die 
petition for interim suspension. 
In the instant case, four separate counts of drug-
related offenses were filed against Pendleton in the 
criminal court. After [*292] discovering die pending 
criminal charges against Pendleton, the OPC filed a 
petition for interim suspension in the disciplinary court 
under rule 18. The allegations on which die rule 18 
petition was based were Pendleton's pending criminal 
charges and the alleged conduct that prompted those 
charges. The disciplinary court granted die petition and 
suspended Pendleton. Subsequently, the criminal court 
convicted Pendleton for use or possession of 
methamphetamine. After Pendleton was convicted, the 
OPC filed a formal complaint in the disciplinary court 
The formal complaint included not only the allegations 
stated in the earlier petition for interim suspension, but 
also die feet that Pendleton's conviction had been 
entered, along with evidence of additional purported 
misconduct that was discovered after die rule 18 petition 
was filed. 
As rule 18 makes clear, it was proper for die OPC 
to file a formal complaint after die disciplinary court 
ordered interim [**19] suspension under rule 18. Under 
this rule, it was unnecessary for die OPC to proceed first 
through a screening panel. Moreover, nothing precluded 
die OPC from including in its formal complaint 
additional allegations of purported misconduct that arose 
or were discovered after die petition for interim 
suspension was filed. Our review of the formal complaint 
indicates tiiat it satisfied the basic requirements outlined 
in rule 11(a). Furthermore, although we stated in our 
previous order that it was error for the disciplinary court 
to order interim suspension under rule 18, we stayed the 
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interim suspension of Pendleton "pending final 
disposition of the disciplinary proceeding" against him. 
We did not stay the ongoing final disciplinary 
proceeding or in any way limit the scope of the formal 
complaint that had been filed in Hie disciplinary court 
Rather, our order made clear that Pendleton's conduct 
was "certainly reprehensible and constituted grounds for 
disciplinary proceedings." 
In addition, even after we stayed the interim 
suspension under rule 18, the OPC was still entitled to 
file a motion for interim suspension under rule 19. We 
made this clear in our earlier order, recognizing [**20] 
that by that time, Pendleton had been convicted of a 
crime that "reflected adversely on [Pendleton]'s honesty, 
trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer.19 RLDD 19(b). 
However, when the OPC filed the rule 19 motion for 
interim suspension, there was no need for the OPC to file 
another formal complaint The rule 19 motion simply 
requested the interim suspension of Pendleton pending 
the final discipline that the OPC already sought by 
having filed the formal complaint Finally, because the 
OPC satisfied die requirements of rule 19, there was no 
need for the OPC to proceed through a screening panel at 
this stage of the disciplinary proceeding. Pendleton's first 
claim of error thus fails. 
IL PENDLETON'S NOTICE OF CHANGE OF 
JUDGE 
Pendleton claims on appeal that the disciplinary 
court erred when it ruled that Pendleton's notice of 
change of judge was untimely. Pendleton contends that 
the requirement that die notice be filed within thirty days 
after the commencement of die action was satisfied since 
the action commenced when the formal complaint was 
filed. Thus, he alleges, die notice was timely. The OPC 
alleges that die action commenced when the OPC filed 
its petition for interim [**21] suspension and therefore 
Pendleton's notice was untimely. 
Rule 11 of the RLDD states that a lawyer is entitled 
to a change of judge as of right if die lawyer files a 
notice of change of judge within thirty days "after 
commencement of die action." RLDD 11(d)(2). We thus 
must determine when an action commences in the 
context of a lawyer disciplinary proceeding. Rule 11 
outlines the procedure by which a typical case proceeds 
from a screening panel to die district court 
(a) Commencement of action. In the event die screening 
panel finds probable cause to believe that there are 
grounds for public discipline and that a formal complaint 
is merited, OPC counsel shall prepare and file with the 
district court a formal complaint.... 
RLDD 11(a). Thus, when proceeding through a 
screening panel, an action is not commenced until a 
formal complaint is filed [*293] widi die district court 
The formal complaint is die first pleading filed with the 
district court, and it is at that stage of die proceedings 
that a district judge is assigned to the case. 
However, a disciplinary proceeding that is brought 
under rule 18 is different As discussed above, rule 18 
permits [**22] die OPC to bypass die screening panel 
by petitioning for interim suspension directly to the 
district court when die lawyer poses a substantial threat 
of irreparable harm to die public. In such a case, die 
petition for interim suspension is the first pleading filed 
with the court, and it is at that stage of die proceeding 
that a district judge is assigned to the case. The 
subsequent filing of a formal complaint under rule 18 is 
simply another step in die disciplinary proceeding that 
was already initiated by filing a petition for interim 
suspension. Thus, die "action" is "commenced" under 
rule 18 when the petition for interim suspension is filed. 
n4 
n4 In contrast, an action commences under 
rule 19 when both die petition for interim 
suspension and die formal complaint are filed 
because both must be filed concurrently under 
rule 19. 
In the instant case, die OPC filed a rule 18 petition 
for interim suspension against Pendleton on July 2,1997, 
and a formal complaint on March 3,1998. Judge Bunnell 
was [**23] assigned to this case when die petition for 
interim suspension was filed and was still presiding over 
die disciplinary proceeding when Pendleton filed a notice 
of change of judge on April 1, 1998, more than thirty 
days after die petition was filed and the action was 
commenced. Thus, Pendleton's notice was untimely and 
was properly denied by Judge Cornaby. 
HI. THE OPCS REQUEST FOR ADMISSIONS 
Pendleton argues that the court erred in denying his 
motion for a protective order, which sought relief from 
die OPC's request for admissions, in ruling tiiat the 
matters were deemed admitted against him, and in 
denying his motion for relief from the default 
admissions. 
A. Pendleton's Motion for a Protective Order 
We first address the disciplinary court's denial of 
Pendleton's motion for a protective order. Pendleton 
objected to die OPC's request for admissions because the 
request was filed during die pendency of his appeal of 
die rule 18 interim suspension to this court Pendleton 
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claims that the disciplinary court lacked jurisdiction over 
the disciplinary proceeding during that time. He 
specifically claims that die disciplinary court incorrectly 
ruled that his [**24] motion was untimely. 
We disagree with Pendleton's characterization of 
die disciplinary court's ruling. The disciplinary court 
specifically stated that its denial of Pendleton's motion 
was not based on die timeliness of the motion. Rather, 
the court explained in its order denying die motion: 
The Respondent's motion is so general that it in effect is 
asking the Court to deny die Bar its rights of discovery in 
preparing for the disbarment proceeding. For die Court to 
enter such a general and all-inclusive protective order 
would deny the Bar its discovery rights as set forth in the 
Rules of Civil Procedure. 
The court did not address die timeliness of Pendleton's 
motion or the jurisdictional issue raised by Pendleton. 
Nonetheless, before we can address whether the 
disciplinary court set forth a proper basis for denying die 
motion, it is necessary for us to address the jurisdictional 
issue raised by Pendleton. 
Under rule 5 of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, when a litigant appeals from a nonfinal, 
interlocutory order, die appellate couifsrevjew of the 
appeal is discretionary. See Utah R. App. P. 5(a). 
Moreover, it is generally recognized that [**25] die 
granting of an interlocutory appeal does not normally 
divest the district court of jurisdiction over the 
underlying matter. See 16 Charles A. Wright et al., 
Federal Practice and Procedure: Jurisdiction 2d § 
39212, at 53-64 (1996); see also, e.g., Ex Parte Nat'l 
Enameling <& Stamping Co., 201 US. 156, 162, SOL Ed 
707, 26 S. Ct 404 (1906) ("It was not intended diat die 
cause as a whole [*294] should be transferred to the 
appellate court prior to die final decree. The case, except 
for the hearing on the appeal from die interlocutory 
order, is to proceed in the lower court as diough no such 
appeal had been taken, unless odierwise specially 
ordered.'1); Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. 
Norris, 2000 US App. LEXIS 14680, *3-4 (10th Cir. 
2000). When the scope of die interlocutory appeal is not 
affected by litigation of die underlying action, the 
interest in expediting litigation requires that die district 
court proceed with die action. See 16 Wright, supra, at 
54, 56. An interim suspension order, by definition, is a 
nonfinal order because it is entered "pending final 
disposition of a disciplinary [**26] proceeding 
predicated upon the conduct causing the harm." RLDD 
18(b) (emphasis added). Thus, the appeal of an interim 
suspension order is interlocutory and does not normally 
divest die district court of jurisdiction over die pending 
disciplinary proceeding. 
In the instant case, Pendleton's earlier appeal to this 
court from the disciplinary court's interim suspension 
order was an appeal from a nonfinal, interlocutory order. 
Moreover, die pending proceeding to determine whether 
permanent disciplinary sanctions should be imposed 
against Pendleton was in no way dependent upon our 
disposition of Pendleton's interlocutory appeal. Thus, 
even though the disciplinary court foiled to address this 
issue, die disciplinary court retained jurisdiction over die 
ongoing disciplinary proceeding, and the OPC was 
entitled to proceed widi discovery. 
We now examine whether die disciplinary court 
properly denied Pendleton's motion for a protective 
order. Rule 26(c) of die Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
provides in pertinent part: 
Upon motion of a party or by the person from whom 
discovery is sought, and for good cause shown, die court 
... may make any order which justice [**27] requires to 
protect a party or person from annoyance, 
embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense, 
including one or more of die following: 
(1) that discovery not be had; 
(4) that certain matters not be inquired into, or that die 
scope of die discovery be limited to certain matters.... 
Moreover, we have stated that die district court is 
entrusted with broad discretion in dealing with discovery 
matters, namely, protective orders. See R.&H Energies 
v. Mother Earth Indus., Inc., 936 P.2d 1068, 1079 (Utah 
1997). This court will "*not find abuse of discretion 
absent an erroneous conclusion of law or where there is 
no evidentiary basis for the trial court's rulings.'" Id. 
(quoting Askew v. Hardman, 918 P.2d 469, 472 (Utah 
1996)). 
In die instant case, Pendleton's motion sought a 
protective order "relieving him from responding to all of 
die Bar's requests for admissions, interrogatories, and 
requests for production of documents." Pendleton set 
forth two grounds for die relief he requested in his 
motion: 
1. The requested discovery is not reasonably calculated 
to lead to die discovery of admissible [**28] evidence. 
2. The requested discovery seeks information which has 
no relationship to die professional misconduct which is 
properly alleged and is die subject matter of these 
proceedings: information which would establish that of 
2000UT77;l lPJd284,*; 
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which respondent has never been accused. It is 
impermissible inquisition. 
The disciplinary court correctly ruled that 
Pendleton's motion would have denied the OPC any 
further meaningful discovery in this case. The court 
correctly determined that the OPCs specific 
interrogatories, requests for admissions, and requests for 
production of documents were reasonably calculated to 
lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. The OPCs 
complaint involved allegations of criminal activity, into 
which the OPCs requested discovery properly inquired. 
Moreover, die OPCs requested discovery sought to find 
evidence establishing certain aggravating factors, 
including Pendleton's addiction to methamphetamine and 
his failure to seek treatment, and his failure to comply 
with die disciplinary court's rule 18 [*295] order of 
interim suspension. Discovering this evidence was 
essential to die OPCs duty to determine whether 
Pendleton had violated die Rules of Professional [**29] 
Conduct and what sanction should be imposed. 
Furthermore, Pendleton's motion for a protective 
order was untimely under rule 36 of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure because it was not filed within thirty 
days of service of the request for admissions. As 
discussed above, Pendleton's interlocutory appeal did not 
prevent the OPC from requesting discovery, nor did it 
relieve Pendleton of his duty to respond within thirty 
days. Thus, the disciplinary court did not abuse its 
discretion when it denied Pendleton's motion for a 
protective order. 
B. Pendleton's Default Admissions 
We next address whether the matters set forth in the 
OPCs request for admissions were properly deemed 
admitted. The disciplinary court deemed die matters 
admitted because Pendleton failed to file a timely 
response to the OPCs request for admissions: Rule 36 
makes clear that "each matter of which an admission is 
requested... is admitted" if not responded to within thirty 
days. Utah R. Civ. P. 36(a)(2); see also Triple I Supply, 
Inc. v. Sunset Rail. Inc. 652 P.2d 1298. 1299-1300 
(Utah 1982). In the instant case, Pendleton foiled to 
timely respond to die OPCs request [**30] for 
admissions. Thus, die trial court correctly concluded that 
the matters set forth in the OPCs request were deemed 
admitted. 
C. Pendleton's Motion for Relief from His 
Admissions 
In Langeland v. Monarch Motors, Inc., we 
addressed die effect of a party's failure to timely respond 
to a request for admissions. See, 952 P.2d 1058,1060-64 
(Utah 1998). In that case, we explained: 
Requests for admission must be taken seriously, and 
answers or objections must be served promptly. The 
penalty for delay or abuse is intentionally harsh, and 
parties who foil to comply with the procedural 
requirements of rule 36 should not lightly escape the 
consequences of the rule. 
Id at 1061. Rule 36 provides that die court may permit 
withdrawal or amendment [of the admission] when the 
presentation of die merits of the action will be subserved 
thereby and die party who obtained the admission fails to 
satisfy the court that withdrawal or amendment will 
prejudice him in maintaining his action or defense on the 
merits. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 36(b). We explained in Langeland that in 
order to show that withdrawal or amendment promotes 
die presentation [**31] of the merits of the action, 
die party seeking amendment or withdrawal must (1) 
show that the matters deemed admitted against it are 
relevant to the merits of the underlying cause of action, 
and (2) introduce some evidence by affidavit or 
otherwise of specific facts indicating that die matters 
deemed admitted against it are in feet untrue. 
952 P.2d at 1062. If die moving party M s to satisfy this 
two-part test, the nonmoving party is relieved of its 
burden under rule 36(b) to show that it would suffer 
prejudice as a result of die withdrawal or amendment, 
and the trial court has no discretion to grant die motion 
for relief from the admissions. See id at 1063-64. 
We thus turn to the instant case to determine 
whether Pendleton has met his burden of proving that 
relief from the admissions promotes die presentation of 
the merits of the action. First, under Langeland, 
Pendleton must show die relevance of die admissions to 
die merits of the disciplinary proceeding. See id at 1062. 
The admissions are clearly relevant to die disciplinary 
proceeding against Pendleton because they involve 
Pendleton's possession, use, [**32] procurement, and 
distribution of methamphetamine, the allegations upon 
which the disciplinary proceeding was premised. Second, 
under Langeland, Pendleton must introduce evidence that 
the matters deemed admitted are untrue, and "something 
more than a bare denial is required." Id. Pendleton has 
felled to meet this burden. His belated response to die 
OPCs request for admissions included denials of several 
of the requests, but he [*296] Med to support his 
denials with any supporting evidence or affidavit 
Moreover, his motion for relief from die admissions 
merely contends that the default admissions have a 
prejudicial effect upon him. Again, he failed to present 
any evidence supporting his contention of prejudice or 
the falsity of die admissions. Thus, Pendleton has M e d 
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to meet his burden under rule 36(b) of establishing that 
relief from the admissions would promote the 
presentation of the merits of the action against him. As a 
result, as we explained in Langeland, 952 P.2d at 1063-
64, because Pendleton failed to meet his burden under 
rule 36(b), the disciplinary court had no discretion to 
grant Pendleton's motion for relief from his admissions. 
Thus, the disciplinary [**33] court properly denied 
Pendleton's motion. 
IV. THE OPCS MOTION FOR A PROTECTIVE 
ORDER 
Pendleton next claims that the disciplinary court 
erred in granting the OPCs motion for a protective order 
and thus providing relief from any obligation to respond 
to Pendleton's interrogatories. As discussed above, die 
district court is granted broad discretion in whether to 
enter a protective order. See FL&R Energies v. Mother 
Earth Indus., Inc., 936 P.2d 1068,1079 (Utah 1997). We 
will mnot find abuse of discretion absent an erroneous 
conclusion of law or where there is no evidentiary basis 
for the trial courts rulings.'" Id. (quoting Askew v. 
Hardman, 918P.2d469,472 (Utah 1996)). 
The disciplinary court granted the OPCs motion for 
a protective order on two bases. First, the disciplinary 
court held that at the time Pendleton's interrogatories 
were filed and served, the only aspect of this case to be 
concluded was the sanctions hearing, and thus, any 
proper discovery request "would have to be limited to 
matters covered by rule 4 of the Rules of Professional 
Conduct and matters in aggravation or mitigation of the 
sanctions to [**34] be imposed." Examining Pendleton's 
interrogatories, however, the court concluded: 
None of the interrogatories, except for die request to 
identify contemplated witnesses, would lead to 
admissible evidence on this final issue or they cover 
privileged or confidential information; [Pendleton's 
requests] are cumulative since much of the information 
requested is already in the record by way of deposition or 
transcript; [and the requests] callQ for mental 
impressions, conclusions or legal theories of the Utah 
State Bar or [its] attorneys. 
Second, the court noted that the interrogatories were 
signed by Pendleton, not by his attorney of record, as 
required by rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
n5 
n5 This rule provides in relevant part: 
Every pleading, written motion, and other paper 
shall be signed by at least one attorney of record 
in the attorney's individual name, or if the party is 
not represented by an attorney, shall be signed by 
the party. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 11(a). 
[**35] We conclude that both bases on which the 
disciplinary court entered a protective order were proper. 
First, as the court correctly noted, the interrogatories 
would not lead to die discovery of admissible evidence, 
were cumulative, and called for OPC work product 
Pendleton's interrogatories included, for example, such 
requests as "identify your ultimate objective in the 
instant case and identify die criteria by which it was 
established"; "state whether or not disciplinary counsel is 
subject to any professional discipline under die Rules of 
Lawyer Discipline and Disability or under any other 
established regimen [sic]"; and "identify the factors 
which have lead [sic] you to conclude that allegations of 
professional misconduct which you advanced in your 
petition can be appropriately asserted as grounds for 
permanent discipline in your formal complaint whether 
or not Judge Bunnell found merit in diem." As die 
disciplinary court correctly concluded, these requests 
would not lead to die discovery of admissible evidence, 
and they lack any other justifiable legal basis for 
discovery. It was therefore proper for the disciplinary 
court to grant relief from Pendleton's interrogatories. 
[**36] Second, die disciplinary court property 
concluded that it was necessary under rule 11 for 
Pendleton's discovery request to be [*297] signed by his 
attorney of record. At die time die requested discovery 
was served, Pendleton was not acting pro se; rather, his 
attorney of record was Jim R. Scarth. Thus, it was 
necessary under rule 11 for Mr. Scarth to sign 
Pendleton's discovery request Because Mr. Scarth did 
not sign the request, die disciplinary court properly ruled 
that Pendleton had failed to meet die requirements of rule 
11. In sum, the disciplinary court did not abuse its 
discretion by entering a protective order to relieve the 
OPC from Pendleton's substantively and procedurally 
improper discovery request 
V. DISBARMENT 
Pendleton claims diat the disciplinary court erred in 
concluding that disbarment was an appropriate sanction 
for his misconduct Pendleton argues that suspension was 
appropriate, and he takes issue with die disciplinary 
court's reliance upon aggravating factors. The OPC 
contends that disbarment was the appropriate 
presumptive sanction and that even if suspension were 
die correct presumptive sanction, disbarment was still 
appropriate due to die aggravating [**37] factors 
established by die OPC. 
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Rule 4 2 of the Standards for Imposing Lawyer 
Sanctions ("SILS") states that disbarment is appropriate 
when a lawyer engages in serious criminal conduct 
involving "the sale, distribution, or importation of 
controlled substances;... or ... solicitation of another to 
commit any of these offenses." SILS Rule 42(b). Rule 
43 of the SILS explains that suspension is an appropriate 
sanction when the lawyer engages in criminal conduct 
that "seriously adversely reflects on the lawyer's fitness 
to practice law." SILS Rule 43(b). Rule 6.1 of the SILS 
provides, "After misconduct has been established, 
aggravating and mitigating circumstances may. be 
considered and weighed in deciding what sanctions to 
impose." Possible aggravating factors pertinent to this 
case include: 
(b) dishonest or selfish motive; 
(c) a pattern of misconduct; 
(d) multiple offenses; 
(f) submission of false evidence, false statements, or 
other deceptive practices during the disciplinary process; 
(g) refusal to acknowledge the wrongful nature of the 
misconduct involved, either to the client or to the 
disciplinary authority; 
(h) vulnerability [**38] of victim; 
(0 substantial experience in the practice of law .... 
SILS Rule 62. Potential factors in mitigation include, for 
example, the absence of a prior record of discipline. See 
SILS Rule 63. Factors in aggravation or mitigation are 
not limited to those specifically enumerated in the rules. 
See SILS Rules 6 2 , 6 3 . 
In the instant case, the disciplinary court concluded 
that the appropriate presumptive sanction was 
disbarment and, in the alternative, suspension aggravated 
to disbarment 
The disciplinary court premised its conclusion that 
disbarment was the appropriate presumptive sanction not 
upon the fact of Pendleton's criminal conviction for 
methamphetamine possession, but upon the courts 
factual findings regarding Pendleton's possession, use, 
procurement, and distribution of methamphetamine. On 
the basis of evidence presented at die sanctions hearing, 
the disciplinary court found that Pendleton testified to 
using methamphetamine fifty or sixty times within a 
three-year period. The court also found that Pendleton 
accepted methamphetamine from Mills in exchange for 
legal services. On two or three occasions, Mills received 
money [**39] from Pendleton to purchase 
methamphetamine for Pendleton, and Mills supplied 
methamphetamine to Pendleton twelve to fifteen times 
from June 1995 to October 1996. The disciplinary court 
also found that Pendleton supplied methamphetamine to 
Meyers and smoked methamphetamine with her in his 
office while she was a client and within the setting of die 
attorney-client relationship. The court found that 
Pendleton violated his probation agreement by receiving 
traffic citations and Ming to report diem to his 
probation officer and then being arrested for failing to 
appear. The court found that Pendleton had been 
sentenced to sixty days in jail for his probation [*298] 
violation and that he was under die influence of 
methamphetamine when he reported to jail to serve his 
sentence. Furthermore, the disciplinary court 
incorporated in its final order of disbarment die findings 
of fact from its order of partial summary judgment, 
which included Pendleton's admissions regarding his 
possession, use, procurement, and distribution of 
methamphetamine, and also his criminal conviction. 
Pendleton argues that these findings are 
unsupported by the evidence in the record. Pendleton 
fails, however, to [**40] marshal die evidence in 
support of the disciplinary court's findings, and 
regardless, the court's findings are amply supported by 
die record. n6 
n6 T o successfully challenge a trial court's 
findings, an appellant must first marshal all the 
evidence that supports the trial court's findings. 
After marshaling the supportive evidence, die 
appellant then must show that, even when 
viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to 
the trial court's ruling, die evidence is insufficient 
to support die trial court's findings." State v. 
Gamblin, 2000 UT44, PJ7n29 1 P.3dll08. 
In view of these findings, the disciplinary court 
concluded that Pendleton had violated rule 8.4(b) of die 
Rules of Professional Conduct, n7 and die court held that 
Pendleton had engaged in serious criminal conduct 
involving "die sale, distribution, or importation of 
controlled substances;... or ... solicitation of another to 
commit any of these offenses," justifying the 
presumptive discipline of disbarment under [**41] rule 
4 2 of die SOLS. 
n7 "It is professional misconduct for a 
lawyer to ... commit a criminal act that reflects 
adversely on the lawyer's honesty, 
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trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other 
respects...." Utah R. Prof. Conduct 8.4(b). 
Pendleton argues that disbarment was not die 
appropriate presumptive sanction for his misconduct 
because his only criminal conviction, on which the 
interim suspension order was premised, was for simple 
possession of methamphetamine. However, nothing in 
the SILS or die RLDD limits the scope of a disciplinary 
proceeding and die ultimate sanction imposed to the 
conduct for which die court enters an interim suspension. 
Moreover, nothing prevents the court in a disciplinary 
proceeding from making findings of fact regarding a 
lawyer's criminal misconduct, even if that misconduct 
has not yet resulted in a criminal conviction. 
As discussed above, an interim suspension order is 
a temporary sanction that is entered pending the final 
disposition of a disciplinary [**42] proceeding against 
the lawyer. The interim suspension order enables the 
disciplinary court to take swift action against the lawyer 
to protect die public while preserving die opportunity to 
then conduct a full-scale disciplinary proceeding to 
determine the scope and extent of die lawyer's 
misconduct The OPCs investigation may invariably 
reveal, after the interim suspension order is entered, 
additional instances of misconduct, and there is no 
justifiable basis" for' preventing die disciplinary court 
from making findings in regard to such misconduct and 
using these findings to determine an appropriate 
sanction. Indeed, to enable the court to adequately weigh 
and appreciate the gravity of the lawyer's misconduct, it 
is necessary that die OPC bring all instances of 
misconduct to die court!s attention. This serves "the 
interests of the public, die courts, and die legal 
profession," as required under rule 1(d) of die RLDD. 
Thus, tiiere is no reason to limit the scope of a final 
disciplinary proceeding to the misconduct that 
precipitated the interim suspension order. 
Moreover, in determining an appropriate sanction 
for lawyer misconduct, die SILS do not prevent the 
disciplinary [**43] court from examining criminal 
conduct that has not yet resulted in a criminal conviction. 
While an interim suspension order is proper under rule 
19 of the RLDD only if the lawyer has been convicted of 
a crime, disbarment is proper anytime a lawyer engages 
in "serious criminal conduct," as set forth in rule 42(b) 
of the SILS, regardless of whether die lawyer was 
ultimately convicted of the misconduct Enabling the 
disciplinary court to examine all of die lawyer's criminal 
acts that are revealed during die discovery process 
promotes "consideration of all factors relevant to 
imposing the appropriate level of sanction in an 
individual case." SILS Rule 13(a). Thus, it was proper 
for the disciplinary [*299] court to conclude, from its 
factual findings, that Pendleton sold and distributed 
controlled substances and solicited the distribution of 
controlled substances, even tiiough he was not convicted 
of such offenses. Furthermore, in light of Pendleton's 
serious criminal misconduct, die disciplinary court 
correctly concluded that disbarment was die appropriate 
presumptive sanction. Having thus concluded that 
disbarment was die correct presumptive sanction for 
Pendleton's misconduct, we need not [**44] address die 
disciplinary court's alternative conclusion that if 
suspension was the appropriate presumptive sanction, 
disbarment was still appropriate due to numerous 
aggravating factors. 
VI. DUE PROCESS 
Pendleton's final claim of error is that he was denied 
due process "as a result of disciplinary counsel's 
overreaching and die district court's bias." Pendleton's 
due process claim involves a series of allegations. First, 
he claims that OPC counsel used hearsay to persuade die 
disciplinary court to issue its interim suspension order 
under rule 18. This claim is moot because this court has 
previously vacated the rule 18 order. Second, Pendleton 
contends that the court's findings in support of the 
disbarment order were unsupported by die record. 
However, he fails to indicate which findings are 
unsupported and fails to marshal the evidence. Third, 
Pendleton argues that the disciplinary court improperly 
limited his cross-examination of Mills. Again, Pendleton 
fails to show dial the disciplinary court abused its 
discretion, and he presents no evidence of the 
disciplinary court's alleged bias. Finally, he claims that 
the disciplinary court willfully distorted the record. This 
[**45] allegation also lacks any support or explanation. 
In sum, Pendleton fails to cite any authority for die 
proposition that any of these events constituted a 
deprivation of due process, and our review indicates that 
he received all of die process that was due under the 
applicable rules. 
CONCLUSION 
The disciplinary court did not err in ruling that the 
appropriate sanction for Pendleton's misconduct was 
disbarment We dierefore affirm the disciplinary court's 
ruling. 
Chief Justice Howe, Justice Durham, Justice 
Dun-ant, and Justice Wilkins concur in Associate Chief 
Justice Russon's opinion. 
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July 24,1996, Decided 
SUBSEQUENT HISTORY: [****1] As Amended. 
Application for Reinstatement Granted March 8,1999, 
Reported at 1999 Ohio LEXIS 808. 
PRIOR HISTORY: ON. CERTIFIED REPORT by 
the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline of the Supreme Court, No. 95-34. 
On November 18, 1994, based on his plea of guilty, a 
federal court convicted respondent, David William 
Noiris, die Prosecuting Attorney of Portage County, 
Attorney Registration No. 0021394, of the 
misdemeanor of possession of cocaine. The court 
placed respondent on a two-year probation and fined 
him $ 250. Pursuant to his agreed guilty plea, 
respondent resigned as prosecutor and sought drug 
counseling and rehabilitation. 
On April 10, 1995, relator, Office of Disciplinary 
Counsel, filed a complaint charging respondent with 
violating DR1-102 (A)(3) (engaging in illegal conduct 
involving moral turpitude) and 1-102(A)(6) (engaging 
in conduct adverse to his fitness to practice law). 
At a hearing before a panel of the Board of 
Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline of the 
Supreme Court ("board"), die parties stipulated to the 
above facts and violation of die Disciplinary Rules as 
charged. Respondent and other witnesses testified in 
mitigation that while respondent [****2] had used 
cocaine in the past, he did not use or possess it on the 
day charged in the indictment, but that respondent had 
entered his guilty plea to avoid a trial Respondent and 
others testified that since his resignation as prosecutor, 
respondent regularly attended rehabilitation meetings. 
Respondent and others further testified that respondent 
has become involved with the Ohio Lawyers 
Assistance Program and a similar program in Florida, 
where he temporarily resided, and that he has tested 
drug-free on numerous random occasions during die 
six-month period prior to the panel's hearing. Several 
lawyers, a judge, a physician, the chief executive 
officer of a comity hospital who is also an attorney, 
and a representative of the Ohio Lawyers Assistance 
Program testified as to respondent's being a highly 
qualified attorney and being committed to his 
rehabilitation. 
The panel found that mitigating circumstances existed 
and recommended that respondent be suspended from 
the practice of law for two years, but that the 
suspension be stayed, provided that the respondent 
continues his rehabilitation and fulfills his contract 
with the Ohio Lawyers Assistance Program, submits to 
periodic and random [****3] drug testing, and 
continues to attend AA meetings. The board adopted 
the panel's findings and recommendation. 
CASE SUMMARY 
PROCEDURAL POSTURE: The court considered a 
report by die board of commissioners on grievances 
and discipline of die supreme court, which adopted a 
panel's findings and recommendation that respondent 
attorney be suspended from die practice of law for two 
years, but that die suspension be stayed. Relator office 
of disciplinary counsel had filed a complaint charging 
die attorney with violating Ohio Code Prof. Resp. DR 
1-102(A)(3) and 1-102(A)(6). 
OVERVIEW: The attorney had pleaded guilty to and 
was convicted in federal court of the misdemeanor of 
possession of cocaine. The court concurred with the 
board's findings, but found that a more severe penalty 
was warranted. The court took as feet that the attorney 
was guilty of die misdemeanor of possessing cocaine, 
despite his testimony, and that of others, that there 
were no facts to support his conviction and that he pled 
guilty to avoid a trial. The court noted that the attorney 
had committed the misdemeanor while serving as an 
elected public official whose sworn duty was to 
prosecute the very crime he was committing. The court 
determined that it should temper any penalty due to its 
belief that in a case involving substance abuse, die 
disciplinary process of the court could and should be 
viewed as a potential for recovery, as well as a 
procedure for the imposition of sanctions. The court 
concluded that it was clear from the testimony that the 
attorney had already committed himself to a 
rehabilitation program in which he had made 
significant progress. 
Pagel 
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OUTCOME: The court suspended the attorney from 
the practice of law for two years with one year of fee 
suspension stayed. The court required the attorney to 
comply with the drug and alcohol treatment of the state 
lawyers assistance program throughout the two-year 
period, to have mandatory, periodic random drug 
testing, and to continue to attend AA meetings. The 
court taxed costs taxed to the attorney. 
CORE TERMS: canon, misdemeanor, suspension, 
disciplinary, character witness, one year, two-year, 
testifying, separately, prestige 
LexisNexis(TM) HEADNOTES - Core Concepts 
Legal Ethics > Sanctions > Disciplinary Proceedings 
> Hearings 
(EN1]A guilty plea is not a ceremony of innocence, 
nor can it be rationalized in a subsequent disciplinary 
proceeding. 
Legal Ethics > Professional Conduct > Substance 
Abuse 
[HN2]In a case involving substance abuse, the 
disciplinary process of the court can and should be 
viewed as a potential for recovery, as well as a 
procedure for the imposition of sanctions. 
HEADNOTES: Attorneys at law - Misconduct -
Two-year suspension with one year of stayed on 
conditions — Conviction of possession of cocaine. 
COUNSEL: Geoffrey Stern, Disciplinary Counsel, 
and Stacy M. Solochek, Assistant Disciplinary 
Counsel, for relator. 
Antonios C. Scavdis, for respondent 
JUDGES: MOYER, CJ., DOUGLAS, RESNICK, 
FJE. SWEENEY, PFEDFER and STRATTON, JJ., 
concur. COOK, J., concurs separately. 
OPINION: 1*94] 
1***1088] 
Per Curiam. We concur with Ac board's findings, but 
believe that a more severe penalty [***1089] is 
warranted. First, we take as feet that the respondent is 
guilty of the misdemeanor of possessing cocaine. 
Despite his testimony, and that of others, that Acre 
were no facts to support his conviction and that he pled 
guilty to avoid a trial, we decline to go behind the 
federal court's judgment As we pointed out in 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Mesi (1995). 72 Ohio St 3d 
45. 49. 647 N.E.2d 473. 476. [HNl]wa guilty plea is 
not a ceremony of innocence, nor can it be rationalized 
in a subsequent disciplinary proceeding." 
Second, we recognize that respondent committed this 
misdemeanor [****4] while serving as an elected 
public official whose sworn duty was to prosecute the 
very crime he was committing. Our previous decisions 
involving public officials should have provided a 
warning to respondent Disciplinary Counsel v. 
Smakula (1988V 39 Ohio St 3d 143. 529 NJE.2d 1376 
(assistant prosecutor received one-year suspension for 
misdemeanor of ticket fixing); Disciplinary Counsel v. 
Gross f1983V 11 Ohio St 3d 48.11 Ohio B. Rep. 195. 
463 N.E.2d 382 (misdemeanor convictions of 
Industrial Commission attorney for drug abuse and 
driving under the influence warranted indefinite 
suspension). 
Third, we are disposed to temper any penalty due to 
our belief that [HN2]in a case involving substance 
abuse, "the disciplinary process of this court can and 
should be viewed as a potential for recovery as well as 
a procedure for the imposition of sanctions." 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Michaels (1988^ 38 Ohio St 
3d 248. 251. 527 N.E.2d 299. 302. la this case it is 
clear from the testimony that die respondent has 
already committed himself to a rehabilitation program 
in which he has made significant progress. 
In view of the foregoing, die respondent is hereby 
suspended from the practice of law [****51 for two 
years with one year of the suspension stayed, provided 
that throughout the two-year period he complies with 
the" drug and alcohol treatment of die Ohio Lawyers 
Assistance Program, and otherwise complies in full 
with his contract under that program, has mandatory 
periodic random drug testing, and continues to attend 
AA meetings. Costs taxed to the respondent 
Judgment accordingly. (*95] 
MOYER, CJ., DOUGLAS, RESNICK, FJS. 
SWEENEY, PFEIFER and STRATTON, JJ., concur. 
COOK, J., concurs separately. 
CONCURS Y: COOK 
CONCUR: Cook, J., concurring. I write separately on 
the subject of judges testifying as character witnesses 
in disciplinary proceedings. Canon 2 of the Code of 
Judicial Conduct prohibits a judge from lending the 
prestige of die office to advance the private interests of 
others. It states that "[a judge] should not testify 
voluntarily as a character witness.19 Canon 2(B). As 
explained in die commentary to Canon 2, the 
"testimony of a judge as a character witness injects die 
prestige of his [her] office into the proceeding *** and 
may be misunderstood to be an official testimonial." 
Although the canon does not afford a judge the 
privilege against testifying in response to an official 
[****6] summons, such practice should be 
Parr* 0 
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discouraged'when employed as a means to circumvent 
the very principle espoused by Canon 2. 
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In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings Against DAVID V. PENN, Attorney at Law. 
No. 95-0536-D 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
201 Wis. 2d 405; 548 N.W.2d 526; 1996 Wise. LEXIS 64 
June 4,1996, Filed 
DISPOSITION: 1***1] Attorney's license 
suspended. 
CASE SUMMARY 
PROCEDURAL POSTURE: The referee 
recommended that the license of an attorney, who was 
die county district attorney, be suspended for two years 
as discipline for professional misconduct 
OVERVIEW: The attorney's state bar membership 
was suspended for failure to pay membership dues. He 
was later convicted of six drug-related misdemeanors. 
His sentence was withheld and he was placed on 
probation for three years, with six months in the 
county jaiL He was also ordered to perform community 
service. The referee concluded that the attorney had 
violated the conflict of interest rule, Wis. Sup. Ct R. 
20:1.7, by representing the State when that 
representation was materially limited by his own 
interests. The referee found that the attorney discussed 
a defendant's case with him out of the presence and 
without the consent of the defendant's attorney, in 
violation of Wis. Sup. Ct R. 20:4.2. Moreover, the 
attorney committed criminal actions reflecting 
adversely on his fitness as a lawyer, in violation of 
Wis. Sup. Ct R 20:8.4. The referee recommended a 
two-year suspension. The court adopted the referee's 
findings of feet and conclusions of law concerning the 
attorney's professional misconduct and imposed the 
recommended two-year suspension. The court also 
ordered die attorney to pay the costs of the 
proceedings. 
OUTCOME: The court ordered the suspension of the 
attorney's license to practice law in Wisconsin for a 
period of two years. The court also ordered the 
attorney to pay the costs of the disciplinary proceeding. 
CORE TERMS: referee, district attorney, 
professional misconduct, suspended, cocaine, license 
suspension, illegal drug, recommended, practice law, 
marijuana, deferred, two-year, license, disciplinary 
proceeding, appropriate discipline, license to practice, 
personal knowledge, trustworthiness, consultation, 
metabolite, materially, discipline, membership, 
misconduct, adversely, convicted, referral, honesty, 
fitness, felony 
LezisNexis(TM) HEADNOTES - Core Concepts 
Legal Ethics > Client Relations > Conflicts of Interest 
[HNl]Wis. Sup. Ct R. 20:1.7 provides in part 
Conflict of interest general rule, (b) A lawyer shall not 
represent a client if the representation of that client 
may be materially limited by die lawyer's 
responsibilities to another client or to a third person, or 
by the lawyer's own interests, unless: (1) the lawyer 
reasonably believes the representation will not be 
adversely affected; and (2) the client consents in 
writing after consultation. When representation of 
multiple clients in a single matter is undertaken, the 
consultation shall- include explanation of the 
implications of the common representation and the 
advantages and risks involved. 
Legal Ethics > Professional Conduct > Opposing 
Counsel & Parties 
[HN2]Wis. Sup. Ct R. 20:42 provides: 
Communication with person represented by counsel In 
representing a client, a lawyer shall not communicate 
about the subject of the representation with a party the 
lawyer knows to be represented by another lawyer in 
the matter, unless the lawyer has the consent of the 
other lawyer or is authorized by law to do so. 
Legal Ethics > Professional Conduct > Moral 
Accountability 
PBN3]Wis. Sup. Ct R. 20:8.4 provides in part 
Misconduct It is professional misconduct for a lawyer 
to: (b) commit a criminal act that reflects adversely on 
the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a 
lawyer in other respects. 
OPINION: [**526J ATTORNEY disciplinary 
proceeding. 
1*405] PER CURIAM We review the 
recommendation of the referee that fee license of 
David V. Pexm to practice law in Wisconsin be 
suspended for two years as discipline for the following 
professional misconduct [*406] While serving as 
Pagel 
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Vilas county district attorney from 1987 through 1992, 
Attorney Perm used marijuana and cocaine, for which 
he was subsequently convicted, and acted as district 
attorney in respect to referral and prosecution of nine 
persons who had used an illegal drug with him or had 
personal knowledge of his illegal drug use. In late 
1993 and early 1994, Attorney Penn's use of marijuana 
and cocaine resulted in a deferred prosecution 
arrangement On one occasion, Attorney Perm 
discussed a pending criminal matter with a defendant 
whose felony drug charge he was prosecuting out of 
the presence of the defendant's attorney and without 
his consent 
We determine that the recommended two-year license 
suspension is appropriate discipline to impose for 
Attorney Penn's professional misconduct The 
seriousness of his criminal conduct in using illegal 
drugs is exacerbated by [***2] the feet that it occurred 
in the context of Ids official position as district 
attorney, a position of public trust in the legal system 
to which the people of his county elected him. His 
repeated contravention of die criminal law, which was 
widely known in die community, caused significant 
and unjustified damage to the public's perception of the 
integrity of law enforcement personnel throughout die 
county. 
Attorney Penn was admitted to practice law in 
Wisconsin in 1986 and practiced and served as district 
attorney in Eagle River. He has not previously been the 
subject of a disciplinary proceeding. He was suspended 
from membership in die State Bar in October, 1993 for 
failure to pay membership dues, and that suspension 
continues. The referee in this proceeding, Attorney 
Janet A. Jenkins, made findings of feet pursuant to die 
stipulation of the parties. 
[*4071 In January, 1993, on his.guilty plea to five 
counts of possession of marijuana containing THC and 
an Alford plea to one count of cocaine possession, 
Attorney Penn was found guilty and convicted of six 
misdemeanors..Sentence was withheld and Attorney 
Perm was placed on probation for three years, with six 
months in the county jail with [***3] Huber 
privileges, and ordered to perform 200 hours of 
community service. 
[**527] While acting as district attorney, Attorney 
Penn was involved in referral and prosecution in 
criminal proceedings of nine persons who previously 
had used an illegal drug with him or had personal 
knowledge of his illegal drug use. The referee 
concluded that Attorney Penn thereby represented his 
client, die State, when that representation might have 
been or was materially limited by his own interests, in 
violation of die conflict of interest rule, SCR 20:1.7(b). 
n l 
•Footnotes-
nl [HN1]SCR 20:1.7 provides, in pertinent 
part: Conflict of interest: general rule 
(b) A lawyer shall not represent a client if 
the representation of that client may be 
materially limited by the lawyer's 
responsibilities to another client or to a 
third person, or by the lawyer's own 
interests, unless: 
(1) die lawyer reasonably believes the 
representation will not be adversely 
affected; and 
(2) the client consents in writing after 
consultation. When representation of 
multiple clients in a single matter is 
undertaken, the consultation shall include 
explanation of the implications of the 
common representation and die advantages 
and risks involved. 
- End Footnotes- • 
1***4] 
In February, 1990, while at a tavern, District Attorney 
Penn encountered the defendant in a pending felony 
drug case and discussed the case out of the presence 
and without the consent of the defendant's [*408] 
attorney. The referee concluded that his doing so 
violated SCR 20:4 J2.n2 
- Footnotes « 
n2 [HN2]SCR 20:42 provides: 
Communication with person 
represented by counsel 
In representing a client, a lawyer shall not 
communicate about the subject of the 
representation with a party the lawyer 
knows to be represented by another lawyer 
in die matter, unless die lawyer has the 
consent of the other lawyer or is authorized 
by law to do so. 
•EndFootnotes-
Ih February, 1994, after he had left office as district 
attorney, Attorney Perm's blood and urine samples 
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taken following-a trafBc^ stop disclosed the presence of 
cocaine metabolite and marijuana metabolite. He then 
was charged with having possessed cocaine and he 
entered into a deferred prosecution agreement 
In respect to the drug possession conviction and the 
subsequent charge resulting [***51 in Ac deferred 
prosecution agreement, the referee concluded that 
Attorney Perm committed criminal acts reflecting 
adversely on his honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a 
lawyer in other respects, in violation of SCR 20:8.4(b). 
n3 
Footnotes 
n3 [HN3]SCR 20:8.4 provides, in pertinent 
part: Misconduct 
It is professional misconduct for a lawyer 
to: 
(b) commit a criminal act that reflects 
adversely on the lawyer's honesty, 
trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in 
other respects; 
End Footnotes 
As discipline for Attorney Pcnn's professional 
misconduct, the referee recommended a two-year 
license suspension. The referee took into account the 
aggravating factor of Attorney Peon's position of chief 
law enforcement official in the county and the feet that 
his use of illegal drugs frequently occurred in the 
company of persons subject to prosecution by his 
office for non-drug criminal offenses. The referee also 
acknowledged [*409] as mitigating circumstances 
Attorney Penn's voluntarily having ceased practicing 
law in 1992 and his acceptance 1***6] of 
responsibility for his misconduct and genuine remorse 
for it 
We adopt die referee's findings of fact and conclusions 
of law concerning Attorney Penn's professional 
misconduct and determine that the recommended two* 
year license suspension is appropriate discipline to 
impose for i t We emphasize that in order to have his 
license to practice law reinstated, Attorney Penn will 
have to establish, among other things, that his conduct 
since the license suspension has been exemplary and 
above reproach, that he has a proper understanding of 
and attitude toward the standards imposed on lawyers 
and that he will act in conformity with those standards, 
and- that he safely can be recommended to the legal 
profession, the courts and die public as a person fit to 
be consulted by others and to represent them and 
otherwise act in matters of trust and confidence. SCR 
22.28(4). 
IT IS ORDERED feat die license of Attorney David V. 
Penn to practice law in Wisconsin is suspended for a 
period of two years, commencing the date of this order. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that wifliin 60 days of 
the date of this order David V. Penn pay to the Board 
of Attorneys Professional Responsibility the costs of 
this proceeding, [***7] [**528] provided that if the 
costs are not paid within the time specified and absent 
a showing to this court of his inability to pay the costs 
within that time, the license of David V. Perm to 
practice law in Wisconsin shall remain suspended until 
further order of the court 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that David V. Perm 
comply with the provisions of SCR 22.26 concerning 
the duties [*410] of a person whose license to practice 
law in Wisconsin has been suspended. 
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VIA Facsimile (801) 531-9912 OFRCEOF 
& Hand Delivered PROFESSIOMALCQHBUCT 
Billy L.Walker 
Senior Counsel 
Office o f Professional Conduct 
Utah State Bar 
645 South 200 East, Suite 205 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-3834 
Re : R a y Harding, Jr. 
Dear Mr. Walker 
Thank you for speaking with me yesterday. A s I indicated, I w a s surprised to read the 
"Screening Panel Memo" w e received from your office on January 16, 2004 , after w e had faxed 
you our witness list. I was surprised because o f my previous conversations with you wherein I 
thought that your office was not seeking disbarment in this case. Additionally, I have not 
practiced regularly before Screening Panels but my experience has almost always been that the 
Screening Panel Memo is an objective report to the Screening Panel. The Screening Panel 
M e m o in this matter is argumentative and takes issue with every one o f our anticipated defenses 
and mitigation. Finally, I believe I have been told by your office on several occasions that the 
poaching charge did not relate to the practice o f law and therefore would not be a material part o f 
the hearing. H i e Screening Panel Memo indicates otherwise. 
W e are caught slightly off guard by the Screening Panel M e m o and its rather harsh 
treatment of Ray. In that respect I wish to address certain matters as follows: 
T H E P O A C H I N G C H A R G E 
Y o u have indicated on page 3 o f the Screening Panel M e m o that Ray Harding, Jr. 
allegedly killed a trophy moose and t w o (2) c o w elk on October 6 , 2 0 0 1 . Y o u have indicated on 
page 10 o f the Screening Panel Memo that Ray may have violated Rule 8.4(c) (misconduct) by 
committing that crime. Ray is innocent o f that crime, and there has never been even a probable 
cause determination before any adjudicative body that he committed that crime. We believe he 
SKORDAS & CASTON, LLC. 
Billy L. Walker, Senior Counsel 
Re: Ray Harding, Jr. 
January 21, 2004 
Page 2 
will ultimately be vindicated of that crime and also that at this point it is inappropriate for the 
Screening Panel to consider those allegations. They are unsubstantiated allegations raised by his 
ex-wife who arguably and perhaps understandably, is bitter and has every reason to try to hurt 
Ray as much as possible. 
MISDEMEANOR POSSESSION CHARGES 
You have correctly pointed out in the Screening Panel Memo that disbarment is generally 
appropriate under Rule 4.2(b) of the Standards for Imposing Lawyers Sanctions, when a person 
"engages in serious criminal conduct, a necessary element of which includes intentional 
interference with the administration of justice, false Swearing, misrepresentation, fraud, 
extortion, misappropriation, or theft; or the sale, distribution, or importation of controlled 
substances; or the intentional killing of another, or attempt or conspiracy or solicitation of 
another to commit any of these offenses.11 Mr Harding has never been charged with nor is there 
any chance that he will ever be convicted of such a crime. Utah Law recognizes a substantial 
difference between a person who possesses drugs and one who distributes them. It is obvious 
that one cannot possess drugs without procuring them illegally. However, the indication in your 
Screening Panel Memo that he may have committed the illegal act of soliciting controlled 
substances has already been taken into account by everyone involved in this case. He was never 
charged, nor will he ever be charged with solicitation or distribution of a controlled substance. 
AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES 
You have chosen to argue aggravating circumstances in the Screening Panel Memo. 
While it is certainly true that Ray was convicted of two (2) misdemeanor offenses, I believe that 
does not constitute a "pattern of misconduct.11 Certainly any drug abuse, especially one as severe 
as Ray suffered in 2002, took some period of time to develop. He was convicted of two (2) 
misdemeanor drug possession offenses. Given all that the government knew and the law 
enforcement discovered; that is essence of the criminal charges. Ray is currently on probation 
and it is my understanding that he has never violated even a single provision of that probatioa 
MITIGATION 
The Screening Panel Memo argues against the mitigation you believe we will be 
presenting. Specifically, you indicate that most of these mitigating factors "deserve little or no 
weight." The mitigating factors are listed in our rules so that they will be given weight We 
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intend that they be weighed appropriately by the Screening Panel and that evidence with respect 
to each of them is entirely appropriate. 
CONCLUSION 
Disbarment is not the appropriate remedy in this case. It appears more likely that 
suspension is the presumptive discipline. 
In light of the mitigation we intend to present, a lesser period of time for suspension or in 
the alternative, a stayed suspension given that Ray has not practiced at all in the last eighteen 
(18) months is probably more appropriate. I have provided with this letter a summary of 
American Law Reports and Law Reviews regarding attorney discipline as it may be effected by 
substance abuse, including alcoholism and drug abuse. Additionally, there are attached cases 
how narcotic convictions have been treated. That is, whether they are serious crimes or crimes 
involving "moral turpitude11 justifying disbarment. 
I apologize for the lateness of this, but again, I was caught a little off guard by the 
aggressive stance your office took in its Screening Panel Memo. 
Sincerely, 
SKORDAS& CASTON, LLC. 
GragoryHj. Skordas 
GGS/hy \ \ 
End. ^ - ^ 
American Law Reports and Law Reviews 
7 Anu Jur. 2d Attorneys at Law § 28 
American Jurisprudence, Second Edition 
Database updated May 2003 
Attorneys at Law 
Anne E. MeHey, JJD., of the staff of the National Legal Research Group, Inc. 
C Judicial Supervision of Legal Profession [§§13-135] 
A. Admission to Practice [§§13-29] 
2. Moral Character [§§24-29] 
§ 28. REHABELITATION OF MORAL CHARACTER 
Past misconduct sufficient to deny application for admission to the bar may be offset by a 
showing of rehabilitation of the applicant and of his or her current moral qualification for 
admission. [FN65] In some cases, however, an applicant is deemed to have foiled to show 
that his or her rehabilitation was sufficient to offset past misconduct. [FN66] 
When an applicant has previously committed acts of moral turpitude, the applicant bears 
the burden of demonstrating that he or she is rehabilitated and currently possesses the 
moral qualifications to be a member of the bar. [FN67] 
AMJURATTNYS§28 
END OF DOCUMENT 
39AJUEL4th567(1985) 
American Law Reports ALR4th 
BAR ADMISSION OR REINSTATEMENT OF ATTORNEY AS AFFECTED BY 
ALCOHOLISM^ 
Volume 39 (1985) 
8 3. Control of alcohol use as factor considered in granting reinstatement 
The courts in the following cases held that the feet that an attorney had gained control of 
his use of alcohol was a factor to be considered in granting him reinstatement to the bar. 
Where an attorney who had been disbarred because of his addiction to alcohol had 
applied for reinstatement and had presented persuasive evidence of rehabilitation, the 
court in Application of Lanahan (196T> 102 Ariz 19L 427 P2d 142 held that the 
application should be granted. The court found it significant that an administrative 
committee of the state bar had conducted an investigation of the applicant's personal and 
business activities from the time of his disbarment, and had reached a conclusion, 
supported by substantial evidence, that the attorney had been rehabilitated and was 
morally fit to practice law. 
Retroactive suspension for 4-year period ending just before date of court's opinion, with 
right to apply for reinstatement pursuant to applicable rules, was appropriate sanction for 
attorney whose inadequate representation of two clients was result of alcohol abuse 
where attorney had joined Alcoholics Anonymous and reinstatement was conditioned on 
attorney's abstaining completely from use of alcohol and drags for 2 years and his 
continuing his participation in Alcoholics Anonymous and state bar membership 
assistance program. In re Arrick (1994, Ariz^ 882 P2d 943. 176 Ariz Adv Rep 9. 
Attorney who had been suspended from practice for various violations stemming from 
alcohol abuse was entitled to reinstatement after demonstrating that problem was under 
control, and 2-year probationary period with some conditions related to alcohol was 
recommended by state bar as "safety net" rather than contingency of reinstatement. Inre 
Reinstatement of Blasnig (1995, Ariz) 890 P2d 1141. 
Reinstatement of attorney transferred to disability inactive status based on attorney's 
problems with alcohol would only be permitted upon showing of clear and convincing 
evidence that attorney's alcohol-related disability had been removed, and that attorney 
was once again competent to practice law. Rules Civ. Proa, Rule 241.23(a). People v. 
Coulter. 950 R2d 176 fColo. 1998V 
In The Florida Bar v Stewart (198L Flal 396 So 2d 170. the court approved the 
reinstatement of an attorney on the condition that he actively participate in Alcoholics 
Anonymous. The evidence established that the individual had been a successful and 
highly respected trial attorney, but for several years had been unable to control his use of 
alcohol The court pointed out that the attorney had admitted that he was an alcoholic, 
that he had voluntarily sought help for his addiction to alcohol by entering a drug abuse 
program, and that, according to his testimony, he had not had any alcohol for more than 2 
years. In addition, noted the court, numerous witnesses testified that the petitioner's 
previous inability to function as a lawyer had been the result of gross alcohol abuse, and 
that after being suspended and seeking treatment, he had rehabilitated himself and was 
now capable of assuming the responsibilities and trust of an attorney. Therefore, the court 
approved the referee's recommendation that the attorney, who had been suspended for 6 
months or until he proved his rehabilitation from alcoholism, be reinstated on the 
condition that he continue treatment for his alcoholism during a 2-year probationary 
period. 
Former attorney disbarred in 1984 did not establish his rehabilitation sufficient to warrant 
readmission, where attorney had been arrested for DUI in 1986 but did not join 
alcoholics' recovery program until 1994, after board of bar examiners raised question of 
attorneys drinking. Florida Bd. of Bar Examiners re: L.BLH.. 660 So. 2d 1046 fffa. 
1995). 
Where an attorney had been suspended from the practice of law because of his neglect of 
legal matters entrusted to him, which neglect was found to have been caused principally 
by his excessive use of intoxicating beverages, the court in Re Johnson (1979. Km) 608 
P2d 101L ordered that the attorney be reinstated to the practice of law where the 
evidence showed that he had been cured of his drinking problem and had totally 
abstained from the use of intoxicating beverages for several months, and the attorney 
testified that he would continue to totally abstain in the future. In addition, the court 
ordered that the newly reinstated attorney should continue to completely refrain from the 
use of all intoxicating liquor and beverages, and that if it should in the fixture come to the 
5 
attention of the court that he had resumed the consumption of alcoholic beverages, 
disciplinary action, including disbarment, could result without further formal proceedings 
of any kind. 
Attorney who had been indefinitely suspended from practice of law for excessive use of 
alcohol that had resulted in neglect of his law practice would be reinstated where 
disciplinary board was convinced that attorney had rehabilitated himself from his 
alcoholism and had maintained sobriety for four and one-half years. Re Johnson (1989^ 
244Kan59L770P2d842. 
Attorney who was placed on disability inactive status as result of professional misconduct 
arising from alcoholism would be reinstated to practice of law subject to being on 
probation for two years in compliance with recommended conditions of reinstatement, 
where respondent had undergone treatment for alcohol abuse and had succeeded for over 
period of one year to remain free of alcohol. Re Keil (199n 248 Kan 629. 809 P2d 531. 
Issuing bad checks, which were not honored by bank and were returned due to non-
sufficient funds on several occasions, warranted transfer to disability inactive status, 
where attorney's misconduct was directly related to and caused by his alcoholism and 
drag addiction, and attorney voluntarily sought treatment for his substance abuse 
problems and had completed successfiil recovery period. In re Dixon. 744 So, 2d 618 (La. 
1999). 
Petition for reinstatement of attorney who had been indefinitely suspended for at least 18 
months was denied, and any new petition would be subject to conditions requiring 
successful completion of his criminal probation following his conviction of aggravated 
driving while under influence of alcohol, continued proof of abstinence from all mood-
altering chemicals to date of any new petition for reinstatement, and minimum of one 
year sustained and successfiil full-time employment. In re Lilja. 557 N.W.2d 209 (Minn. 
1997V 
The recommendation of the state's Commission on Practice that an attorney be reinstated 
to the practice of law was accepted by the court in Re Herriott 0972^ 159 Mont 540,499 
P2d 807. where the attorney was shown to have been successfully treated for his 
alcoholism. The attorney had been disbarred primarily because of a larceny conviction 
which the court stated was for the most part caused by habitual intemperance. The 
individual had thereafter committed himself to a state hospital for treatment of his 
problem, and had completed the prescribed course at that institutioa The evidence also 
showed that he had maintained continuous sobriety for 2 years, had been steadily 
employed as a laborer, and had become an active member of Alcoholics Anonymous. 
After considering the many supporting letters and petitions from follow practitioners, the 
court concluded that under the circumstances, the evidence was sufficient to warrant the 
reinstatement of the attorney. 
State bar applicant would be admitted to practice law, subject to conditions designed to 
ensure applicant's continued sobriety, notwithstanding applicant's history of alcohol and 
narcotic abuse and criminal misconduct, where applicant completed substance abuse 
treatment program, continued to attend Alcoholics Anonymous and other support 
programs, and remained sober for three-year period prior to bar application, and where 
applicant produced medical and psychological evidence to establish that his chances for 
remaining sober were excellent Re Application of Strait H99(ft 120 NJ 477. 577 A2d 
149. 
Attorney suspended for one year for neglect of client matters and failure to cooperate 
with committee on professional standards, who applied for reinstatement on grounds that 
his alcoholism had caused problems and that he completed rehabilitation program and 
was participating in 15-week aftercare program but had application denied as premature 
in view of recent completion of rehabilitation program and continued involvement in 
aftercare, and who renewed request for reinstatement after completing aftercare, 
maintaining sobriety, and submitting evidence of progress and doctor's report that 
alcoholism did not result in impairment that would preclude him from practicing law, 
would be reinstated and suspension would be terminated, where attorney satisfied 
conditions set forth in decision denying previous application for reinstatement, where 
attorney demonstrated physical and mental fitness to resume practice of law, where 
misconduct which resulted in suspension occurred several years ago and did not involve 
moral turpitude or misappropriation of funds, and where attorney served nine months of 
his one-year suspension and committee on professional standards did not oppose 
tennination of suspension. Re Woods (1989. 3d Depfl ISO App Div 2d 987,542NYS2d 
797. 
Attorney indefinitely suspended from practice of law for numerous instances of 
misconduct would not be readmitted to practice, where attorney had not regularly 
received alcohol counseling. Toledo Bar ASSIL v DeMars H99(ft 56 Ohio St 3d 90.564 
NE2d43L 
In concluding that a disbarred attorney should be reinstated as a member of the bar of the 
state, the court in State ex rel Dabnev v Ledbetter (1933^ 162 Okla 20.18 P2d 1085. 
gave consideration to the feet that the attorney had made a complete reform with 
reference to his use of intoxicating liquor, the abuse of which had played an important 
part in his original disbarment, which was due to his disrespectful attack on and conduct 
toward the court 
Where an attorney, who had been disbarred because of several serious breaches of his 
duty as a member of the bar, presented evidence that he had lived a life of sobriety and 
industry since his disbarment, the court in Re Greenwood (1945) 22 Wash 2d 684.157 
P2d 591. ordered that he be reinstated to the practice of law. The evidence showed that 
the attorney had had a reputation as a lawyer of great learning and ability until he had 
become addicted to the excessive use of intoxicating liquor which had resulted in the acts 
of misconduct for which he was disbarred. In his petition for reinstatement, the attorney 
alleged that he had completely controlled his former desire for intoxicating liquor, and 
had been steadily employed in responsible positions, and earnestly desired an opportunity 
to rehabilitate himself as a lawyer. The court indicated that the petitioner's character, both 
before and after his disbarment, and his conduct subsequent to the disbarment were 
important factors, particularly as it was not denied that the petitioner had been recognized 
as a man of high character and a lawyer of integrity before he became an alcoholic, and 
therefore, his subsequent rehabilitation, which was not controverted, was entitled to 
consideration. In addition, the court noted that the court which had ordered the 
petitionees disbarment had expressed the hope that in the future he would demonstrate 
through right living and by abstaining from the use of intoxicating liquor that he was 
worthy of reinstatement to the bar. [FN3] 
The recommendation of the state's Board of Governors to reinstate an attorney was 
accepted by the court in Re Johnson (1979^ 92 Wash 2d 349, 597 P2d 113. where the 
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attorney was shown to have been rehabilitated and to no longer suffer from an addiction 
to alcohol The evidence showed that alcoholism had been a primary factor contributing 
to the attorney's loss of judgment which had caused him to commit the crime of grand 
larceny which had resulted in his being disbarred Explaining that the major consideration 
in reinstatement proceedings is whether the petitioner has affirmatively shown that he has 
overcome those weaknesses which produced his earlier misconduct, the court noted that 
after making several attempts to conquer his alcohol problem, the attorney had 
successfully undergone treatment approximately 5 years earlier and had since that time 
totally abstained from alcohol, which the court saw as proof of the success of the 
treatment. The court also considered the fact that the petitioner had at all times been 
sincere, frank, and truthful in discussing his alcoholism and the other factors relating to 
his disbarment and reinstatement. 
Reinstatement of a suspended attorney was ordered by the court in Re Livesev (198(fl 94 
Wash 2d 251.615 P2d 1294 on the basis of a showing by the petitioning attorney that he 
had sought treatment and no longer suffered from the alcoholism which had been the 
primary cause of the misconduct for which he was suspended. The petitioner had been 
suspended for foiling to process several cases and then, upon inquiry by a client 
concerning the status of a particular matter, falsely responding that it was proceeding 
satisfactorily. Following his suspension, the petitioner had sought psychiatric treatment, 
and the evidence showed that he had apparently made a remarkable recovery. The 
petitioner's doctors testified that he had completely abstained from the use of alcohol for 
more than 2 years and showed no signs of returning to his former drinking habits, and 
that alcohol was no longer a problem for him. In addition, the court noted that it had been 
furnished with numerous letters from Both professional and nonprofessional persons in 
the community, all attesting to the petitioner's dramatic physical and mental improvement 
and to the feet that he had overcome the weaknesses that had produced his earlier 
difficulties. 
Attorney was reinstated to practice where evidence, inter alia, included favorable 
testimony regarding attorney's integrity, legal competence, and rehabilitation from 
alcoholism, and attorney had 5-year certificate of sobriety from Alcoholics Anonymous; 
attorney would be subject to conditions and continue rehabilitation program with 
Alcoholics Anonymous. Lawyer Disciplinary Bd v Vieweg (1995. W Va) 461 SE2d 60. 
§ 4. Control of alcohol use as condition imposed upon fixture reinstatement at time of 
suspension or disbarment 
In the following cases, the courts conditioned the future reinstatement of an attorney who 
was suspended or disbarred upon his ability to get his use of alcohol under control. 
Attorney would be disbarred and would be required to undergo evaluation process of 
reinstatement proceeding before being allowed to practice law again, where he engaged 
in repeated misconduct, including abandonment of clients, practicing law while under 
suspension, and drunk driving, notwithstanding that attorney had been in alcohol 
rehabilitation program for approximately eight months at time of his hearing; such 
rehabilitation, while sustained, was not meaningful in light of attorney's repeated 
misconduct over years. In re Billings (1990) 50Cal3d 358.267 CalRptr319. 787 P2d 
617. 
Suspending an attorney indefinitely from the practice of law, the court in The Florida Bar 
v Blalock (1976. Fla) 325 So 2d 401. stipulated that he would be eligible for 
reinstatement only after he had demonstrated to the satisfaction of the court that he had 
been cured of his drinking problem. The record clearly demonstrated that the respondent 
attorney's professional misconduct was directly connected with his disease of alcoholism 
which had also led to financial, marital, and professional problems, said the court, while 
prior to the development of his dependency upon alcohol, his personal and professional 
conduct was ethical, competent, and responsible. If and when the suspended attorney is 
able to bring his dependency upon alcohol under his complete control, continued the 
court, he should be seriously considered for reinstatement to the practice of law. 
However, the court disregarded the referee's more specific recommendations that the 
attorney be required to actively participate in a continuing personal program controlling 
his disease of alcoholism, including the total abstinence from all forms of alcohol, as a 
condition to his reinstatement to the practice of law, and merely concluded that he must 
be able to prove that he had been rehabilitated as to his alcoholism in order to be eligible 
for reinstatement. 
In suspending an attorney for professional misconduct resulting from the effects of 
alcohol abuse, the court in The Florida Bar v Larkin T1982. Fla) 420 So 2d 1080. ruled 
that the attorney would be eligible for reinstatement after 91 days if he could at that time 
show that he had established full control ova: his problem with alcohol abuse. The court 
noted that it was clear from the facts of the case that the attorney's professional 
misconduct had stemmed totally from his drinking problem, and indicated its belief that if 
he could control his use of alcohol, he would be able to be restored as a fully contributing 
member of the legal profession. The court explained that it had a duty to protect the 
public from attorney misconduct, but stated that in those case where alcoholism was the 
underlying cause of the improper behavior and the individual attorney is willing to co-
operate in seeking alcoholism rehabilitation, these circumstances should be taken into 
account in determining the appropriate discipline. In conclusion, the court stated that a 
suspension for 91 days and until such time as the attorney establishes his rehabilitation 
should be sufficient to protect society while at the same time encouraging the individual 
to seek treatment. 
Attorney who received suspension for neglecting legal matter, failing to cany out 
employment contract, and intentionally prejudicing or damaging his client would not be 
reinstated unless he established alcoholic rehabilitatioa The Florida Bar v Alford (1983, 
Fla) 441 So 2d 615, 
After suspending an attorney's license to practice law for an indefinite period of time, the 
cnnit in rnmmittee on Professional Ethics & Conduct etc. v Sloan (1978, Iowa) 262 
NW2d 262, stated that if and when the attorney believed that he had his alcoholism under 
control and that he would continue to have it under control in the future, he might apply 
to the court for reinstatement, although reinstatement could not be guaranteed. The 
attorney had conceded that he had been an alcoholic for a number of years, and that at 
times he had suffered from acute alcoholism which had rendered him incompetent to 
practice law. The court also explained that if the attorney could prove that his alcoholism 
was under control, his reinstatement would include a probationary period of 2 years 
during which he must totally abstain from the consumption of intoxicating beverages, and 
if any such beverage were consumed by him, his license would be revoked. 
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In suspending an attorney's license to practice law for an indefinite period of time, the 
court in Committee on Professional Ethics & Conduct of The Iowa State Bar Asso. v 
Rabe (1979. Iowa^ 284 NW2d 234. also provided that he could apply to the court for 
reinstatement after 6 months if he could prove that his alcoholism had been cured. After 
having consumed a quantity of alcoholic beverages, the attorney had attempted to steal 
several items from a department storey and was subsequently convicted of fourth-degree 
theft of property, which resulted in his suspension from the practice of law. The evidence 
showed that the attorney had had a severe problem with alcohol and was apparently under 
its influence at the time he committed the misconduct in question. The attorney testified, 
however, that since that time he had joined Alcoholics Anonymous and attended the 
meetings frequently and worked with other professionals who were combating alcohol 
problems. Because of the attorney's efforts to cope with his alcohol problem and 
rehabilitate himself the court decided not to disbar him, but to merely suspend him, and 
specifically provided that if after 6 months he could establish that he had his alcoholism 
under control and that the control would extend into the future, and if his conduct during 
the period of suspension had been good, the court might reinstate his license. 
In Committee on Professional Ethics & Conduct of Iowa State Bar Asso. v Bergren 
(1980. Iowa> 300 NW2d 85. the court suspended an attorney as a result of his alcoholism 
and related misconduct, but stated that if and when he believes he has his alcoholism 
under control, and if upon application he establishes that the control of his alcoholism 
will extend into the future, the court may then reinstate his license. The court apparently 
considered it significant that although the attorney had not as yet been able to control his 
drinking, he had at least made sincere attempts to do so. 
Although the respondent attorney was suspended indefinitely, the court in Attorney 
Grievance Com, v Finlavson (1982^ 293 Md 156.442 A2d 565. 39 ALR4th 562. stated 
that the suspension was without prejudice to the attorney's right to apply immediately for 
reinstatement if he could meet certain conditions pertaining to his alcoholism. The 
evidence showed that the attorney had seriously neglected several matters which clients 
had brought to him, and the court ruled that his numerous violations of various 
disciplinary rules made it necessary to suspend him. However, the court stated that the 
attorney had at one time been a very active and able member of the bar whose problems 
were primarily due to the fact that he had become an alcoholic, and expressed a desire to 
assist him in his rehabilitation as an individual and as an attorney. The court pointed out 
that although the attorney freely admitted that he was an alcoholic, the evidence showed 
that he had consumed no alcoholic beverages in nearly a year, and that he had sought 
professional treatment from several organizations, including Alcoholics Anonymous and 
a counseling program established by the state bar association. The disease of alcoholism 
is such that those who say and believe that they are cured do not always remain so, 
reasoned the court, and it would be necessary to monitor the respondent's progress 
carefully should he in the future be reinstated. Thus, the court concluded that the 
respondent attorney would be eligible for reinstatement in the future only if he continued 
to participate in the counseling program sponsored by the state's bar association, 
maintained an active membership in and participation with Alcoholics Anonymous, and 
became associated with another member of the bar who would monitor his activities as a 
practicing lawyer and report any failure by the respondent to act promptly on behalf of 
his clients. 
Attorney's future reinstatement after indefinite suspension would be conditioned on his 
abstaining from consumption of alcoholic beverages, participating in such rehabilitative 
activities as might be prescribed by bar association, operating with association to work 
out program for having his practice monitored with submission of periodic reports to 
association, and paying all costs incurred in original disciplinary proceeding. Attorney 
Grievance Com, v Shaffer (19861305 Md 19(X 502 A2d 502. 
Attorney who had been indefinitely suspended and whose misconduct was substantially 
related to his dependence on alcohol would be reinstated subject to certain conditions, 
including counseling, participating in Alcoholics Anonymous, and monitoring of his 
practice by a member of the bar. In re Reinstatement of Grier. 356 Md, 142.737 A.2d 
1076 (1999Y 
Where an attorney was suspended indefinitely from the practice of law due to misconduct 
which resulted from the fact that he was an alcoholic who had been unable to control his 
drinking problem, the court in Re Application of Satterlee (1973) 296 Minn 515.207 
NW2d 362. gave the attorney permission to apply for reinstatement when he is able to 
show that he has his drinking problem under control. When charged with failure to attend 
to matters entrusted to him as an attorney and deliquencies in payment of his state and 
federal taxes, the court related, the attorney admitted that he was an alcoholic and that as 
long as he continued to be such, he would be incompetent to practice law. The court 
noted, however, that the administrative director who had commenced the disciplinary 
proceeding had stated that the individual in question was a competent lawyer when he 
was not drinking, and therefore the court concluded that at such time as the attorney is 
able to present testimony from an expert in the treatment of alcoholics that he has had his 
drinking problem under control for such time as to make it probable that he would 
continue to be able to refrain from the use of alcohol, reinstatement would be appropriate. 
The court in Re Stearns f 1976) 309 Minn 548.243 NW2d 312. held that an attorney who 
was to be suspended from practice for misappropriating the funds of two clients could 
petition for reinstatement to the bar after one year, provided the petition included a 
showing that he had undergone appropriate medical treatment and abstained from the use 
of alcohol during that period, and that there was a substantial likelihood, supported by 
competent medical evidence, that his alcoholism was and would remain arrested. It was 
undisputed that the attorney's derelictions stemmed from alcoholism, said the court, and 
that prior to the incidents in question, the attorney had been a person of ability, integrity, 
and good moral character. The court also noted that the attorney himself had disclosed Ids 
improprieties to the state's Board of Professional Responsibility before any complaint had 
been filed against him, and had made restitution of the sums which he had appropriated, 
and that he recognized his need for medical treatment and rehabilitation. Under the 
circumstances, the court concluded that the attorney should be suspended from the 
practice of law, but expressed its opinion that he would be an appropriate candidate for 
reinstatement once he was cured of his alcoholism. 
Noting that attorney's trouble stemmed from chronic alcoholism, that he was not evil or 
dishonest man, that, if his alcoholism could be arrested, he could be restored as 
contributing and worthy member of Minnesota bar, but that, while he continued to drink, 
he was not fit to practice law and public must be protected, court ordered indefinite 
suspension from practice of law with provision that attorney might petition for 
reinstatement, but only upon meeting following conditions, among others: (1) that he 
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submit to physical and psychological examinations requested by referee, (2) that he 
undertake long-term treatment and rehabilitation for alcoholism, (3) that no petition for 
reinstatement be made before attorney could show total abstinance from use of alcohol 
for at least one year following treatment, and (4) that, if no petition for reinstatement be 
made by January 1,1985, director might petition court to make indefinite suspension 
permanent in form of permanent disbarment Re Disciplinary Action against OfHara 
(1983. Minn) 330 NW2d 863. 
Attorney who was on probation and failed, inter alia, to abstain from alcohol or to verify 
attendance at Alcoholics Anonymous meetings, would be indefinitely suspended from 
practice for period of at least six months, and, as condition for reinstatement, would be 
required to provide evidence that he had abstained from alcohol and other mood-altering 
chemicals for at least one year, had attended Alcoholics Anonymous meetings weekly, 
and had continued regular chemical dependency counseling. Re Application for 
Discipline of Kroening (1986. Minn) 397 NW2d 335. 
Attorney's misconduct in refusing to return clients' telephone calls, misrepresenting to 
client that child custody modification hearing had been continued, agreeing to temporary 
change of custody and suspension of child support obligations to obtain continuance 
without client's consent, neglecting another client's case, and trust account violations 
warranted indefinite suspension from practice of law, with no possibility of reinstatement 
for 18 months, and with reinstatement conditioned upon factors including abstinence 
from use of alcohol during period of suspensioa Code of Prof Resp., DR1- 102(A)(1,4, 
5), DR 6-101(A)(3), DR 9-102(A)(l, 2), (BX3,4). State ex rel Nebraska State Bar Ass'n 
v. PulleiL 260 Neb. 125.615 N.W.2d 474 f2000V 
An attorney who was suspended as a result of various acts of misconduct which were said 
to have been caused by his drinking problem was held by the court in Jubicv New York 
State Bar Asso. (1974^ 46 App Div 2d 843,361 NYS2d 709. to be eligible to apply for 
reinstatement after one year on the condition that he submit satisfactory medical evidence 
of his rehabilitatioa The suspension had resulted because of misconduct consisting of 
neglect of claims, deception of clients, failure to respond to the inquiries of clients, and 
failure to co- operate with the investigation of complaints received from clients, but the 
attorney testified that his acts were unintentional and had resulted from a drinking 
problem for which he had undergone medical treatment, therapy, and counseling. In 
granting the attorney leave to apply for reinstatement after a period of suspension, the 
court stated that he would be required to submit proof that he had become physically and 
mentally capable of once again engaging in the practice of law. 
Upon application for reinstatement to Bar after six-month suspension of practice of law, 
applicant should demonstrate that he has taken appropriate and effective steps to maintain 
his sobriety and to prevent recurrence of kinds of professional misconduct which led to 
suspension. Re Conine (1990,3d Deprt 167 App Div 2d 657. 564 NYS2d 202. 
Office of Disciplinary Counsel appropriately recommended indefinite suspension from 
practice of law on evidence that attorney had effectively abandoned his law practice and 
offices, and had failed to take adequate steps to protect his clients or to insure that 
pending legal matters would be properly handled by other counsel, as result of his serious 
abuse of drugs and alcohol, but was without authority to recommend that suspension be 
stayed and attorney be placed on professional probation for 2 years. Although Board's 
attempt to design form of probationary discipline might well have merit, if such 
probationary discipline is to be adopted, it should be adopted formally by way of 
amendment to Supreme Court rules for government of bar. Office of Disciplinary 
Counsel v Hiller (1983) 5 Ohio St 3d 237. 5 Ohio BR 498.450 NE2d 1157. 
Attorney who committed numerous acts of misconduct and who admitted he had serious 
chemical dependency problem in form of alcohol dependency would be indefinitely 
suspended from practice of law and in any application for reinstatement, court will look 
for proof that attorney resolved alcohol abuse problems. Office of Disciplinary Counsel v 
Gieeel (19901 56 Ohio St 3d 58. 564 NE2d 84. 
Attorney's misconduct in failing to act on behalf of clients, neglecting entrusted legal 
matters, failing to assist in disciplinary investigations, failing to appear in court on behalf 
of client, falsely representing that he had authority to reach settlement on behalf of client, 
and manufacturing and giving client "Report of Court Action" which appeared to give 
limited driving privileges to client who was appealing driver's license suspension 
warranted suspension from practice of law for two years, with one year stayed on 
conditions that attorney make restitution, enter arrangement with Ohio Lawyers 
Assistance Program (OLAP) relating to treatment for alcoholism, abstain from alcohol 
and drugs, be subject to random testing by OLAP, and attend recovery program. 
Government of the Bar Rule V, § 4(G); Code of Prof. Resp., DR1- 102(A)(3-6), DR 6-
101(A)(3), DR 7-101(A)(l, 2), DR 7-102(A)(5), DR 7-106(A), DR 9-102(BX4). Office 
of Disciplinary Counsel v. MaxwelL 83 Ohio St 3d 7. 697 N.E.2d 597 (1998). 
Where the decision was made to suspend an attorney because of his conduct in appearing 
in court on several occasions in an intoxicated condition to represent a client, the court in 
Re Complaint of Dibble (19701 257 Or 120.478 P2d 384. stated that if the attorney 
would make the decision to stop drinking and seek help and be rehabilitated, he might be 
readmitted to the practice of law. Two judges had testified that the attorney in question 
had appeared before them on several occasions in an intoxicated condition, and the court 
considered it significant that the attorney's alcoholism had resulted in misconduct in open 
court which it felt tended to bring the legal profession and the administration of justice 
into disrepute. Although the accused denied the charges and asserted that he was not an 
alcoholic and did not use alcohol to excess, he did admit that he was a problem drinker. 
The court recognized that in the absence of a course of intensive treatment as an 
alcoholic, which the accused had refused to accept, there was no reasonable assurance 
that he had permanently ended his drinking problem. Thus, the court ruled that the 
attorney could not be reinstated into the practice of law until he could affirmatively show 
that he had refrained entirely from the use of alcoholic beverages for a period of at least 
one year and that he was in all respects again able and qualified to resume his position as 
a member of the bar and that his resumption of the practice of law would not be 
detrimental to the bar or to the public interest. 
Attorney who was suspended for 63 days would be placed thereafter on three- year 
probation requiring that he refrain entirely from using alcohol, continue in alcoholic 
rehabilitation program, and permit bar association to monitor such compliance; attorney 
would be subject to summary suspension for violating these conditions. Re Conduct of 
Paauwe (19841298 Or 215.691 P2d 97. 
In Re Greenwood (194118 Wash 2d 722.111 P2d 79L the court disbarred an attorney for 
various professional misdeeds, but expressed the hope that he would in the future be able 
to demonstrate by abstinence from the use of intoxicating liquor that he was worthy of 
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reinstatement to the bar. fFN41 
Applicant was properly denied permission to sk for bar examination, where he freely 
admitted to three convictions for drunk driving and 32 traffic arrests, but doctor who 
evaluated applicant for Colorado bar examiners concluded that applicant was suffering 
from alcoholism and denial of his condition, and feet that applicant only began to abstain 
from alcohol and attend Alcoholics Anonymous meetings after receiving Board of Law 
Examiner's decision not to let him sit for examination indicated that finding of 
rehabilitation was not yet warranted. Frasher v West Virginia Bd. of Law Examiners 
(199L W Va^ l 408 SE2d 675, 
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NARCOTICS CONVICTION AS CRIME OF MORAL TURPITUDE JUSTIFYING- • • 
Volume 99 (1980) 
ARTICLE 
Some statutes and rules regulating the conduct of attorneys provide for disciplinary action 
if an attorney has engaged in conduct involving moral turpitude or has been convicted of 
a crime involving moral turpitude (as distinguished from statutes or rules which do not 
contain the "moral turpitude11 qualification, but which provide for disciplinary action if an 
attorney has been convicted of a felony). This annotation collects and analyzes the cases 
which have determined whether an attorney's conviction of a narcotics offense constitutes 
a crime of moral turpitude and thus justifies disbarment or other disciplinary action 
against the attorney. 
The reader is reminded that the annotation does not purport to state the statutory law or 
other applicable rules of any jurisdiction except insofar as they may be reflected in the 
reported cases within the scope of the annotation; the reader should therefore consult the 
latest relevant enactments in the jurisdiction of interest 
Most of the courts which have been confronted with the annotated issue have held that a 
narcotics conviction does justify disbarment or other disciplinary action, such as 
suspension from die practice of law for a period of time. The courts typically reason that 
an attorney is held to a high standard of conduct, particularly with respect to upholding 
the law, so that a conviction for such a criminal offense requires disciplinary action in 
order to protect the public, the courts, and the legal profession Some courts have held 
that various mitigating factors lessened the severity of the disciplinary action which 
might otherwise have been taken 
In Re Application ofShepard(1917) 35 CalApp 492,170 P 442, the court held that an 
attorney's federal conviction for conspiring to import opium involved moral turpitude 
justifying his disbarment under a statute authorizing the removal or suspension of an 
attorney upon a conviction of a felony or misdemeanor involving moral turpitude. The 
court said that even if opium were not subject to an import duty so that it could not be 
said that the attorney attempted to defraud the government out of revenue, the smuggling 
of smoking opium is on at least as low a moral plane as the smuggling of dutiable goods. 
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the court said, smoking opium has dysfunctional and degenerating effects upon the 
human body and the act of making the drug available for distribution cannot be 
reasonably differentiated from maiming a body with the intent to wreak harm upon it 
The court also said that the attorney became involved in the crime through his 
representation of clients who were charged with a similar crime, and that the public is 
entitled to protection from attorneys who are unable to resist the opportunities for 
dishonesty which their practice often presents. The court added that it made no difference 
that the attorney was convicted in a federal court, reasoning that jurisdictional lines did 
not affect the character of the act done. 
In Disciplinary Board of Hawaii Supreme Court v Bergan (1979, Hawaii) 592 P2d 814, 
the court ordered that the attorney's license to practice law be suspended for 5 years, upon 
evidence that the hearing committee of the state supreme court's disciplinary board had 
found that the attorney had engaged in conduct involving moral turpitude in that he 
knowingly and intentionally possessed cocaine with the intent to distribute it, for which 
he was convicted in federal court on his guilty plea. The court rejected the disciplinary 
board's recommendation of disbarment, however, in view of the mitigating factors that 
the attorney (1) had served his time in a penal institution and had suffered the ignominy 
of a criminal conviction; (2) was still subject to parole restrictions; (3) had earned the 
respect and confidence of his business associates upon being paroled; (4) had 
demonstrated his commitment to self- rehabilitation by engaging in an extensive drug 
rehabilitation program while imprisoned; (5) had displayed candor, co-operation, and 
repentance throughout the disciplinary proceedings and a willingness to accept 
punishment for his misconduct; and (6) had voluntarily undergone psychiatric treatment 
after his commission of the offense, with a favorable prognosis. 
Acknowledging that there may be problems in defining moral turpitude since acts which 
are defined as crimes do not always involve an element of moral turpitude, the court m 
Re Gorman (1978, Jnd) 379NE2d970, held, however, that an attorney's federal felony 
conviction of possession with intent to distribute cocaine, distribution of cocaine, and 
conspiracy to distribute cocaine did involve moral turpitude. The court said that the issue 
did not involve the nature of the drug, and thus the court rejected the attorney's 
contention that the use of cocaine is neither addictive nor injurious to health so that his 
involvement with it could not be said to involve a lack of moral fitness. The issue for 
determination, the court said, was the attorney's moral fitness to continue practicing law. 
Accepting the definition of moral turpitude as baseness, viieness, or depravity in the 
private and social duties which persons owe to each other and to society, the court said 
that the attorney's conduct was an attempt to place himself above the law and superior to 
societal judgment and was thus base, vile, and depraved. The court noted that the 
attorney's conduct was not the act of an experimenting youth, but involved the 
introduction, without apparent regard for the consequences, of a controlled substance into 
a marketplace often occupied by children and adolescents. Accordingly, the court 
concluded that disbarment, the strongest sanction available, must be imposed in order to 
preserve the integrity of the bar and to demonstrate the court's total and absolute disfavor 
with the attorney's actions. 
In Butler County Bar Asso. v Schemer (1961) 172 Ohio St 165,15 Ohio Ops 2d 320, 174 
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NE2d 103, the court held that a county bar association's findings that an attorney who had 
been convicted of state felonies of (1) obtaining a narcotic drug by forging a prescription, 
and (2) uttering a false prescription for a narcotic drug had been convicted of a crime 
involving moral turpitude, and that the bar association's recommendation that the attorney 
be suspended from the practice of law indefinitely was not unreasonable. The court 
rendered judgment accordingly. 
In Munizv State (1978, TexCivApp 13ihDist) 575SW2d408, 99ALR3d277, writrefnr 
e, the court held that an attorney's federal felony convictions, on his guilty pleas, of 
unlawfully conspiring to import marijuana and conspiring to possess with intent to 
distribute marijuana, were felonies involving moral turpitude under a statute mandating 
disbarment for the conviction of such crimes, because, the court said, this type of activity: 
(1) affects the morals of the community in which an attorney lives; (2) tends to lessen 
public confidence in the legal profession; and (3) is morally reprehensible conduct on the 
part of a licensed attorney. The court said that moral turpitude had been variously defined 
as anything done knowingly contrary to justice, honesty, principle, or good morals, or an 
act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private and social duties which persons owe 
to each other or to society in general The court said that the term "moral turpitude" 
implies something immoral in itself; regardless of whether it is punishable by law. 
Whether a particular crime involves moral turpitude, the court said, is to be determined 
by a consideration of the nature of the offense as it bears on the attorney's moral fitness to 
continue in the practice of law. The court said that in determining this issue, 
consideration must be given to the fact that the illegal act was committed by an attorney 
as compared to a layperson, for an attorney must be held to a more strict standard because 
of the position of public trust which an attorney enjoys. Because a lawyer assumes a 
position of responsibility to the law itself the court said, any serious disregard of the law 
by him or her is much more grave than that by the layperson who may breach the law 
innocently or otherwise. The court also said that it made no difference that the Texas 
Penal Code did not contain prohibitions similar to those for which the attorney was 
convicted under federal law, since the relevant statute mandated disbarment upon 
conviction in any trial court of any felony involving moral turpitude. 
On the other hand, in Re Higbie (1972) 6 Cal 3d562,99 CalRptr 865, 493 P2d97,^ 
qpurt held t t o an attorney's conviction for failure to pay a marijuana transfer tax gT^rol 
^mfiM^mFMIfcfiun^^l per se and thus did not justify a disbarment or suspension, 
because (1) possession priiise^ofithe dru 
:mbra^aod(2) although 
the use of marijuana for illicit traffic could be considered abase crime, it was not dear 
that the attorney became involved in the smuggling operation to traffic marijuana. The 
court pointed out that the federal statute under which the attorney was convicted did not 
require wrongful intent or intent to defraud the government, and the court said that 
without such intent, the failure to pay the tax did not involve moral turpitude. However, 
the court said, the attorney's conduct in assisting and counseling a conspiracy to smuggle 
marijuana did involve moral turpitude because the attorney disregarded the legitimate 
public concern that attorneys not use their legal knowledge to counsel or assist clients to 
violate the law. Thus, the court said, these actions by the attorney involved moral 
turpitude because they demonstrated his unsuitability to be entrusted with the privileges 
and duties of the legal profession. Disbarment was not warranted, however, the court 
said, in light of the mitigating fectors that: (1) the attorney's actions were prompted by a 
desire to assist a client who was in financial difficulties and did not grow out of a motive 
of personal financial gain; (2) the attorney's actions did not cause any particular 
individual to suffer physical or financial harm; (3) the attorney displayed honesty and co-
operation when he was arrested; (4) the attorney indicated a recognition of his wrongful 
conduct and a willingness to rehabilitate himself in forgoing possible meritorious 
defenses (such as entrapment) to both the conspiracy and tax evasion charges; (5) the 
client whom the attorney was trying to help encouraged the attorney's growing 
involvement in the smuggling operation in order to obtain a bounty offered by the United 
States Customs Service; and (6) the attorney had no prior disciplinary record and enjoyed 
a good reputation among his clientele and the members of his community. Accordingly, 
the court ordered that the attorney be suspended from the practice of law for 2 years, the 
first year to be actual suspension, followed by a year's probation during which he would 
be permitted to practice law. 
Court Cases Involving Disciplinary 
Action Against Attorney's for Use and/or 
Possession of Alcohol/Drugs 
In re Cohen (1974) 
113 Cal Rptn 485,11 CaUd 416,521 P2d 477 
the court held that an attorney's conviction, on his guilty plea, for possession of marijuana 
for sale involved moral turpitude, upon evidence that: (1) the attorney was 
unquestionably aware of the laws proscribing the possession and sale of marijuana; (2) 
the attorney acknowledged that he knew he was in violation of the law; and (3) at the 
time of his arrest the attorney was representing a person who was charged with 
possession of marijuana and restricted dangerous drugs. The court said that the facts 
showed that the attorney had failed to abide by the oath he had taken when admitted to 
practice, to support the laws of the state and to maintain the respect due to the courts of 
justice. In determining the degree of discipline to be imposed upon the attorney, the court 
considered the feet that the attorney had no prior record of discipline, that his wrongful 
acts did not grow out of a motive for personal enrichment, and that he displayed honesty 
and co-operation when he was arrested. Accordingly, the court ordered that the attorney 
be suspended from the practice of law for 3 years, the first 2 years to be actual 
suspension, followed by a year of probation during which he would be permitted to 
practice law.. 
In Re Kreamer (1975) 
14 Cal 3d 524,121 Cal Rptr 600,535 P2d 728 
the court held that an attorney's convictions on his guilty pleas to the federal offenses of 
illegal possession of marijuana (a misdemeanor) and of conspiracy to distribute 
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marijuana (a felony) justified a finding that moral turpitude was involved, on 
incontroverted evidence that: (I) the attorney was aware of the laws proscribing the 
possession and distribution of marijuana; (2) he was a principal and not merely an advisor 
in both enterprises which gave rise to the conviction; and (3) he entered into the 
enterprises at least in part for financial gain. Considering that the purpose of a 
disciplinary proceeding is not punitive but is to inquire into the fitness of an attorney to 
continue in that capacity so that the public, the courts, and the legal profession will be 
protected, the court said that although the federal offenses were serious ones and reflected 
on the attorney's character as a member of the legal profession, there were numerous 
mitigating factors present, including: (1) the attorney had had no prior disciplinary 
proceedings brought against him; (2) his involvement in the marijuana offenses was 
largely motivated by a domestic financial crisis; (3) the attorney was young and 
committed the offenses during a period of protracted emotional difficulties; (4) the 
offenses were not committed in his capacity as an attorney and wore not in any way 
related to his practice of law; (5) extensive and uncontroverted testimony was given by 
professional colleagues as to the attorney's rehabilitation, his return to a more normal life, 
his value to the profession, and his past and present good moral character; (6) a letter was 
presented from the attorney's federal probation officer expressing optimism with respect 
to the attorney's future success and urging that he not be severely punished; and (7) the 
attorney's candid and co- operative behavior was evident throughout the disciplinary 
proceedings. Accordingly, the court concluded that adequate discipline would be a 3-year 
suspension which would be stayed in favor of placing the attorney on probation for that 
period 
In re Gardner 
625A.2d293 
D.C4993. 
Decided May 27,1993. 
However, consistent with our prior decisions, w^Ma that simple possessiontof cocaine 
po^not constitute TOnauCTmyo ana, therefore, there was no 
violation of DR 1-1Q2(A)(3) 
Board recommended to this court that reciprocal discipline not be imposed pursuant to 
D.CBarILXI,§ll(cX5). 
In this jurisdiction, a lawyer who commits misconduct which was substantially affected 
by alcoholism or addiction to legal drugs, lawfully obtained, would be disciplined unless 
the lawyer could show by clear and convincing evidence that he/she was substantially 
rehabilitated from his addiction. In re Kersey, 520 A.2d 321 (D.C.1987); In re Temple, 
596 A.2d 585 (D.C.1991), If he/she could make a showing of rehabilitation, he/she 
might be placed on probation for a lengthy period with monitoring to detect relapses. By 
contrast, Respondent will be practicing under no such supervision. 
Case Law 
In re Lock 
54S.W-3d305 
Tex.,2001. 
Decided June 21,2001 
44Tex.Sup.CtJ.934 
Attorney appealed Board of Disciplinary Appeals' (DODA) determination that she was 
subject to compulsory discipline for being placed on probation, without an adjudication 
of guilt, for possession of a controlled substance. The Supreme Court, Hankinson, J., held 
that attorney was required to be disciplined in the standard grievance process. 
Reversed and remanded 
Justice HANKINSON delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice 
PHTTIIPS, Justice ENOCEL Justice BAKER, Justice QT^ML, and Justice JEFFERSON 
joined 
The issue in this appeal from a judgment of the Board of Disciplinary Appeals (BOD A) 
concerns the appropriate disciplinary procedure to be followed when a licensed Texas 
attorney is convicted of or placed on probation with or without an adjudication of guilt 
for possession of a controlled substance. We must decide whether discipline in this 
instance is mandatory under the compulsory discipline process, or whether BODA may 
consider a range of sanctions based on the facts underlying the alleged misconduct as part 
of the standard grievance process. 
Paula Ann Lock, a licensed Texas attorney, pleaded guilty to possession of a controlled 
substance, a third-degree felony, in violation of Texas Health & Safety Code § 
481.115(c). The trial court deferred further proceedings without an adjudication of guilt, 
ordered her to pay a $500.00 fine, and placed her on community supervision for six years. 
Through the Chief Disciplinary Counsel, the State Bar of Texas commenced compulsory 
discipline proceedings against Lock pursuant to Part Vm of the Texas Rules of 
Disciplinary Procedure. See TexJL Disciplinary P. 8.01-.08. reprinted in Tex. Gov't 
Code, tit 2, siibtit. G app. A-l. After a hearing, BODA held that Lock, having been 
placed on probation for possession of a controlled substance without an adjudication of 
guilt, had been convicted of an intentional crime, as defined by disciplinary rule 1.06(0). 
BODA suspended Lock for the term of her criminal probation and held that if her 
criminal probation is revoked, she should be disbarred pursuant to Texas Rule of 
Disciplinary Procedure 8 . 0 6 ^ ^ ^ J ^ » ^ ^ ^ i r t g s M k ^ ^ f f l ^ 
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moral turpitude, and therefore, on the facts of her case, she was not convicted of an 
inteMSMjcrunff We agree that under Texas1 disciplinary scheme, Lock is not subject to 
compulsory discipline, but that her actions may be reviewed and sanctioned following the 
standard grievance procedures. We therefore reverse BOD A's judgment and remand the 
case to BODA for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
As the question before us is which of the two available disciplinary procedures is the 
appropriate way to review Lodk*s conduct, we begin with an overview of the disciplinary 
system. The Texas Rules of Disciplinary Procedure provide two procedures by which a 
licensed attorney may be disciplined: compulsory discipline, delineated in Part VIII, or 
the standard grievance procedures outlined in Parts II and DI See In re Birdwell 20 
S.W.3d 685. 687 fTex.2000). Compulsory discipline is reserved for when an attorney has 
been convicted of or received deferred adjudication for an "intentional crime," as that 
term is defined in the rules; in all other instances of alleged attorney misconduct, 
discipline is determined in the standard grievance process. See generally TexJL 
Disciplinary P. Part II, Part ID, Part VOL 
The salient distinction between the two procedures for purposes of this appeal is that the 
compulsory discipline process admits no discretion. Compulsory discipline for an 
intentional crime turns solely on the record of conviction, the criminal sentence imposed, 
and the factual determinations that the attorney is licensed to practice law in Texas and is 
the party adjudged guilty. See Tex.R. Disciplinary P. 8.04. 8,05.8.06. An attorney guilty 
of an intentional crime must be either suspended or disbarred—depending *307 solely on 
whether the attorney's criminal sentence was probated—without regard for any collateral 
matters, and without any consideration or inquiry into the facts of the underlying criminal 
case. See Tex.R. Disciplinary P. 8.05.8.06. 
The standard grievance process, unlike the compulsory process, affords some discretion. 
In the standard grievance process the attorney has the opportunity to present the facts 
underlying the alleged misconduct The reviewing body that hears the evidence and 
imposes sanctions—whether an investigatory or evidentiary panel or district court-may 
also consider any mitigating circumstances in determining the appropriate degree of 
discipline. See Tex.R. Disciplinary P. 2.13T 2,17.3.09.3.10. In the standard grievance 
process, the rules permit the reviewing body to disbar the offending attorney, but also 
make available a range of lesser sanctions, including various types of suspension and 
reprimand. See TexJt Disciplinary P. 1.06m. 
Apparently concluding that the elements of Lock1 s crime satisfied the rules1 definition of 
an intentional crime, the Office of Chief Disciplinary Counsel invoked the compulsory 
discipline process against Lock. Thereafter, BODA suspended Lock for the term of her 
probation. Whether compulsory discipline was the appropriate disciplinary procedure 
depends on the nature of Lock's offense, specifically, whether possession of a controlled 
sub stance is an intentional crime. See Tex.R. DisdpKnaryP. 8.01. To hold that 
possession of a controlled substance is an "intentional crime,11 by definition BODA had to 
conclude that it is a "[sjerious [cjrime that requires proof of knowledge or intent as an 
essential element." Tex.R. Discinlinarv R L06fOV Further, BODA concluded as a matter 
of law that Lock's crime qualified as a "serious crime" as that term is defined by rule 
1.06(U\ Under the disciplinary rules, "serious crime" means: 
barratry, any felony involving moral turpitude; any misdemeanor involving theft, 
embezzlement, or fraudulent or reckless misappropriation of money or other property; or 
any attempt, conspiracy, or solicitation of another to commit any of the foregoing crimes. 
TexiL Disciplinary P. 1.06(01 Possession of a controlled substance is neither barratry 
nor a misdemeanor involving theft, embezzlement, or misappropriation of money or other 
property; BOD A thus implicitly concluded that it is a felony involving moral turpitude. 
Therefore, to determine whether the Bar properly invoked the complusory-discipline 
procedure against Lock, we must review its core conclusion that her crime was one of 
moral turpitude. 
The conclusion that a particular crime involves moral turpitude is one of law. See In re 
Thacker. 881 S.W.2d 307,309 frex.1994^: State Bar of Tex, v. Heard 603 S.W.2d 829. 
835 (Tex.19801 We review BODA's legal conclusions de novo. Birdwell 20 S.W.3d at 
687. We have also established that to determine whether a crime is an intentional crime, 
thus permitting the Bar to pursue the compulsory discipline process, we look solely to the 
elements of the crime, and not to any collateral matters, such as an attorney's record of 
service and achievement, orto the underlying facts of the criminal case. Duncan v. Board 
of Disciplinary Appeals, 898 S.W.2d 759,762 (Tex. 1995^ (attorney convicted of 
misprision of felony not subject to compulsory discipline because BOD A could not 
determine if the attorney committed an intentional crime without looking to the 
underlying facts); In re Humphreys. 880 S.W.2d 402.406-07 (Tex. 1994^ (attorney 
convicted of tax evasion subject to compulsory discipline because *308 tax evasion is an 
intentional crime involving "deliberate greed and dishonesty and has a specific 
connection to a lawyer's fitness to practice11). 
See Birdwell 20 S.W.3d at 688: Duncan 898 S.W.2d at 761: Humphreys. 
880 S.W.2d at 408. Therefore, under the analysis we established in Humphreys and 
Duncan we look solely to the elements of Lock's crime to determine if those elements 
involve any of the kinds of acts or characteristics encompassed within our definition of 
moral turpitude. The elements of the applicable criminal statute are that the defendant 
knowingly or intentionally possessed a controlled substance listed in Texas Health & 
Safety Code 6 481.102. Seel&L Health & Safety Code S 481.115fa>. i ^ a s l l 
As we explained in Humphreys, quoting from the comment to rule 8.4 ("Misconduct") of 
the American Bar Association's Model Rules of Professional Conduct, not all crimes 
implicate fitness to practice law: "Many kinds of illegal conduct reflect adversely on 
fitness to practice law.... However, some kinds of offense carry no such implication... 
Although a lawyer is personally answerable to the entire criminal law, a lawyer should be 
21 
professionally answerable only for offenses that indicate lack of those characteristics 
relevant to law practice." 880 S. W.2d at 407. 
The Rules of Professional Conduct define "fitness11 as denotftng] those qualities of 
physical, mental and psychological health that enable a person to discharge a lawyer's 
responsibilities to clients in conformity with the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional 
Conduct. Normally a lack of fitness is indicated most clearly by a persistent inability to 
discharge, or unreliability in carrying out, significant obligations. 
TEX. DISCIPLINARY R. PROPL CONDUCT terminology. This definition of fitness 
plainly contemplates that some review of particular facts or a course of conduct may be 
necessary before one can conclude that an attorney should be professionally answerable 
for a particular offense or pattern of offenses. We simply cannot determine whether an 
attorney's conduct reveals "a persistent inability to discharge, or unreliability in carrying 
out, significant obligations" without looking to the facts of the case. The Rules of 
Disciplinary Procedure clearly limit compulsory discipline to, among other specified 
crimes, "any felony involving moral turpitude." By contrast, the Rules Governing 
Admission to the Bar dictate that anyone convicted of or who receives deferred 
adjudication for "a felony" is "conclusively deemed not to have present good moral 
character and fitness," and must wait five years after the completion of any sentence or 
period of probation before filing a declaration of intent to study law or application to take 
the bar exam. TEXR. GOVERN. B AR ADMTtf IV(d), While we could change the 
disciplinary rules to likewise say that an attorney should be professionally answerable by 
compulsory discipline for any crime or any felony, we are not permitted to judidally read 
the current express limitation, "involving moral turpitude," out of the disciplinary rules. 
Precisely because we are not permitted under our current disciplinary rules to consider 
any underlying facts in a compulsory *310 discipline proceeding, and because the Rules 
of Disciplinary Procedure limit compulsory discipline to felonies involving moral 
turpitude, the assertions in the dissenting opinion are likewise inapposite. In particular, 
every case cited in the dissenting opinion may be distinguished in that the attorney's 
conduct involved more than simple possession, the jurisdiction does not have a 
comparable compulsory procedure that looks only at the elements of the crime in 
determining which disciplinary procedure to follow, or the ultimate tribunal looks at the 
underlying facts to determine the appropriate sanction. fFNl] In other words, the 
jurisprudence of almost every *311 state court with an opinion on the issue is that 
possession of a controlled substance may or may not be a crime of moral turpitude, 
depending on the circumstances. And our compulsory discipline rules prohibit 
consideration of the circumstances. We may change die rules, but until we do so we are 
constrained to follow those rules and the analysis we established in Humphreys and 
Duncan. [FN2] How other lawyers fared under different disciplinary systems in other 
jurisdictions amply does not help us answer the question before us in this case, which is 
not whether Lock should be disciplined, but which procedure the Bar should follow in 
pursuing that discipline. 
Because we would need to examine the drcumstances surrounding Lock's possession of a 
controlled substance to determine if she were unfit to practice law, which we are 
prohibited from doing under the compulsory discipline rules, !wi c^iot^concliid^tliO 
possession of W^^  cnme^pf moral turpitude petsgf Thus, Lock is 
not subject to compulsory discipline. Instead, Lock's misconduct should be reviewed and 
sanctioned under the standard grievance procedures. Our holding does not mean that an 
attorney who has pleaded guilty to possession of a controlled substance is immune from 
discipline or will necessarily receive the least possible sanction; we rely on the Bar to 
impose appropriate discipline, including suspension or disbarment when the facts so 
warrant, to protect the public from impaired attorneys, and to improve the reputation and 
integrity of the legal professioa However, the venue for that discipline is the standard 
grievance process. 
Our position is further supported by the existence of the Texas Lawyers1 Assistance 
Program. Among other things, TLAP provides peer intervention and rehabilitation to 
practicing attorneys whose professional performance is impaired because of chemical 
dependency. This service is available not only to lawyers who take part voluntarily, but 
also to lawyers who have been referred by family, friends, or other members of the bar. 
Impaired attorneys may participate in the program without being subject to disciplinary 
action. Infect, TLAP receives referrals from the State Bar's disciplinary system, but 
TLAP win not intervene in any disciplinary action, nor will it report an impaired lawyer 
to the disciplinary authorities. Therefore; it would be inconsistent for us to hold that 
possession of a controlled substance is a crime of moral turpitude, which means by 
definition that an attorney is categorically unfit to practice law, when the State Bar, under 
our ultimate supervision, sponsors a program to assist attorneys in overcoming addiction 
while the attorneys continue to practice law. 
In light of these considerations, we hold that an attorney convicted of or receiving 
deferred adjudication for possession of a controlled substance must be disciplined in the 
standard grievance process, where the underlying facts and any collateral circumstances 
can yield the appropriate sanction. We reiterate that our holding does not mean that a 
lawyer's possession or use of drugs should go undisciplined. Rather, a licensed Texas 
attorney convicted of or receiving deferred adjudication for possession of a controlled 
substance should be sanctioned in the standard grievance process. Accordingly, we 
reverse BODA's judgment and remand the case to BODA for fiirfher proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. 
Tex.,2001. 
In re Lock 
54 S.W.3d 305,44 Tex. Sup- Ct 1 9 3 4 
END OF DOCUMENT 
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In re Discipline of Ashton 
768F.2d74 
CJL3(Pa.),1985. 
Decided July 16,1985 
After testimony was concluded Ashton's counsel advanced the legal argument that it was 
not proper to confront him for the first time at this hearing with rumors based on hearsay, 
and expect him to meet them in the hearing. A. 155- 56. Throughout the argument the 
panel member who expressed strong dissatisfaction with the state Disciplinary Board 
proceedings indicated that the rumors (about which no one testified) bore on Ashton's 
reputation. Ashton's counsel attempted, with little success, to convince the panel that the 
relevant inquiry, under Local Rule 1(d), was Ashton's present "moral and professional 
character11 The transcript contains numerous indications that one panel member found 
more relevant an anticipated adverse public reaction to Ashton's readmissioiL Two panel 
members acknowledged, however, that under the governing legal standard of In re 
Dreier, 258 R2d 68 (3d Cir.1958), the district court should not deny admission to an 
attorney who has been readmitted to the state Bar unless the district court finds that the 
attorney is not presently of good moral and professional character. A. 163-65. 
The transcript of testimony before the state Disciplinary Board and the transcript of 
testimony of the witnesses who testified before the ad hoc panel establishes not merely a 
prima facie case, but a rather strong case that Ashton, since joining Alcoholics 
Anonymous, has ceased alcohol abuse, and has become a person of good moral and 
professional character. 
The ad hoc panel filed a report to the fall court on April 19,1983. Aside from a listing of 
witnesses, the entire report states: 
Some of the witnesses testified that they had known Mr. Ashton for a long time, felt that 
his problems were caused by alcoholism, but that he is now reformed and is capable of 
practicing law. 
The district court requires applicants to its Bar to offer satisfactory evidence of their good 
moral and professional character. Local Rule 1(d). Since that is the standard which the 
court adopted by rule, we need not consider whether, had some more stringent standard 
been adopted, it would conflict with Matter ofAbrams, 521 F.2d 1094 (3d Cir.1975). 
Applying the standard of Local Rule 1(d), on this record, Ashton established a prima 
facie case of present good character. The only relevant reason advanced by the district 
court for concluding that he is not entitled to admission to the B ar is a reason on which 
the ad hoc panel made no finding, and which is in any event not supported by the record 
evidence. That being the case, there is no rational basis for the district court's order 
denying Ashton's application for admission. This alone is ground for reversal, and it is 
not necessary to address Ashton's further contentions that the procedures adopted by the 
ad hoc panel are inconsistent with the due process requirements of In re Ruffcdo, 390 U.S. 
544,88 S.Ct 1222,20 LJEd2d 117 (1968). 
The order appealed from will be reversed and the district court will be directed to grant 
Ashton's motion for admission to its Bar. 
C.A.3 (Pa.),1985. 
In re Discipline of Ashton 
768F.2d74 
Opinion on rehearing, 
3dCir..769F.2dl68. 
SUR PETITION FOR REHEARING 
GIBBONS, Circuit Judge. 
The petition for rehearing filed by appellant in the above entitled case, 768 F.2d 74-
having been submitted to the judges who participated in the dedsion of this court and to 
all the other available circuit judges of the circuit in regular active service, and no judge 
who concurred in the decision having asked for rehearing, and a majority of the circuit 
judges of the circuit in regular active service not having voted for rehearing by the court 
in banc, the petition for rehearing is denied 
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Ray Harding, Jr. Case No. 03-0417 
RESPONDENTS SCREEOTNG PANEL WITNESS LIST 
The Respondent, Ray Harding, Jr., hereby submits that the following witnesses will be 
called at the Screening Panel Hearing currently scheduled for Thursday, January 22,2004, 
commencing at 1:00 p.m. By this document the Respondent has attempted to provide the Panel 
with the approximate time each witness will be providing testimony, the name and relationship 
of the witness to the Respondent, and what information the testimony is anticipated to provide: 
1:30 p.m. 
Dr. Lynn Johnson, 261-1412, may appear in person. 
Psychologist for Ray Harding. 
Meets with Ray regularly 
Involved with Ray's aftercare through the Betty Ford Clinic. 
6.3(b) absence of a dishonest or selfish motive; 
6.3(c) personal or emotional problems; 
6.3(d) timely good faith effort to make restitution or to rectify the consequences of 
the misconduct involved; 
6.3(g) good character or reputation; 
6.3(1) mental disability or impairment, including substance abuse when: 
6.3(i)(l) The respondent is affected by a substance abuse or mental disability; and 
6.3(i)(2) The substance abuse or mental disability causally contributed to the 
misconduct; and 
6.3(i)(3) The respondent's recovery from the substance abuse or mental disability 
is demonstrated by a meaningful and sustained period of successful rehabilitation; 
and 
6.3(i)(4) The recovery arrested the misconduct and the recurrence of that 
misconduct is unlikely. 
Dr. (HenR. Hanson, 581-3174, may appear in person. 
PhD, DDS, Director of Utah Addiction Center. 
6.3(1) mental disability or impairment, including substance abuse when: 
6.30(1) The respondent is affected by a substance abuse or mental disability; and 
6.3(5(2) The substance abuse or mental disability causally contributed to the 
misconduct; and 
6.3(iX3) The respondent's recovery from the substance abuse or mental disability 
is demonstrated by a meaningful and sustained period of successful rehabilitation; 
and 
6.3(i)(4) The recovery arrested the misconduct and the recurrence of that 
misconduct is unlikely. 
Francis Mackenzie, 381-4148, will appear in person. 
Met Ray through drug rehabilitation about one (1) year ago. 
Sees Ray regularly about four (4) times per week. 
6.3(g) good character or reputation; 
6.3(1) mental disability or impairment, including substance abuse when: 
6.30(1) The respondent is affected by a substance abuse or mental disability; and 
6.30(2) The substance abuse or mental disability causally contributed to the 
misconduct; and 
6.30(3) The respondent's recovery from the substance abuse or mental disability 
is demonstrated by a meaningful and sustained period of successful rehabilitation; 
and 
6.30(4) The recovery arrested the misconduct and the recurrence of that 
misconduct is unlikely; 
6.3(e) full and free disclosure to the client or the disciplinary authority prior to the 
discovery of any misconduct or cooperative attitude toward proceedings; 
6.3(m) remorse. 
Richard Uday, 579-0404, will appear in person 
Head of Utah State Bar's Lawyers Helping Lawyers Program. 
Will testify about Ray's involvement with that Program. 
6.3(d) timely good faith effort to make restitution or to rectify the consequences of 
the misconduct involved; 
6.3(e) full and free disclosure to the client or the disciplinary authority prior to the 
discovery of any misconduct or cooperative attitude toward proceedings; 
6.3(g) good character or reputation; 
6.3(i) mental disability or impairment, including substance abuse when: 
6.3(f)(1) The respondent is affected by a substance abuse or mental disability; and 
6.3Q(2) The substance abuse or mental disability causally contribute^ to the 
misconduct; and 
6 3 0 ( 3 ) The respondent's recovery from the substance abuse or mental disability 
is demonstrated by a meaningful and sustained period of successful rehabilitation; 
and 
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6.3 (i)(4) The recovery arrested the misconduct and the recurrence of that 
misconduct is unlikely; 
6.3 (m) remorse. 
DordKynaston, (801) 369-3281, (801) 423-3338, will appear tdephonically. 
Ex husband of Ann Harding. 
Will testify as to her credibility. 
Judge Fred Howard, (801) 429-1113, (801) 429-1054, may appear tdq>honically. 
Fourth District Court Judge. 
Saw Ray regularly during the time he was a sitting Judge. 
Never felt that he was under the influence. 
Never thought he smoked crack cocaine at the Court 
Judge Claudia Laycock, (801) 429-1071, will appear tdephonically. 
Fourth District Court Judge. 
Saw Ray regularly during the time he was sitting Judge. 
Never felt that he was under the influence. 
Never thought he smoked crack cocaine at the Court. 
3:00 p.m. 
Paul Belnap, (801) 560-9758 (cdl), (801) 532-7080 (work), will appear tdephonically. 
Attorney at Strong & Hanoi 
Appeared in Judge Harding's Court several times. 
6.3(g) good character or reputation. 
John Allen, (801) 375-8800, will appear tdephonically. 
Former Deputy Utah County attorney. 
Appeared in Judge Harding's Court regularly. 
Never observed inappropriate behavior or anything which would lead him ta condude 
Ray was ever under the influence while on the bench. 
6.3(g) good character or reputation. 
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Thomas W. Sdler, (801) 375-1920, may appear in parson. 
Attorney at Robinson, Seiler. 
6.3(g) good character or reputation. 
Rick J. Sutherland, (435) 645-6156, will appear telephonically. 
Attorney at Law. 
Wrote letter of January 17,2004. 
6.3(g) good character or reputation. 
Ed Brass, 322-5678, will appear telephonically. 
Ray's attorney throughout the criminal process. 
Was present in Court in July, t, 2002, will testify contraiy to anticipated testimony of 
Mariane O'Biyant 
6.3(e) full and free disclosure to the client or the disdplinaiy authority prior to the 
discovery of any misconduct or cooperative attitude toward proceedings; 
6.3(e) foil and free disclosure to the client or the disciplinary authority prior to the 
discovery of any misconduct or cooperative attitude toward proceedings; 
6.3(m) remorse. 
Sheleigh A. Chalkey-Harding, 651-1901,347-0143, may appear in person. 
Attorney and friend of Ray. 
63(g) good character or reputation; 
63(1) mental disability or impairment, including substance abuse when: 
63(f)(1) The respondent is affected by a substance abuse or mental disability; and 
63(i)(2) The substance abuse or mental disability causally contributed to the 
misconduct; and 
63(i)(3) The respondent's recovery from the substance abuse or mental disability 
is demonstrated by a meaningful and sustained period of successful rehabilitation; 
and 
63®(4) The recovery arrested the misconduct and the recurrence of that 
misconduct is unlikely; 
63(m) remorse. 
4 
Mike Petro, (801) 362-1760, will appear tdephonically. 
Attorney at Young, Kester & Petro. 
Appeared in Judge Harding's Court regularly. 
Never observed any conduct which would lead him to condude that Ray was under the 
influence while on the bench. 
6.3(g) good character or reputation. 
4:00 p.m. 
Shauna Young Woodward, (801) 429-1067, will appear tdephonically. 
Judge Harding's In-Court Cleric 
Will testify that she never observed Ray under the influence or using drugs while on the 
bench. 
6.3(g) good character or reputation. 
Dave Sturgill, (801) 370-8026, will appear tdephonically. 
Deputy Utah County Attorney. 
Appeared in Judge Harding's Court regular}/. 
Never observed any conduct that would lead him to conclude Ray used drugs while on 
the bench. 
6.3(g) good character or reputation. 
Michelle Monson, (408) 349-6123, will appear tdephonically. 
Ray's daughter. 
6.3(c) personal or emotional problems; 
63(g) good character or reputation; 
6.30 mental disability or impairment, including substance abuse when: 
6.30(1) The respondent is affected by a substance abuse or mental disability; and 
6.3(F)(2) The substance abuse or mental disability causally contributed to the 
misconduct; and 
6.30(3) The respondent's recovery from the substance abuse or mental disability 
is demonstrated by a meaningful and sustained period of successful rehabilitation; 
and 
6.30(4) The recovery arrested the misconduct and the recurrence of that 
misconduct is unlikely; 
6.3(m) remorse. 
5 
Nicole Farnsworth, (801) 794-0278, will appear in person. 
Ray's daughter. 
63(c) personal or emotional problems; 
6.3(g) good character or reputation; 
6.3(i) mental disability or impairment, including substance abuse when: 
6.30(1) The respondeat is affected by a substance abuse or mental disability; and 
6.3(i)(2) The substance abuse or mental disability causally contributed to the 
misconduct; and 
6.3(i)(3) The respondent's recovery from the substance abuse or mental disability 
is demonstrated by a meaningful and sustained period of successful rehabilitation; 
and 
6.3^(4) The recovery arrested the misconduct and the recurrence of that 
misconduct is unlikely; 
6.3(m) remorse. 
5:00 p.m. 
James Heiting, (909) 682-6400, will appear by telephone. 
Attorney at Heiting & Irwin. 
Ray's mentor and sponsor during his current care. 
6.3(g) good character or reputation; 
6.3 (I) mental disability or impairment, including substance abuse when: 
6.3(i)(l) The respondent is affected, by a substance abuse or mental disability; and 
6.30(2) The substance abuse or mental disability causally contributed to the 
misconduct; and 
6.3(L)(3) The respondent's recovery from the substance abuse or mental disability 
is demonstrated by a meaningful and sustained period of successful rehabilitation; 
and 
6.3(iX4) The recoveiy arrested the misconduct and the recurrence of that 
misconduct is unlikely. 
Ray Harding, Jr., Respondeat. 
Respectfully submitted this Z7* day of J d u t e , 2004. 
ft 
SKORDAS1& CASTON, LLC 
Gregory tj. Skordas 
IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
00O00 
In Re: Ray Harding, Jr. Case No. 20020535-SC 
ORDER OF REFERENCE 
Pursuant to Rule 6. Rules of Lawyer Discipline and 
Disability, this Court has the exclusive authority to review the 
licensure status of Ray Harding, Jr., a former Utah District 
Judge, in connection with facts arising during his judicial 
tenure, summarized in the recommended Order of Removal from 
Office of Judicial Conduct Commission, Case No. 200300173-SC, and 
the accompanying stipulation and record. The Court therefore 
requests the Office of Professional Conduct of the Utah State Bar 
to proceed with a disciplinary review under its ordinary rules, 
but with its conclusions and recommendations regarding Mr. 
Harding's license to practice law to be submitted directly to 
this Court for final action. 
Date 7 
For The Court: 
Christine M. Durham 
Chief Justice 
O0O0G1 
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ooOoo 
PAT BARTHOLOMEW 
CLERK OF THE COURT 
I n Re: Ray H a r d i n g , J r . Case No. 20020535-SC 
ORDER 
Pursuant to this Court's Order of Reference, dated March 25, 
2003, zne Court: has received a copy of the decision of Screening 
Panel C-l, including its findings, conclusions, and 
recommendation for discipline in this matter, along with the 
entire evidentiary record before the Panel. Inasmuch as the 
court now intends to review the case in order to make a final 
determination regarding what sanction is appropriate in this 
matter, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 
1. Ray Harding, Jr. is suspended from the practice of law 
pending a final disposition by this Court; 
2. This matter will be placed on the Court's oral argument 
calendar for May 6, 2004, at 9:00 a.m. 
3. The parties ( Mr. Harding and the Office of Professional 
Conduct of the Utah State Bar ) are requested to file briefs 
with the Court regarding the appropriate disciplinary 
sanction to be imposed. The parties should be aware that the 
Court intends to consider the full range of disciplinary 
sanctions available. 
The schedule for briefing will be as follows: 
Simultaneous opening briefs are due to be filed on or before 
April 5, 2004. Simultaneous reply briefs ( optional )to be filed 
on or before April 22, 2004. The briefs and oral argument shall 
conform to the applicable Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
For The Court: 
Date [/ / Christine M. Durham 
Chief Justice 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I certify that on the 13 th day of February 2004, I mailed a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing Order, postage prepaid, to 
the following addresses: 
Billy L. Walker 
Senior Counsel 
Office of Professional Conduct 
645 South 200 East, Suite 205 
Salt Lake City, Utah 8 4111-3834 
Gregory G. Skordas 
Attorney At Law 
9 Exchange Place #1104 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Date CJ^f) • tf. 20OV 
Pat H. Bartholomew 
Clerk of Court 
Re: Ray Harding Jr. 
Case No, 20020535-SC 
